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PATTERNHOOD, CORRELATION, AND GENERALITY: 
FOUNDATIONS OF A PEIRCEAN THEORY OF PATTERNS 
This thesis develops a general theory of patterns on the basis of the philosophy of Charles S. 
Peirce. The main questions with which this thesis is concerned are: what is the ontological status of 
patterns? In what does their reality consist in? Why does exhibiting patternhood seem to be a nec-
essary condition for the very possibility of cognition? The development of the theory is motivated 
by a discussion of Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), a theory that has recently been gaining attention 
in analytic philosophy of science, especially in philosophy of physics. The central claim of OSR is 
that only patterns (structures) are real; individual objects are not real, or have only a “thin” being in 
some sense. In this thesis I deal mainly with the version of OSR developed by James Ladyman and 
Don Ross in their book Every Thing Must Go. I address two criticisms that are commonly levelled 
against OSR, (1) that it cannot give an adequate account of the difference between physical struc-
ture and mathematical structure, and (2) that it cannot give an adequate account of the relationship 
between the world and our representations of the world. I then show how Peirce’s philosophical 
framework, as encapsulated in his pragmatism, theory of the categories, Scholastic realism, and 
theory of the continuum, could provide an answer to these difficulties. OSR will also be used to 
illuminate an aspect of Peirce’s philosophy which I believe has not been sufficiently emphasized in 
the literature, namely its structuralist aspect. Specifically, it will be shown that Peirce’s philosophy 
leads to a worldview very similar to that of OSR, via a path of reasoning that is completely different 
from those standardly used to argue for OSR. This thesis as a whole is an attempt to throw light on 
the nature of patternhood through an elucidation and justification of this path of reasoning, which I 
call the alternative path to OSR. 
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Introduction 
The central question with which this thesis is concerned is: what is a pattern? Everything that we 
experience in this world seems to have some sort of pattern, a regularity by which we are able to 
make sense of the things and events around us, and respond to them in appropriate ways. This is not 
to deny that there are purely random events, such as the “snow” noise that appears on analog TVs 
receiving no transmission signal. But even such noise must display some kind of regularity—in the 
case of the TV static, the noise is displayed on a TV screen, which is itself a regularity in space and 
time (and other dimensions, as we shall see), the noise consists of black and white pixels of the 
same size and shape, the distribution of black and white across a sufficiently large area is uniform, 
etc.—otherwise we would not be able to perceive the noise at all. It is true that the noise itself is not 
a regularity, yet it can be discerned only against the backdrop of a series of regularities. Exhibiting 
regularity seems to be a condition for the very possibility of cognition; but why should this be the 
case? What kind of mode of being does a pattern have? Furthermore, is there anything in the world 
that is not a pattern? 
This thesis will be concerned primarily with the philosophy of Charles S. Peirce, in particular his 
pragmatism, theory of categories, and ideas on continuity. We shall see how Peirce can guide our 
way through the seemingly intractable maze of issues surrounding the concept of patternhood, and 
why it is no exaggeration to characterize him as a philosopher of patterns. 
But before delving into Peirce’s philosophy, I would first like to take my point of departure in a 
theory called Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), a theory which has recently been gaining attention in 
analytic philosophy of science, especially in philosophy of physics. It was developed in the late 
1990s by the British philosophers of science James Ladyman and Steven French, partly as a radi-
calization of the position called “structural realism” defended by John Worrall in the context of the 
scientific realism debate (Worrall 1989), and partly as a metaphysical theory motivated by the find-
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ings of contemporary physics. In this thesis I will deal mainly with the version of OSR developed 
by Ladyman and Don Ross (the latter being an interdisciplinary scholar who does work on issues 
lying at the boundary between microeconomics, neuroscience, and philosophy) in their book Every 
Thing Must Go (Ladyman, Ross, et al. 2007; hereinafter abbreviated as ETMG).1 As suggested by 
the title of the book, OSR is a theory that holds that only structures are real—individuals are not 
real. In Chapter 1 we shall discuss in more detail how we should understand the notions of structure 
and individual, as well as the main thread of argumentation that Ladyman and Ross give to support 
their version of OSR. 
Ladyman and Ross use the terms “pattern” and “structure” synonymously, and so will I, alt-
hough I prefer the term “pattern” because “structure” tends to evoke the image of a fixed, static en-
tity, which in my view represents only a particular species of pattern. Another merit of the term 
“pattern” over “structure” is its inseparable connection with observation. As pointed out by Dennett 
(1991: 32), a pattern, by definition, must be a candidate for pattern recognition—an incognizable 
pattern is a contradiction in terms. The term “structure,” on the other hand, tends to evoke the image 
of an entity capable of subsisting independently of any relation with an observing mind; this is a 
crucial issue that we shall return to repeatedly throughout the thesis. My preference notwithstanding, 
I will continue to use both “pattern” and “structure” interchangeably, since the latter term is the one 
established in the philosophy of science literature. I believe there will be no danger in such a usage, 
as long as we keep in mind the caveats noted above. 
                                                            
1 Every Thing Must Go is co-authored by four authors: James Ladyman, Don Ross, John Collier, 
and David Spurrett; Collier being a contributor to Chapter 4 and Spurrett being a contributor to 
Chapters 1 and 5. However, since Ladyman and Ross are displayed as the main authors on the 
cover and title page, I shall simply refer to the authors of the book as “Ladyman and Ross.” Col-
lier, by the way, has written several papers on Peirce, particularly in connection with biosemi-
toics. 
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My reason for taking up OSR in this thesis is twofold. The first is to bring into relief the diffi-
culties involved in thinking about patterns from the standpoint of a nominalist metaphysics. The 
main proponents of OSR, James Ladyman, Don Ross, and Steven French (Ladyman’s mentor), 
argue for OSR using arguments from the philosophy of contemporary physics. They have a vague 
sense that patterns can be real, but they seem to lack the philosophical framework necessary for 
understanding what a pattern is, and thereby fall into the confusion of conceiving of patterns on 
the model of individuals, as I shall argue in this thesis. My taking up of OSR is meant to bring 
into relief this confusion and motivate our solution to it—a solution that will draw upon the ideas 
and resources of Peirce’s philosophy. The other reason why I take up OSR is because I believe its 
central thesis, that only patterns are real, contains a deep truth about the constitution of our uni-
verse. The proponents of OSR, however, do not seem to realize this. The “deep truth” that I speak 
of has to do with what I will call the alternative path to OSR, a path of reasoning that suggests 
itself from the basic tenets of Peirce’s philosophy, and which is completely different from the 
arguments standardly used to argue for OSR. I will return to the alternative path to OSR later in 
this Introduction. 
Despite the counter-intuitiveness of its central claim, OSR has gained many followers over the 
years; but it has also been subject to a myriad of criticisms. One of the most serious objections lev-
eled against OSR, in my view, is that it fails to give a sufficient account of the difference between 
mathematical structure and physical structure (e.g. Cao 2003; van Fraassen 2006). Is it possible to 
explain the difference between mathematical structure and physical structure in purely structural 
terms? A table, according to OSR, is not an individual object but a pattern, a regularity in the phe-
nomena that can be discerned at certain grains of observational resolution. Now if we stumble into 
the pattern known as a table, it blocks our progress and injures us (Harman 2010: 782). Apparently 
we cannot “stumble into” a mathematical pattern in the same way. OSR must somehow explain this 
 5 
difference. However, neither the authors of ETMG nor any of the other proponents of OSR seem to 
have addressed this issue satisfactorily. Ladyman and Ross are candid about this: in ETMG they 
simply “refuse to answer” the question as to what the difference between mathematical and physical 
structure consists in (ETMG: 158). Steven French does no better than this. In his recent tome, The 
Structure of the World (French 2014), he devotes an entire chapter to the question, but, as far as I 
am able to make out, fails to offer a compelling answer. In this connection, French’s response to 
Matteo Morganti’s (2011) accusation that OSR conflates general properties such as “bosonness” 
and “fermionness” with actual bosons and fermions is revealing: “I am suspicious of talk of ‘ac-
tual’ properties of ‘actual’ particles when the notion of ‘actual’ remains unarticulated” (French 
2014: 197). Of course, it is the burden of the OSRist, not the opponent of OSR, to provide such 
an articulation; and French’s proposals involving “trope theory” and “mereological bundle theory” 
are inadequate. I will discuss this issue in more detail in Chapter 1.4. 
A related issue concerns the notion of representation. Namely, when OSR claims that only 
structures are real, is it insisting that only the mathematical or formal structures embodied in our 
theories are real, or is it insisting that only the extra-representational structure of the world in itself, 
represented by those theories, is real? Being committed to realism, one would expect the OSRists to 
opt for the latter route, that only the extra-representational structure of the world in itself is real. But 
this gives rise to the problem of how to understand truth—when is a representation a true represen-
tation of the structure of the world? Should truth be understood in terms of an isomorphism between 
the representation and the world? But this is nonsense; isomorphism can only be defined to hold 
between mathematical structures. What exactly do we mean by the “world in itself” in the first 
place? Confronted with the question raised at the beginning of this paragraph in an interview, 
Ladyman responds: “this question gets to the heart of the matter and I must confess that I am not 
sure what the answer to it is” (Ladyman 2009: 166). Similarly, in response to the accusation that 
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OSRists are unable to give an appropriate account of the relationship between representations and 
the world in terms of those very representations, French simply dodges the issue by remarking that 
“all current forms of realism must face this accusation, not just OSR” (French 2014: 195.fn7). 
I submit that both of these difficulties faced by OSR stem from a flawed understanding on the 
part of its proponents of what it means for something to be real. This flaw, in turn, is carried over 
into their conception of structure, as I hope to show in this thesis. What makes the OSR of Ladyman 
and Ross attractive is the way it breaks with the modes of thinking that philosophers trained in the 
analytic tradition of metaphysics are accustomed to.2 Ladyman and Ross do not mince words in 
their criticism of analytic metaphysics. The Preface to ETMG begins: “contemporary analytic met-
aphysics … fails to qualify as part of the enlightened pursuit of objective truth, and should be dis-
continued” (vii). Again: “We think the current degree of dominance of analytic metaphysics within 
philosophy is detrimental to the health of the subject, and make no apologies for trying to counter it” 
(vii). Nonetheless, as we shall see in Chapter 1.4, they still work within the general framework of 
analytic philosophy of science, in particular the scientific realism debate. And this, I believe, is the 
fundamental source of OSR’s flaw. What is needed to counteract the analytic tendency in the 
thought of Ladyman and Ross and complete their break with analytic metaphysics is a good dose of 
Peirce. 
This should not be taken to mean, however, that the illumination will be unilateral. Not only will 
Peirce’s philosophy illuminate the issues faced by OSR, but OSR will also serve as an excellent 
frame of reference from which we can see Peirce’s overall philosophy in a new light. Specifically, 
we shall see how Peirce’s philosophy leads to a worldview very similar to that of OSR, via a path of 
reasoning that is completely different from those standardly used to argue for OSR: this is the al-
                                                            
2 Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of French’s version of OSR, which is why I concentrate 
on Ladyman and Ross’s version in this paper. 
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ternative path to OSR that was mentioned earlier. In Chapter 2 we will lay the groundwork for this 
path of reasoning, by showing how pragmatism can be understood as a “structuralist” theory of 
meaning. First I outline the basic idea behind Peirce’s pragmatic maxim by distinguishing between 
two distinct formulations of the maxim, which I call the verificationist formulation and practicalist 
formulation, and by discussing their relationship. Then, I proceed to exhibit the structuralism em-
bodied in the maxim: it is structuralist in that it tells us to clarify our conception of objects in terms 
of the conceivable effects which they have in relation to other objects. 
In order to appreciate the depth of Peirce’s pragmatism, however, it is necessary to examine its 
interconnectedness with his theory of categories. Peirce’s theory of categories will therefore be the 
topic of Chapter 3. The aim of this chapter will be twofold: first, to exhibit the operation of the three 
categories, Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, within the thought process and show how this op-
eration manifests itself in the structuralism of the pragmatic maxim; and second, to show how the 
theory of categories can lead us to a conception of representation that does not fall prey to the se-
cond of the difficulties faced by OSR. My argument will focus on Peirce’s 1867 paper “On a New 
List of Categories.” After outlining the general strategy of his derivation of the categories in the 
paper, I will take up several competing interpretations of Peirce’s notion of Reference to a Corre-
late, which constitutes the second category, and offer my own interpretation. We shall then see how 
Thirdness may be understood as what may be called the pure power of gluing, that is, the power of 
bringing two hitherto detached objects of thought into relation. Finally, we shall see how the con-
cept of information can be understood from the standpoint of Peirce’s theory of categories. This will 
allow us to see both a striking congruence and difference between Peirce’s model of semiosis, or 
the sign process, and Ladyman and Ross’s model of the self-replication of patterns in Chapter 4 of 
ETMG. 
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In Chapter 4 we turn to Peirce’s Scholastic realism and see how it differs from realism as it is 
understood in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy, including OSR. After outlining Peirce’s 
arguments against nominalism, I show that “realism” in the Anglo-American sense is really a spe-
cies of nominalism in the Scholastic/Peircean sense. This will allow us to see that both of the diffi-
culties faced by OSR derive from the fact that it is straddling two incompatible metaphysics: insofar 
as it takes structures to be real, it is realist (in the Scholastic/Peircean sense), since structures must 
be general. But insofar as it subscribes to a correspondence conception of truth, it is conceiving of 
structures as actual existents rather than as indeterminate laws—or in other words it is conceiving of 
structures on the model of individuals—and is therefore nominalist. The only way for the OSRist to 
be logically consistent is to expunge the residue of nominalism from his system and embrace Scho-
lastic realism, which, as I will further argue, necessarily entails a form of idealism—an objective 
idealism, to use Peirce’s phrase (EP1: 293, 1891).3 
Our discussion in Chapters 3 and 4 will provide an answer to the second of the two difficulties 
faced by OSR, namely that it cannot give an account of the relation between our representations and 
the world in itself in terms of those very representations. Chapter 5 will be concerned mainly with 
how Peirce’s approach can solve the first of the two difficulties faced by OSR, namely that it cannot 
give an account of the difference between mathematical and physical structure. In order to answer 
this problem, it is necessary to delve into Peirce’s conception of continuity. My approach will be 
chronological, focusing on how Peirce’s conception of the continuum evolved over his lifetime. 
This approach, I believe, will put into relief the issues that motivated Peirce’s mature conception of 
the continuum as a “supermultitudinous” collection, a collection whose multitude is greater than 
that of any discrete multitude, and whose members are no longer distinct individuals but are “fused 
                                                            
3 For an explanation of the abbreviations used in referring to Peirce’s writings, see the list at the 
beginning of this thesis. 
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together.” We shall see the implications of Peirce’s mathematical theory of the continuum for the 
distinction between physical structure and mathematical structure, and we shall also see how it can 
provide us with a way of understanding why exhibiting patternhood is a necessary condition for the 
very possibility of cognition. 
The basic line of thought that will emerge as the result of our Peircean answer to the two difficul-
ties faced by OSR is simple: exhibiting patternhood is a necessary condition for the possibility of 
cognition; cognizability is a necessary condition for something to be real; therefore, anything that is 
real must exhibit some kind of patternhood, or, which amounts to the same thing, anything that is 
real must be a pattern. We will thus be lead to the central thesis of OSR, but through a path of rea-
soning that is completely different from those standardly used to argue for OSR.  
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1.  What is This Mysterious Thing Called Pattern? 
 
1. 1  The Theoretical Background of OSR 
The aim of this chapter is to situate OSR within the broader structuralist approach to philosophy 
of science in recent analytic philosophy, outline its main claims and arguments, and address its 
shortcomings. In general, by structuralist I shall mean the tendency of thought which, in the inves-
tigation of phenomena, gives priority to relations over individual objects, and in some sense at-
tempts to reconceive the latter in terms of the former. Structuralism can come in various forms de-
pending on the type of concern it is motivated by (epistemological, methodological, or ontological), 
the domain of inquiry it is interested in, its conception of structure, etc. In this thesis I will deal 
mainly with the structuralist tradition in recent analytic philosophy of science, and will not address 
in any detail the various other strands of structuralism, such as the Neo-Kantian strand of Hermann 
Cohen, Ernst Cassirer, and Henri Poincaré in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the 
group-theoretic structuralism of the physicists Sir Arthur Eddington and Hermann Weyl, the “logi-
cal” structuralism of Bertrand Russell and Moritz Schlick, and the French structuralist tradition 
originating in Ferdinand de Saussure’s approach to linguistics; although brief mention will be made 
of some of these thinkers in my discussion of OSR. 
The structuralist approach in analytic philosophy of science was instigated by John Worrall, who 
advocated a position which he called “structural realism” (Worrall 1989). This position was moti-
vated as a response to Larry Laudan’s so-called Pessimistic Meta-Induction in the context of the 
scientific realism debate (Laudan 1981). By citing examples from the history of science, Laudan 
argues against what he calls “convergent realism,” a view which holds that successive theories in 
any mature science preserve the theoretical relations and referents of preceding theories, and that 
science therefore makes cumulative progress. He observes that most past theories which were em-
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pirically successful have nonetheless been discarded and regarded as false. Therefore, by enumera-
tive induction, we should expect current empirically successful theories to be ultimately discarded 
and regarded as false as well. Against this, Worrall distinguishes those parts of scientific theories 
which are discarded and those parts which are “carried over” in the process of theory change. Citing 
as an example the transition from Fresnel’s elastic solid ether theory to Maxwell’s theory of the 
electromagnetic field, he observes that “[t]here was continuity or accumulation in the shift, but the 
continuity is one of form or structure, not of content” (Worrall 1989: 117). We can be pessimistic 
about the reality of substantive entities that are posited by our scientific theories, but we do not 
thereby have to embrace the empirical success of those theories as a sort of cosmic miracle: 
 
Roughly speaking, it seems right to say that Fresnel completely misidentified the 
nature of light, but nonetheless it is no miracle that his theory enjoyed the empiri-
cal predictive success that it did; it is no miracle because Fresnel’s theory, as sci-
ence later saw it, attributed to light the right structure. ... There is no elastic solid 
ether. There is, however, from the later point of view [of Maxwell’s theory], a 
(disembodied) electromagnetic field. The field in no clear sense approximates the 
ether, but disturbances in it do obey formally similar laws to those obeyed by elas-
tic disturbances in a mechanical medium. (Worrall 1989: 117–18) 
 
Thus we can be realists about the form or structure described by our best scientific theories, while 
remaining agnostic about the nature of the entities which bear those formal relations.4 
But what is meant by this “nature”? Positing such an incognizable seems to open an insur-
mountable gap between epistemology and ontology. This is no coincidence, for Worrall’s structur-
alism is motivated by epistemological issues in the context of the realism debate, and does not con-
                                                            
4 Of course, we should distinguish the claim that there are non-structural entities whose natures 
are unknowable from the claim that it is unknowable whether there are non-structural entities in 
the first place. Worrall seems to have moved recently from the former position to the latter (see 
Worrall 2012). This distinction will have no bearing on my discussions in this thesis. 
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cern itself with the metaphysical questions raised by current science. This is where OSR enters the 
scene. As mentioned in the Introduction, OSR is a theory motivated by the metaphysical implica-
tions of contemporary physics, and as such it goes beyond the merely epistemological concerns of 
Worrall’s structuralism; advocates of OSR call the latter Epistemic Structural Realism (ESR) to 
distinguish it from their own position. The difference between ESR and OSR can be succinctly 
summarized in the following way: ESR claims that structure is all that we can know, that is, indi-
viduals are unknowable; while OSR claims that only structure is real, that is, individuals have no 
being (or have only a “thin” being in some sense). 
Here, it is a good idea to have a working definition of the key term individual. An individual can 
be characterized as a putative entity which bears the properties and relations prescribed by a theory 
or set of beliefs, and which can subsist independently of relation to anything else. This may seem to 
be a rather restrictive definition, since, according to this definition, a person would not be an indi-
vidual. In response to this potential objection, I will here note a distinction that I will discuss more 
fully in Chapter 4.1: the distinction between a relative individual and absolute individual. A relative 
individual is anything that satisfies the definition stated above relative to some particular purpose 
or inquiry. Thus, a person can be regarded as an individual from the standpoint of commonsense or 
“folk” psychology, insofar as we normally consider a person as capable of subsisting independently 
of relation to anything else, at least for the purposes of everyday communication, explaining and 
predicting actions, etc. However, if we adopt the perspective of the biologist, a person can no longer 
be regarded as an individual, since a person is dependent upon food, water, oxygen, and so on in 
order to sustain life. An absolute individual is anything that satisfies the definition stated at the be-
ginning of this paragraph regardless of any particular purpose or inquiry. Thus, a person is a rela-
tive individual but not an absolute individual. Later, we shall see that a pattern cannot be an abso-
lute individual, although it can be a relative individual (Chapter 4.1). 
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It would not be a very interesting task to inquire into whether there are such things as relative in-
dividuals; it seems rather indisputable that there are individuals in this sense. The more interesting 
question—the question addressed by OSR—is whether there are such things as absolute individuals. 
As pointed out by Ladyman and Ross (ETMG: 1–7, 17–27), many philosophers seem to hold that 
reality “bottoms out” at some fundamental level of absolute individuals, such as the level of atoms 
or quarks, or at least proceed upon the assumption that this is a genuine possibility. The claim of 
OSR, of course, is that this is not the correct way of looking at the world. I will have more to say 
about the definition of individual in Chapter 4.1. Until then, whenever I use the term individual, I 
will use it in the sense of absolute individual, since it is the possibility of absolute individuals that 
OSR is concerned with. 
There is one more potential confusion that should be dispelled at this point. It is crucial to dis-
tinguish an individual from a general object-concept. The general concept of a hydrogen atom 
would be an example of the latter, while (assuming that an atom is an individual) the hydrogen atom 
here and now would be an example of the former. The proponents of OSR themselves seem to slide 
on occasion from talk about individuals to talk about general object-concepts, and vice versa.5 But 
it is clear that the central tenet of OSR is the elimination (or reduction in some sense) of individuals 
rather than object-concepts, for the theory is grounded on arguments concerning the identity condi-
tions of quantum particles and space-time points (ETMG, Chapter 3). Keeping this distinction clear, 
let us turn to the motivations of OSR. 
There are several different ways of arguing for OSR, depending on the domain of inquiry one is 
interested in. Perhaps the foremost motivation of the theory is, as mentioned above, the issue of the 
individuality of quantum particles in many-particle quantum theory, raised by a form of symmetry 
in quantum statistics known as permutation invariance. Suppose we have two boxes, A and B, and 
                                                            
5 As pointed out by Morganti (2011). See p. 4 above. 
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we want to distribute two particles i and j among them. In a classical system there are four possible 
arrangements: (1) both i and j in box A; (2) both i and j in box B; (3) i in box A and j in box B; and 
(4) i in box B and j in box A. In a quantum system, however, there are only three possible arrange-
ments: the particles are indistinguishable from one another, and therefore the two cases in which 
there is one particle in each box are regarded as identical. Thus we say that the wave function of the 
system remains invariant under the permutation of particles. From this one could attempt to argue 
directly that quantum particles are non-individuals, but Ladyman and French’s argument is a bit 
different. Namely, they note that the physics is also compatible with a view of quantum particles as 
individuals, and then they go on to argue that it is this underdetermination of interpretation that ul-
timately compels us to dispense with individuals (French and Ladyman 2003: 36–37). The idea 
seems to be that the reason why the formalism of quantum mechanics cannot uniquely determine its 
interpretation is because the notion of “individuality” is fundamentally ambiguous and plays no ex-
planatory role in the first place: “It is an ersatz form of realism that recommends belief in the exist-
ence of entities that have such ambiguous metaphysical status” (Ladyman 1998: 420). 
Thus runs the standard argument for OSR from non-relativistic quantum mechanics.6 OSR has 
also been developed in quantum field theory (Kantorovich 2003; Lyre 2004) and general relativity 
(Rickles 2006; Esfeld and Lam 2008). In addition to these various motivations, there are differences 
in the conception of structure among proponents of OSR. Thus, Ladyman and Ross conceive of 
structure in terms of “patterns,” elaborating on the theory of real patterns outlined by Daniel Den-
nett (1991), while French (2014) goes back to the group-theoretic structuralism of Cassirer, Ed-
dington, and Weyl and emphasizes the importance of group theory in understanding structure. Since 
                                                            
6 See also F. A. Muller’s (2009) argument for OSR from the fact that quantum particles are only 
weakly discernible, that is, discernable via permutation-invariant binary relations such as “has 
opposite spin to.” 
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in this thesis we are concerned with the OSR of Ladyman and Ross, it behooves us to examine in 
detail Dennett’s theory of real patterns, from which Ladyman and Ross draw their inspiration, and 
upon which their version of OSR is based. 
1. 2  Dennett’s Theory of Real Patterns 
Dennett’s main concern in his paper on the theory of real patterns (1991) is the ontological status 
of what he calls intentional states—beliefs, desires, and the like. The question he asks is: are inten-
tional states real in some sense, or are they mere figments of the imagination, perhaps useful fic-
tions, but nonetheless fictions? In order to answer this question, he develops a theory of the onto-
logical status of patterns in general, of which intentional states are a special case (namely, patterns 
of bodily movements, vocalizations, etc.). It is this theory of patterns in general that interests us 
here. 
In the most general terms, a pattern is a regularity in some data, where data is construed in the 
broadest possible sense as something that is observed or may be observed. Consider, for example, 
an endless random string of 0’s and 1’s. There is no regularity in this data. On the other hand, con-
sider an endless string of alternating 0’s and 1’s: 010101010 … etc. What we should notice is that 
this data can be compressed into a program that commands: “generate an endless string of alternat-
ing 0’s and 1’s.” There is no way of compressing the random string of 0’s and 1’s—the only way 
this data can be transmitted to another person is to send the bit map, which identifies each digit se-
riatim (the first place value is 0, the second place value is 0, the third place value is 1, etc.). In more 
general terms, a bit map is a zero-compression encoding, where each bit of information in the initial 
data is mapped one-to-one to a distinct bit in the encoding. Thus, building on Gregory J. Chaitin’s 
definition of randomness,7 Dennett proposes the following criterion for the presence of a pattern: 
                                                            
7 “A series of numbers is random if the smallest algorithm capable of specifying it to a computer 
has about the same number of bits of information as the series itself” (Chaitin 1975: 48). 
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“A pattern exists in some data—is real—if there is a description of the data that is more efficient 
than the bit map, whether or not anyone can concoct it” (Dennett 1991: 34). That is, there is a pat-
tern in some data if there is an algorithm that reproduces the data using a smaller number of bits 
than the data itself (when there is such an algorithm, we say that the data is algorithmically com-
pressible). 
An interesting aspect of pattern recognition is that not all observers are able to discern the same 
pattern in the same data, and even the same observer may discern different patterns in the same data 
on different occasions. The famous duck-rabbit illusion is a prime example of the latter. As another 
example, suppose that an image file—say a jpg image of a human face—is translated into binary 
notation, pixel by pixel. The pattern is still there, but it would be impossible for the human eye to 
discern the pattern visually. Other creatures with different sense organs may readily perceive pat-
terns that are imperceptible to us (Dennett 1991: 34). Hence Dennett’s proviso that the presence of a 
pattern should not depend on whether or not anyone is actually able to concoct a compression algo-
rithm: there is a pattern in some data if the data is in principle compressible by a potential observer. 
Dennett’s criterion specifies a necessary and sufficient condition for the presence of a pattern, 
but it does not by itself guarantee that the pattern is real, i.e. that it has a mind-independent being.8 
This is because we can make false generalizations—we may happen to discern patterns that are due 
to pure chance, for example, and mistake them for having a real being. Dennett himself is clear 
throughout his paper that not all patterns are real—there are non-real as well as real patterns, and we 
need some criterion other than algorithmic compressibility for distinguishing between the two. To 
                                                            
8 The definition of “real” as “mind-independent” is not Dennett’s but is due to Peirce (and Duns 
Scotus); hence Dennett’s use of “real” as synonymous with “exist”: “A pattern exists in some da-
ta—is real—if there is a description of the data …” (1991: 34). Dennett’s use of the term “real” in 
the paper is, unfortunately, not very clear, as I mention below. A more rigorous discussion of the 
notion of mind-independency will be given in Chapter 4.1. 
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take Dennett’s example, the center of gravity of a given body expresses a real pattern (namely, a 
pattern in the motions of that body), whereas the center of population of the United States—which 
he defines as “the mathematical point at the intersection of the two lines such that there are as many 
inhabitants north as south of the latitude, and as many inhabitants east as west of the longitude” 
(Dennett 1991: 28)—does not express a real pattern (although it does express a pattern).9 They are 
both abstractions, but the former is somehow a good abstraction, while the latter is a bad one. In 
what sense is the former abstraction good? Dennett’s answer—an answer which, as we shall see, 
accords with Peirce’s argument for Scholastic realism—is that a center of gravity is an abstraction 
that leads to successful predictions about future events. As he puts it, a pattern is real if you can get 
rich by betting on it (Dennett 1991: 36). Although Dennett himself is not altogether clear on the 
relation between his algorithmic compressibility criterion and predictive potential criterion (most 
likely due to his equivocative use of the term “real”), it is safe to assume that the former constitutes 
a necessary and sufficient condition for the presence of a pattern, regardless of whether it has a real 
being or not, while the latter constitutes a necessary and sufficient condition for the reality of a pat-
tern. 
Mention of predictive potential brings us back to our earlier consideration, that not all observers 
are able to discern the same pattern in the same data, and that even the same observer may discern 
different patterns in the same data on different occasions. This means that patterns are in some sense 
observer-dependent. Dennett explicates this notion in terms of predictive potential: patterns are ob-
                                                            
9 In case the reader may suspect that the center of population of the United States is a real pattern, 
I add Dennett’s alternative example: “I doubt that this abstract object [the center of population of 
the United States] is of any value at all in any scientific theory, but just in case it is, here is an 
even more trivial abstract object: Dennett’s lost sock center: the point defined as the center of the 
smallest sphere that can be inscribed around all the socks I have ever lost in my life” (Dennett 
1991: 28). 
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server-dependent in that they can be discerned only from the point of view of an observer that 
adopts a certain predictive strategy, or stance, to use Dennett’s terminology.10 For instance, Dennett 
calls the predictive strategy from which intentional states can be discerned the intentional stance 
(Dennett 1987: 17). Likewise, there can be predictive strategies for discerning any kind of pattern 
whatsoever: the Newtonian mechanics stance, the cellular biology stance, the microeconomic stance, 
etc. The idea is that patterns are not simply “out there,” naked in the world; on the contrary, the 
recognition of a pattern must always involve an element of active participation on the part of the 
observer, namely the adoption of a certain predictive strategy. This should not be taken to mean, of 
course, that the act of adopting a predictive strategy is always a conscious, deliberate act: the deci-
sion of which predictive strategy to adopt is dictated to large degree by the structure of our sense 
organs, our genetic makeup, and the evolutional history of our culture (Dennett 1991: 36). 
Patterns thus have an observer-dependent being; but at the same time, they are in another sense 
observer-independent. They are observer-independent in that the facts about the success or failure 
of our predictive strategies do not depend on what we may think or will—they are completely out of 
our control. It is this uncontrollability of the outcome of our predictions that imparts to some pat-
terns—namely, those whose discernment leads to successful predictions—a mind-independent, and 
hence real, being. 
Thus in outline is Dennett’s theory of real patterns. As we shall see later when we consider 
Peirce’s philosophy, Dennett’s theory of real patterns can be said to be a revival, in modern garbs, 
of the doctrine of Scholastic realism, according to which universals have a real being. It is a sugges-
                                                            
10 “[W]hile belief is a perfectly objective phenomenon … it can be discerned only from the point 
of view of one who adopts a certain predictive strategy, and its existence can be confirmed only 
by an assessment of the success of that strategy …” (Dennett 1987: 15). Although the claim here 
is couched in terms of intentional states and the intentional stance, the statement can be general-
ized to hold for any kind of pattern recognition. 
 19 
tive fact that Dennett’s theory has come under criticism from all sides of the debate on the ontolog-
ical status of intentional states, as Dennett himself notes (1989: 37–42; 1991: 27–31). Namely, it 
has been attacked as being not realist enough by those who hold that intentional states are “real” in 
the sense that they reflect or correspond to “mental facts,” ultimately traceable to brain states; and at 
the same it has been attacked as being too realist by those who hold that intentional states are 
merely useful fictions. I am inclined to think that this reveals just as much about the deep-seated 
preconceptions of philosophers trained in the analytic tradition, as it does about the nature of Den-
nett’s theory. 
1. 3  The OSR of Ladyman and Ross 
Succinctly put, the central thesis of OSR is that there is no bit map representation of the world: 
“it’s real patterns all the way down” (ETMG: 228). OSR does not deny the reality of everyday ob-
jects like tables and chairs, nor the objects studied by the special sciences, but it denies that they are 
individuals. What we traditionally conceive as individual “things” are reconceived as real patterns, 
discernable at certain grains of observational resolution (a notion that evidently corresponds with 
Dennett’s notion of stance): “Some real patterns … behave like things, traditionally conceived, 
while others behave like traditional instances of events and processes” (ETMG: 121). Of course, a 
non-OSRist may agree with this, and yet hold that reality “bottoms out” at some fundamental level 
of individual objects, such as the level of quarks and leptons. The radicalness of OSR consists in its 
claim that reality does not “bottom out” at a fundamental level; and indeed, Ladyman and Ross re-
ject the very idea that there are “levels of reality”, on the grounds that it is a metaphor unsupported 
by current science (ETMG: 53–57). 
Ladyman and Ross argue for their version of OSR by appealing to contemporary physics, in par-
ticular to the permutation invariance of quantum particles discussed above (ETMG: 132–140), but 
also to the so-called “hole argument” in general relativity (ETMG: 141–145), and to considerations 
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of quantum gravity (ETMG: 167–175) and quantum information theory (ETMG: 183–189). For our 
purposes, it is not the details of these arguments that are significant, but the fact that all of these ar-
guments come from physics—and in particular, from fundamental physics rather than phenomeno-
logical physics such as fluid dynamics or optics.11 One may wonder how Ladyman and Ross are 
able to argue for a metaphysical theory, which applies to all aspects of reality and not just to physics, 
from a consideration of fundamental physics alone. The answer lies in what they call the Primacy of 
Physics Constraint, a methodological rule prescribing an asymmetry between fundamental physics 
and all other branches of science: 
 
Special science hypotheses that conflict with fundamental physics, or such con-
sensus as there is in fundamental physics, should be rejected for that reason alone. 
Fundamental physical hypotheses are not symmetrically hostage to the conclusions 
of the special sciences. (ETMG: 44) 
 
Thus, for Ladyman and Ross, fundamental physics is not just one science among many, but occu-
pies a special status. It is on the basis of this rule that they are able to draw metaphysical conclu-
sions from considerations of fundamental physics alone: insofar as fundamental physics compels us 
to believe in OSR, OSR must be valid not only for fundamental physics but across the board. 
Given their self-avowed “scientism” (ETMG: 61) and privileging of fundamental physics, read-
ers familiar with the analytic philosophy literature may expect Ladyman and Ross to be physical 
reductionists, that is, those who hold that everything—everyday objects, events, and processes as 
well as objects, events, and processes studied by the special sciences—can in some sense be “re-
duced” to fundamental physics. However, Ladyman and Ross reject all forms of reductionism, alt-
                                                            
11 By fundamental physics, I mean (non-relativistic) quantum mechanics, general relativity, 
quantum field theory, and theories of quantum gravity. Whether thermodynamics should also be 
understood as part of fundamental physics is an open question. 
 21 
hough they do acknowledge the existence of what are known as Nagelian reductions, that is, deduc-
tive explanations of a theory by another theory, such as the explanation of the Boyle-Charles Law 
for ideal gasses by statistical mechanics (ETMG: 45–53). With what Graham Harman has called an 
“admirable strangeness” (2010: 778), Ladyman and Ross argue that all of the patterns that we come 
across at everyday scales of observation, as well as those studied by the special sciences, have an 
autonomous being, irreducible to the patterns studied by fundamental physics or other special sci-
ences, as long as they satisfy the criteria for real patternhood (to be discussed shortly). Thus, in op-
position to W. V. O. Quine’s recommendation of “desert” ontologies—meaning that ontologies 
should be as sparse as possible—Ladyman and Ross endorse a view that they call Rainforest Real-
ism, according to which there are diverse, autonomous realities at many different scales of observa-
tion: “[Our realism] is thus a realism of lush and leafy spaces rather than deserts, with science regu-
larly revealing new thickets of canopy” (ETMG: 234). 
What then, it may be asked, makes fundamental physics special, if not the reducibility of every-
thing to it? Ladyman and Ross’s answer is that the asymmetry between fundamental physics and the 
other sciences derives from the fact that fundamental physics has a universal validity, whereas the 
other sciences are valid only for restricted sub-systems of the universe: “a science is special iff it 
aims at generalizations such that measurements taken only from restricted areas of the universe, 
and/or at restricted scales are potential sources of confirmation and/or falsification of those general-
izations” (ETMG: 195). On the other hand, fundamental physics is that science which studies real 
patterns for which measurements are maximally redundant, that is, real patterns for which meas-
urements taken anywhere in the universe, irrespective of the scale of measurement, carry infor-
mation (ETMG: 251). That fundamental physics is possible—or equivalently, that there are maxi-
mally redundant real patterns—is tantamount to the hypothesis that the universe is unified rather 
than dabbled (ETMG: 251). 
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Let us next turn to Ladyman and Ross’s (or rather, Ross and John Collier’s, judging from the 
content of Chapter 4 in which the discussion of real patterns takes place) definition of real patterns, 
and see how they elaborate on Dennett’s theory. Ladyman and Ross’s main complaint against Den-
nett’s criterion for the reality of patterns is that it is not stringent enough—on their view, the facili-
tation of successful predictions specifies a necessary condition for the reality of a pattern, but not a 
sufficient condition. They refer to an idea developed by Dennett in one of his early works on phi-
losophy of mind (Dennett 1971), concerning the indispensability of the intentional stance in making 
predictions about certain systems. For example, it is possible for someone to assume the intentional 
stance to predict the behavior of a thermostat—“It prefers the room to be 68 degrees and believes it 
is now 64 degrees, so it decides to turn on the furnace”—but one must assume the intentional stance 
towards a chess-playing computer, in order to not lose predictive power (ETMG: 206). In the case 
of the thermostat, the intentional stance is possible but dispensable, whereas in the case of the 
chess-playing computer, the intentional stance is indispensable: if one were to dispense with the 
intentional mode of data compression, then they would find it far more difficult—perhaps even im-
possible—to predict the computer’s next move. 
Now the indispensability of a mode of compression is equivalent to the impossibility of further 
compression. For suppose that further compression of the given data is possible without sacrificing 
predictive power. Then the initial mode of compression can be dispensed with, since there would be 
a redundancy in it. Taking the contrapositive, if a mode of compression is indispensable, then the 
data cannot be further compressed without sacrificing predictive power. Conversely, if further 
compression is impossible without sacrificing predictive power, then evidently the given mode of 
compression cannot be dispensed with. Therefore, the indispensability of a mode of compression is 
equivalent to the impossibility of further compression of the data. This is clearly a more stringent 
condition for the reality of a pattern than that it should lead to successful predictions. 
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But the question is: indispensable for whom? Ladyman and Ross accuse Dennett of suggesting in 
his real patterns paper that indispensability should be relativized to a given level of error tolerance 
on the part of the observer—this, they argue, is too instrumentalist (ETMG: 206). It seems to entail 
that there is no indispensability condition at all, since any mode of compression is presumably in-
dispensable at some level of error tolerance. According to Ladyman and Ross, the indispensability 
of a mode of compression ought not to be relativized to the computational capacity of some arbi-
trarily distinguished computers in some arbitrarily limited observational circumstances, such as a 
group of humans (ETMG: 208); otherwise we would fall into instrumentalism. Rather, the sufficient 
condition for the reality of a pattern should be the indispensability of the associated mode of com-
pression—or equivalently, the impossibility of further compression—by any physically possible 
computer (ETMG: 221). Whether a given computation is physically possible can be determined by 
calculating the lower bounds of the energy required to effect that computation, for example by using 
Landauer’s Principle (ETMG: 208). This, according to Ladyman and Ross, is the only way that we 
can make sense of Dennett’s claim that there are real patterns that no person has yet discovered, or 
will ever discover, encapsulated in his proviso “whether or not anyone can concoct it [a compres-
sion algorithm]” in his formulation of the criterion for the presence of a pattern (see Chapter 1.3 
above). 
On the basis of these considerations, Ladyman and Ross formulate their theory of ontology, using 
their unique terminology, as follows: 
 
To be is to be a real pattern; and a pattern x → y is real iff 
(i) it is projectible; and 
(ii) it has a model that carries information about at least one pattern P in an encod-
ing that has logical depth less than the bit-map encoding of P, and where P is not 
projectible by a physically possible device computing information about another 
real pattern of lower logical depth than x → y. (ETMG: 233) 
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Here, a pattern is characterized as a mapping “x → y” because Ladyman and Ross define patterns 
recursively, in relation to a device’s predictive computation of that pattern; this captures the observ-
er dependence of patterns noted in the previous section. x is the observed pattern, while y is the 
output of a predictive computation of x by a device running a simulation of x. y is itself a further 
pattern, which can in turn be simulated by another device, whose output we shall denote as z. Sup-
posing patternhood to be preserved across simulations, if x → y is a pattern, then y → z is also a 
pattern. The base case of the recursive definition is, according to Ladyman and Ross, constituted by 
the situation in which we cannot say anything about what x is, but can only “locate” it (ETMG: 266). 
Starting from this “pattern-in-itself,” patterns are constructed one by one, y observing x, z observing 
y, and so on ad infinitum. This way of defining patterns is likely intended to capture the manner in 
which patterns tend to replicate themselves, that is, to transmit their Form to an interpretive agent, 
so that that agent will also be under the governance of that same Form—a process commonly re-
ferred to as the “flow” of information.12 
To say that a pattern is projectible is Ladyman and Ross’s way of saying that it leads to success-
ful predictions—it is shorthand for projectible into the future, or generalizable into unobserved cas-
es. More specifically, projectibility is a better-than-chance estimatability of a pattern by a physically 
possible computer running a non-trivial program (ETMG: 224). Logical depth is a quantitative 
measure of the informational content of a pattern, introduced by Charles H. Bennett.13 What condi-
                                                            
12 Or as Ladyman and Ross put it, the “dynamic propagation of temporally asymmetric influ-
ences” (ETMG: 210). I will have more to say about information “flow” in Chapter 3.3. 
13 Bennett defines the logical depth of an object as “the time required by a standard universal 
Turing machine to generate it [the object] from an input that is algorithmically random” (1988: 
227). 
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tion (ii) says, essentially, is that further compression of the pattern should be impossible by any 
physically possible computer, without sacrificing projectibility. 
Whether Ladyman & Ross’s reformulation of the theory of real patterns is an improvement over 
Dennett’s theory is an issue that will not be addressed in this thesis. It will have little, if any, bearing 
on our main topic. My intention in introducing the reformulation is to familiarize the reader with the 
general orientation of Ladyman and Ross’s version of OSR, and to highlight its connections with 
Peirce’s theory of categories, to which we shall turn in Chapter 3. 
1. 4  Problems with OSR 
As mentioned in the Introduction, there are, I believe, two major difficulties faced by OSR. One 
is that it is unable to give a satisfactory account of the difference between mathematical and physi-
cal structure, and the other is that it is unable to give a satisfactory account of the relation between 
the world and our representations of the world. I shall first address the former. 
1. 4. 1  Problem 1: The Physical/Mathematical Distinction 
One of the most serious objections levelled against OSR—perhaps the most serious—is that it 
conflates the mathematical and the physical, the “abstract” and the “concrete.”14 Here is Bas C. van 
Fraassen’s objection:15 
 
[OSR] must imply: what has looked like the structure of something with unknown 
qualitative features is actually all there is to nature. But with this, the contrast be-
tween structure and what is not structure has disappeared. Thus, from the point of 
view of one who adopts this position, any difference between it and ‘ordinary’ sci-
                                                            
14 I enclose the terms abstract and concrete in scare quotes because I am not comfortable with 
this terminology. The important distinction here is between physical structure and mathematical 
structure; and physical/mathematical is not coextensive with concrete/abstract. An electric field is 
a physical structure, but is it concrete? In the absence of a precise definition, I think it is best to 
avoid the use of these terms altogether. 
15 A similar complaint is voiced by Cao (2003). 
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entific realism also disappears. It seems then that, once adopted, it should not be 
called structuralism at all! For if there is no non-structure, there is no structure ei-
ther. (van Fraassen 2006: 292–93) 
 
Essentially, the objection here is that existence cannot be explained in purely structural terms. 
Something other than structure must be introduced in order to differentiate between structures that 
we know exert a governing power over actual existents (that is, physical structures), and structures 
such that we do not know if they have any such influence on actual existents, or if they have only a 
possible being (that is, mathematical structures). In other words, if there is no non-structure, then 
physical structure collapses into mathematical structure, and the latter by itself does not imply the 
actual existence of anything, including physical structure. Van Fraassen further elaborates on this 
point (although his use of the terms “abstract” and “concrete” is not very helpful): 
 
There are many familiar examples in which we attribute properties to properties. 
The statement ‘Orthogonality is symmetric’ and ‘Orthogonality is invariant under 
Euclidean transformations’ are good examples. Such statements do not imply the 
existence of anything but abstract entities: properties or relations like orthogonality 
and properties of properties like symmetry or invariance. So if God had—so to 
speak—decided not to create nature at all, nothing at all that belongs to the proper 
domain of physics, those statements would still have been true. The statement ‘X is 
multiply instantiated’, where X is some property or relation like orthogonality, 
must be different from this. If God had decided not to create anything concrete, 
then that statement would have been false. Therefore, taking the contrapositive, if 
such a statement is true, then there exist concrete entities, therefore entities other 
than properties and relations. (van Fraassen 2006: 294) 
 
The crucial question, then, is what we mean by instantiation; what do we mean when we say, for 
example, that “X is multiply instantiated”? Ladyman and Ross remark in passing that “there is an 
analogy here with the theory of universals and the problem of exemplification” (ETMG: 158.fn.53, 
emphasis mine), but actually it is the problem of universals and exemplification. It is unfortunate 
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that, despite the profundity of many of their insights, Ladyman and Ross invest little effort in en-
gaging with traditional philosophical issues in their book, in particular with the problem of univer-
sals, which I believe is the heart of the matter here. This lack of interest most likely stems from their 
disparaging attitude towards traditional philosophy.16 
Their brief remark about the theory of universals notwithstanding, Ladyman and Ross’s answer 
to the question concerning the physical/mathematical distinction is, as we saw in the Introduction, is 
that they do not have an answer: “What makes the structure physical and not mathematical? That is 
a question that we refuse to answer” (ETMG: 158). Of course, they do have reasons for refusing to 
answer the question, indeed two reasons. One of them has to do with what they call the Principle of 
Naturalistic Closure (PNC), which they formulate as follows (I omit their stipulations regarding 
terminology): 
 
Any new metaphysical claim that is to be taken seriously at time t should be moti-
vated by, and only by, the service it would perform, if true, in showing how two or 
more specific scientific hypotheses, at least one of which is drawn from funda-
mental physics, jointly explain more than the sum of what is explained by the two 
hypotheses taken separately … (ETMG: 37) 
 
This principle is intended to delimit the domain of what Ladyman and Ross consider to be valid 
metaphysics. Anything that does not meet the criterion specified in this principle is to be denounced 
as non-naturalistic and hence unscientific. The principle itself reflects Ladyman and Ross’s view of 
                                                            
16 As a typical example of Ladyman and Ross’s attitude towards traditional philosophy, consider 
the following remarks: “We ask the reader to consider whether the main metaphysical idea we 
propose, of existent structures that are not composed out of more basic entities, is any more ob-
scure or bizarre than the instantiation relation in the theory of universals. We think it better to 
attempt to develop the metaphysics presented in this book than to continue to use off-the-shelf 
metaphysical categories inherited from the ancient Greeks that are simply not appropriate for 
contemporary science or mathematics” (ETMG: 155–56). 
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metaphysics as an attempt to “unify hypotheses and theories that are taken seriously by contempo-
rary science” (ETMG: 1). The proviso that at least one of the hypotheses to be unified must come 
from fundamental physics is intended to prevent metaphysics from becoming one of the special 
sciences—a theory that attempts to unify hypotheses drawn from biology and chemistry, for exam-
ple, would presumably be part of one of those two fields. 
It is by appealing to this principle that Ladyman and Ross refuse to answer the question con-
cerning the physical/mathematical distinction: “In our view, there is nothing more to be said about 
this [the physical/mathematical distinction] that doesn’t amount to empty words and venture beyond 
what the PNC allows” (ETMG: 158). Interestingly, they then go on to claim that “The 
‘world-structure’ just is and exists independently of us and we represent it mathematico-physically 
via our theories” (ETMG: 158).17 Of course, it is precisely the notion of existence that is at stake 
here, so simply asserting that “the ‘world structure’ exists” is not very illuminating. Moreover, what 
is striking about this sentence is that there is a substantial amount of non-PNC-compatible meta-
physical assumptions packed into it. As we shall see shortly (in our discussion of the second diffi-
culty faced by OSR) and in Chapter 4, this statement is a typical expression of the doctrine of nom-
inalism, that universals have only a mind-dependent being. Immediately after Ladyman and Ross 
claim to have banished speculative metaphysics from their system with their so-called PNC, we see 
that it has crept in through the back door. I will have occasion to discuss issues regarding the meth-
                                                            
17 To be fair, it should be noted that this statement is due not to Ladyman and Ross but to French 
and Ladyman, since it is taken verbatim from French and Ladyman (2003: 45). My contention 
will be that Ladyman and Ross’s OSR is straddling two incompatible metaphysics, nominalism 
and realism; but I suspect that the nominalist elements are due mainly to Ladyman (and the in-
fluence of his mentor French), while the more realist ideas are due mainly to Ross and perhaps 
Collier. 
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odology of metaphysics in Chapter 4; here I shall simply note that I take seriously Peirce’s follow-
ing dictum: 
 
Find a scientific man, who proposes to get along without any metaphysics [which 
is what Ladyman and Ross do by restricting metaphysics to what is allowed by the 
PNC] … and you have found one whose doctrines are thoroughly vitiated by the 
crude and uncriticized metaphysics with which they are packed … Every man of us 
has a metaphysics, and has to have one; and it will influence his life greatly. Far 
better, then, that that metaphysics should be criticized and not be allowed to run 
loose. (CP 1.129, c.1905) 
 
This should not be taken to mean, however, that we have no choice but to engage in a priori meta-
physics, relying on our intuitions as evidence of the truth or falsity of hypotheses. I fully endorse 
Ladyman and Ross’s criticism of the use of intuition in philosophy (ETMG: 10–15). But from this it 
does not follow that metaphysics should be relegated to the position of handmaiden of the sciences, 
as mandated by the PNC. 
The other reason that Ladyman and Ross refuse to answer the question concerning the physi-
cal/mathematical distinction is because they are attracted by the idea that there is no distinction be-
tween the physical and the mathematical. Although they do not explicitly endorse the view, they 
offer various reasons for believing in “the identity of structures in mathematics and physics, and 
abandoning the distinction between the abstract structures employed in models and the concrete 
structures that are the objects of physics” (ETMG: 159). Now if the claim were that the difference 
between the physical and mathematical is one of degree rather than kind, then that is surely a sound 
claim. To suppose otherwise would make it impossible to explain the relationship between the 
physical and mathematical, in much the same way that Descartes’s mind-body dualism made it im-
possible for him to explain the relationship between mind and body. But even if the difference were 
merely one of degree, there would still be a difference. To deny that there is any difference between 
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the physical and mathematical is tantamount to overlooking the fact that we live in an actual world 
of actions and reactions. The reasons that Ladyman and Ross give for believing in the identity of 
physics and mathematics all come from physics: they emphasize how contemporary physics is be-
coming more and more abstract, and how the traditional notion of matter is becoming more and 
more ephemeral. Yet, whatever physics may disclose to us will not alter the fact that we live in an 
actual world rather than a merely possible one. 
The core of the issue, as I see it, is this: physics (or any other science) can only give us a general 
description or explanation of its object of study. When a physicist makes a statement about elec-
trons, for example, he is not concerned with this or that particular electron but with electrons in 
general. But a general description or explanation can in no way differentiate between the actual and 
the merely possible—a dream may have all the general characters of the actual world and yet fail to 
be the actual world. What is needed for a general description or explanation to relate to the actual 
world is some kind of act of ostension, such as the pointing of a finger, by which one can force an-
other’s attention to be directed towards a particular object of sense. This is something of an alto-
gether different nature from a general description or explanation. The same criticism that Peirce 
levels against Hegel can thus be leveled against OSR: “The capital error of Hegel which permeates 
his whole system in every part of it is that he almost altogether ignores the Outward Clash … this 
direct consciousness of hitting and of getting hit enters into all cognition and serves to make it mean 
something real” (W5: 225, 1885). I will have more to say about the “direct consciousness of hitting 
and of getting hit” later in Chapter 5.1. 
Before moving on to consider the second difficulty faced by OSR, let us examine whether the 
other major proponent of OSR, Steven French, offers a compelling solution to the problem of the 
physical/mathematical distinction. As mentioned in the Introduction, he devotes an entire chapter to 
the problem (which he calls the “collapse” problem) in his recent tome, The Structure of the World 
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(French 2014). In that chapter (Chapter 8), he seems to offer two distinct proposals, or rather lines 
of thought, as solutions to the collapse problem. One of these involves the introduction of a 
non-structural element to differentiate between the “abstract” and the “concrete.” French is clear 
that the introduction of such an element in no way infringes upon the central tenet of OSR, provided 
that the non-structural element is not an individual: 
 
It is no part of OSR or of other members of the structuralist tendency in general 
that all terms, concepts, features, elements, or whatever have to be defined in or 
reduced to structuralist terms. The core feature of OSR, we recall, concerns the 
structuralist reduction of and, according to one form, elimination of objects and 
such a feature and its associated claims is certainly compatible with further 
non-structural features and their associated claims. (French 2014: 201) 
 
What French specifically has in mind seems to be “trope theory” and “mereological bundle the-
ory” (French 2014: 197), both of which he discusses at length in Chapter 7.7 (French 2014: 183–89). 
Here, it should be noted that French’s discussion of these theories is only part of his survey of met-
aphysical “tools” that the OSRist can utilize, and that he does not commit himself to either theory. 
Nonetheless, it will be worthwhile to point out why these theories are inadequate as solutions to the 
collapse problem, because by doing so we will be able to get a sense of what an adequate solution 
should look like. 
Let us examine trope theory first. A trope is “a particular instance of a property, such as Spring-
steen’s awesomeness” (French 2014: 184). The advantage of appealing to tropes is that it allows us 
to reduce both particular objects and general properties to “bundles” of tropes, thus resulting in a 
parsimonious ontology (French 2014: 184). The “bundling” is formulated in terms of a primitive 
relation of “compresence” or “togetherness” (which, French points out, may have to be replaced or 
supplemented by another notion so as to avoid clashing with physics; French 2014: 184–85). What 
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French calls “network instance realism” is simply an expansion of trope theory from monadic pred-
icates (properties) to n-adic predicates (relations), resulting in an ontology of individuated relations 
(French 2014: 186). 
The problem with this approach is that it introduces the notion of instance as a primitive notion 
(in its definition of a trope as a “particular instance” of a property) without explaining what instan-
tiation is, which was the heart of the issue to begin with. It then goes on to “explain” general prop-
erties as “bundles” of tropes; but since a trope was introduced as a “particular instance of a property,” 
all we have done is go around in circles. In other words, this purported solution blatantly begs the 
question. An adequate solution to the problem of the physical/mathematical distinction should pro-
vide us with general principles, whose validity is demonstrated by independent means, which would 
make the notion of instantiation (and the associated notions of existence, general/particular, etc.) 
intelligible by deriving it as a necessary consequence of the operation of those principles. This is the 
kind of explanation that we expect—nay demand—of a theory as fundamental as OSR. Neither 
trope theory nor network instance theory are adequate in this sense. 
“Mereological Bundle Theory” (MBT) fares no better than this. This theory, like trope theory, 
conceives of the world in terms of a one-category ontology of properties, where “objects” are un-
derstood as bundles of these (French 2014: 187). But instead of appealing to the notion of “com-
presence” to bundle the properties together, it invokes the notion of mereological “fusion.” That is, 
it conceives of properties as “parts” of objects in the same sense as spatiotemporal parts, and at-
tempts to explain objects as “fusions” of these parts. Since according to MBT the properties to be 
fused are not tropes but general properties, the OSRist who appeals to this theory must somehow 
explain how a fusion of these properties can result in a particular object rather than a general ob-
ject-concept. French’s idea seems to be to appeal to spatiotemporal location, which is itself under-
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stood as one of the properties to be fused to create an object (French 2014: 187). Thus we can re-
duce particular objects to “fusions” of general properties, including spatiotemporal location. 
The problem with appealing to spatiotemporal location to explain the notion of instantiation is 
that, as pointed out by Ladyman and Ross (ETMG: 172), recent studies in quantum gravity give us 
good reason to suspect that the macroscopic four-dimensional spacetime that we are familiar with is 
dynamically emergent rather than fundamental—the limiting behavior of a more fundamental pro-
cess or structure such as spin networks (loop quantum gravity), stochastic causality relations (causal 
set theory), and quantum entanglement (tensor network approaches). Even string theorists seem to 
have accepted that background-independence (in the sense of being independent of a background 
spacetime structure) is a desideratum for an adequate theory of quantum gravity (ETMG: 169). 
Surely, a theory that aspires to be as fundamental as OSR does should not presuppose a God-given 
backdrop of spacetime, given that some of the most promising research programs in contemporary 
fundamental physics give us good reason to think that spacetime is not a fundamental aspect of real-
ity. An adequate solution to the problem of the physical/mathematical distinction ought to make 
instantiation entail spatiotemporal determination, rather than simply equate the two. 
The second line of thought that can be discerned in French’s chapter on the collapse prob-
lem—and perhaps the more significant of the two, since French seems to commit himself to it—is 
the idea that the “structure of the world” itself is “concrete” rather than “abstract.” 
 
Putting things in broad terms, the ‘quantum structure’, say, does not exist inde-
pendently of any exemplifying concrete system, it is the concrete system … Indeed, 
the central claim of OSR is that what appears to be a system of objects and rela-
tions should be reconceptualized as a relational structure; that is, it is the structure 
that is (ultimately) ontically prior and also concrete. Hence, the conception of 
structure as abstract is rejected also. (French 2014: 209) 
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Mathematical structure can then be understood as the result of abstracting away certain features of 
the concrete, physical structure of the world—it is “surplus” structure, in the sense that there is more 
of it than there is physical structure (French 2014: 197–98, et passim). 
While it is not altogether clear what French means by “abstract” and “concrete,” his use of ex-
pressions such as “exist independently of any exemplifying concrete system” to characterize ab-
stractness suggests that he is using the term “abstract” in the sense of general or multiply instantia-
ble, and the term “concrete” in the sense of actual or present here and now (a more detailed discus-
sion of these notions will be given in Chapter 4.1). If indeed this is what French has in mind, that is, 
if French’s claim is that structures are not general, then my contention will be that this betrays a 
serious confusion as to the mode of being of structures on French’s part. A structure must by its 
very nature be general, because it is precisely its multiple instantiability that makes it a structure 
rather than an individual; and that which is multiply instantiable is what philosophers have tradi-
tionally called general (or universal). To borrow an example that Peirce gives in “Prolegomena to 
an Apology for Pragmaticism” (CP 4.530, 1906), consider the molecular structure of a certain sub-
stance. When a chemist conducts experiments on a sample of this substance in order to determine 
its molecular structure, he is not interested in that particular sample. After the experiment is done, 
he may as well throw it away. What the chemist is interested in is the molecular structure as such, 
considered independently of its particular instantiations; and anything that can be considered inde-
pendently of its particular instantiations is, by definition, general or “abstract.” For the chemist, the 
particular sample is nothing more than a sign of the general molecular structure: the chemist sees 
the general structure through the sample, in much the same way that one grasps an idea through the 
mediation of a written or spoken word. This is not to put forth any particular theory about the onto-
logical status of general structures, namely whether they are somehow “in” each instantiation or 
have being independent of their instantiations, etc. My point is simply that the instantiation itself is 
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not the general structure, and that the latter is the proper object of scientific investigation. Further-
more, it should be emphasized that the fact that a general structure is instantiated here and now (as 
is the molecular structure in a particular sample) does not thereby make it non-general, since it is its 
multiple instantiability that makes it a general rather than an individual. 
Revealingly, right after the above quotation, French goes on to remark that taking structures to be 
“non-specific, general, and ontological … would be to accept a contradiction in terms” (French 
2014: 209, emphasis in original).18 Now why would it be a “contradiction in terms” to affirm that 
structures are both general and ontological (that is, real)? The only explanation seems to be that 
French is a nominalist, assuming without argument that generals cannot be real. That is, he is as-
suming that whatever is real must also be actual, and since he wants physical structures to be real, 
he has no choice but to insist that they are actual—and this is a contradiction in terms, tantamount to 
asserting the existence of something like a “particular general.” Substantially the same criticism 
has been voiced by Stathis Psillos: “To put the point crudely, French seems to require a concep-
tion of structure which renders structures both concrete (qua particular spatiotemporal physical 
systems) and abstract (qua shareable by distinct physical systems)” (Psillos 2012: 171); however 
it should be noted that I do not concur with Psillos’s characterization of the actual or “concrete” 
in terms of spatiotemporal determination.19 
It is true that at one point, French grants the possibility that some form of “structure as abstract” 
version of OSR is viable (French 2014: 209). However, he immediately qualifies this by remarking 
                                                            
18 More accurately, he is paraphrasing Slowik (2012: 53), but he seems to accept the claim. 
19 In the latter half of this paper, Psillos goes into a discussion of the problem of universals, tak-
ing up the concept of structural universals and examining whether it could help the OSRist. His 
answer—with which I substantially agree—is negative. My aim in the ensuring chapters is to 
present as an alternative the Peircean view, which does not maintain that structures are a particu-
lar kind of universal (as in the theory of structural universals), but that all universals are at bot-
tom structural. 
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that this kind of OSR “brings serious problems in its wake, most notably to do with the lack of 
causal efficacy of this kind of structure” (French 2014: 209). But why would an “abstract” struc-
ture lack causal efficacy? It is by no means evident that this must be the case. Although French 
goes into a long discussion of causation in the latter half of Chapter 8 of his book (French 2014: 
212–28), he does not seem to offer any explanation of why this should be the case. Again, I think 
the assumption here is that “abstract” structures cannot be causally efficacious because they are 
not real—they are mere figments of the mind, or something to that effect. This nominalistic iden-
tification of reality with actuality is, I believe, the central flaw of French’s version of OSR. Alt-
hough Ladyman and Ross’s OSR is subtler than French’s, by virtue of its reliance on Dennett’s the-
ory of real patterns, we shall presently see that it is plagued by the same problem. 
1. 4. 2  Problem 2: The Concept of Representation 
Let us turn to the second of the difficulties faced by OSR, that it cannot give an adequate account 
of the relationship between the world and our representations of the world. The question, it will be 
recalled, is: what is it that OSR is asserting the reality of? Is it the mathematical or formal structures 
embodied in our theories, or the extra-representational structure of the world itself, represented by 
those theories? Ladyman and Ross seem to endorse the latter view, which is not surprising, given 
their commitment to scientific realism, albeit of a structuralist kind. If they were to hold the former 
view, that it is the mathematical or formal structures embodied in our theories that are real, appar-
ently there would have to be something outside of those theories, so to speak, that makes those the-
ories true rather than false; and as realists, Ladyman and Ross are committed to the idea that our 
current best scientific theories are true (or approximately true) in some sense. But what can this 
“outside” be, other than the structure of the world in itself? Thus Ladyman and Ross are led natu-
rally to the latter view, that it is the structure of the world in itself—or the “world-structure” as they 
call it, as we saw earlier in a quotation (ETMG: 158)—that is real. 
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Ladyman and Ross seem to endorse the notion of truth as some kind of correspondence between 
our theories or representations on the hand and the world in itself on the other. Call this the corre-
spondence conception of truth. Here, I am not trying to articulate any precise account of this con-
ception. Indeed, my claim will be that this conception is problematic precisely because it is vague. 
However, its being vague does not prevent it from being a real pattern that manifests itself in vari-
ous forms throughout ETMG. Most significantly, it is implicit in the fact that the authors feel they 
have to respond to Laudan’s argument against realism from theory change (the so-called Pessimistic 
Meta-Induction; ETMG: 83–93) and to van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism (ETMG: 95–111). 
Laudan and van Fraassen’s arguments, as well as Ladyman and Ross’s responses, make sense only 
if one presupposes the correspondence conception of truth, that there is such a thing as the “world in 
itself” and that truth consists in our representations accurately “copying” or “mirroring” it; and in-
deed it is no exaggeration to say that the entire scientific realism debate in analytic philosophy of 
science is predicated upon the assumption, often tacit, that one form or another of the correspond-
ence conception must be correct. The correspondence conception of truth can also be discerned in 
Ladyman and Ross’s distinction between the “formal” and “material” modes discourse (ETMG: 
118–22), and in their distinction between “representational” and “extra-representational” real pat-
terns (ETMG: 243); the latter will be discussed in more detail below. 
Now, as I noted above, the problem with the correspondence conception of truth is that the cru-
cial notion of “correspondence” is left unarticulated. What does it mean to say that a representation 
“corresponds” to the world in itself? What do we mean by the “world in itself” in the first place? 
How can we verify whether a given representation corresponds to the “world in itself,” given that 
we have no way of accessing the latter? An analogy from mathematics will serve to illustrate this 
problem. Consider the set {0, 90, 180, 270} together with the binary operation of addition modulo 
360. This represents rotation by 90 degrees on a plane. Next consider the set of complex numbers 
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{1, i, −1, −i} together with the binary operation of multiplication. This too represents rotation by 90 
degrees on a plane. Both of these structures satisfy the group axioms, and are isomorphic to each 
other. Now two isomorphic groups are said to be representations of the same abstract group struc-
ture; in the above example the abstract group structure is known as the cyclic group of order 4. The 
question is: are the isomorphic representations also isomorphic to the abstract group structure? Evi-
dently the answer is no: in order to say that a representation is isomorphic to the abstract group 
structure, we must define a one-to-one mapping between the elements of both in such a way that the 
group operations are preserved; but it is impossible to specify the elements of the abstract group 
structure because it does not consist of distinct, identifiable elements at all (which is precisely why 
we say that it is “abstract”). This is strictly parallel to the situation in the correspondence conception 
of truth: namely, it is impossible to define a correspondence relation between our representations on 
the one hand and the “world-structure” on the other because the latter cannot be an actually existing 
thing; rather, if there is such a thing, it must be regarded as “abstract” or general, and whatever is 
“abstract” or general cannot consist of distinct, identifiable elements (the reason for this will be-
come clear in Chapters 4 and 5). Once again, we see that that the root of the problem lies in the 
confusion of real with actual—a confusion characteristic of nominalism. 
Another problem with Ladyman and Ross’s appeal to the “world-structure” is that, as we saw in 
Chapter 1.2, the very being of a pattern is dependent on an actual or potential observer. As Dennett 
had pointed out (1991: 32), a pattern, by definition, must be a candidate for pattern recognition; and 
this necessarily implies that there is someone or something that does the recognizing. What mean-
ing, then, can we attach to a notion like “world-structure,” if this is understood as the structure of 
the world as it is in itself, independently of any observer? It is true that Ladyman and Ross are care-
ful to point out, in their discussion of what they call “first-order” and “second-order” real patterns, 
that they are not making the metaphysical claim that there are two kinds of real patterns (ETMG: 
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242). Rather, their first-order/second-order distinction is meant to capture contingent relationships 
among real patterns: second-order real patterns are real patterns that “depend for their genesis and 
maintenance on their utility to observers as devices for tracking other real patterns” (ETMG: 243). 
When there is such a genetic dependence between two real patterns, R1 and R2, such that the exist-
ence of R2 depends on its utility to observers for tracking R1, R2 is said to be “second-order” with 
respect to R1. Then, a real pattern is said to be “extra-representational” if it is not second-order with 
respect to any other real pattern; otherwise it is “representational” (ETMG: 243). 
Despite Ladyman and Ross’s careful proviso that they are not making a metaphysical distinction 
between two kinds of real patterns, I find the notion of extra-representational real patterns problem-
atic. As we saw in the previous section, Ladyman and Ross define the reality of patterns in terms of 
projectibility. To say that a pattern is projectible is to say that it can be reliably used by observers to 
track other real patterns (namely, those that have not yet been observed). Now if there is such a 
thing as an extra-representational real pattern, that is, a real pattern that can exist independently of 
its utility to observers for tracking other real patterns, then how can its reality be established? Not in 
terms of its projectibility. As mentioned above, I think that here Ladyman and Ross are sliding into 
a correspondence conception of truth. Furthermore, by definition, an extra-representational pattern 
would seem to be capable of existing independently of reference to any actual or potential observer. 
How does this cohere with Dennett’s claim that a pattern must be a candidate for pattern recogni-
tion? Insofar as Ladyman and Ross incorporate the observer-dependence of patterns into their defi-
nition of real patterns (Chapter 1.3), there seems to be a serious tension within their system. If we 
are to retain talk of “extra-representational” patterns or the “world-structure,” the notions must be 
reformulated in such a way as to render them compatible with the observer-dependence of patterns; 
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and moreover, we should dispense with the idea that any intelligibility can be attached to such a 
notion as the structure of the world as it is in itself.20 
Without further ado, let us turn to Peirce to see how his ideas can shed light on these issues faced 
by OSR. Reciprocally, we shall also see how OSR can serve as a frame of reference that will allow 
us to see an aspect of Peirce’s philosophy which, I believe, has not been sufficiently emphasized in 
the literature, namely its structuralist aspect.  
                                                            
20 Here, it is unnecessary to go into French’s views with respect to the problem of representation. 
As I mentioned above (fn. 17), the notion of “world-structure” is due not to Ladyman and Ross but 
rather to Ladyman and French. In light of this, and given what has already been said regarding 
French’s version of OSR, I believe it is clear that my criticism of Ladyman and Ross with respect to 
the second problem applies equally, if not a fortiori, to French. 
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2.  Pragmatism as a Structuralist Theory of Meaning 
 
2. 1  Two Formulations of Pragmatism 
A good place to start our foray into Peirce’s system of thought is his pragmatism. I will first out-
line the basic idea behind Peirce’s pragmatic maxim by distinguishing between two distinct formu-
lations of the maxim, which I call the verificationist formulation and practicalist formulation, and 
by discussing their relationship. Then, in the following section, I will show how pragmatism can be 
understood as a structuralist theory of meaning. 
Peirce’s pragmatic maxim appeared in public form for the first time in “How to Make Our Ideas 
Clear” (1878), the second paper of the Illustrations of the Logic of Science series, published in the 
Popular Science Monthly. It was formulated as a logical principle for clarifying ideas, for attaining 
the “third grade of clearness” of apprehension, the first two being the traditional criteria of clearness 
and distinctness as formulated by Descartes and developed by Leibniz (W3: 257–61). The famous 
statement of the maxim runs as follows: “Consider what effects, which might conceivably have 
practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these 
effects is the whole of our conception of the object” (W3: 266). While it is evident that this is a rule 
for clarifying our concepts in terms of some sort of “effects,” the difficulty of making sense of this 
statement lies in understanding what Peirce means by “effects which might conceivably have prac-
tical bearings.” The natural interpretation, induced by the examples that Peirce gives in the paper as 
applications of the pragmatic maxim, is this: the maxim is a rule which tells us to clarify our con-
cepts in terms of what we conceive would be the counteractive effects of actions conducted upon an 
object to which the concept in question can be veritably applied as a predicate. In other words it 
dictates that the meaning of a concept can be expressed in conditional propositions of the form: 
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(i) If you were to do m to object x (to which the concept in question can be veritably applied as a 
predicate), then you would have an experience of type n. 
 
Call this the verificationist formulation of the pragmatic maxim.21 The examples that Peirce gives 
in “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” in order to illustrate his maxim, namely those of the concept of 
“hardness,” “heaviness,” “force,” and “reality,” fit neatly with this interpretation. In the case of 
hardness, the pragmatic maxim dictates that the meaning of calling something (say a diamond) 
“hard” can be expressed in conditional propositions such as: “if you were to apply pressure to the 
diamond with a knife-edge, then it would not be scratched.” Likewise, the meaning of calling 
something “heavy” can be expressed in conditional propositions such as “if you were to try to lift 
the heavy object, then it would take considerable effort.” Peirce’s clarification of the concept of 
“reality” is conducted along similar lines: he asks what the “peculiar sensible effects which things 
partaking of it [the quality of reality] produce” (W3: 271). 
There are passages, however, that suggest a different interpretation of the pragmatic maxim. 
“How to Make Our Ideas Clear” can for the most part be read along verificationist lines, but there is 
one passage which does not seem to fit this interpretation. This is where Peirce takes up the concept 
                                                            
21 This corresponds to what Alston calls the experimentalist formulation, which he expresses by 
the following scheme: “If you do m to x, then you will experience n” (1955: 67–68). My formula-
tion is a correction of Alston’s in two respects: firstly, instead of saying “experience n,” I say 
“experience of type n,” in order to indicate that the experience should be a general type rather than a 
particular instance (the significance of this will become apparent in Chapters 4 and 5); and secondly, 
I have replaced Alston’s “you will experience” with the subjunctive “you would have an experience.” 
The difference between “will” and “would” is subtle but important. It concerns the reality of possi-
bilia, the recognition of which prompted Peirce to abandon his earlier Scotist brand of realism and 
adopt a more “extreme” form of realism in the late 1890s. Significant though the distinction may be, 
I will not go into it in this thesis; for a more extended discussion of this matter see Aames (2015, 
online text). 
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of “force,” and says “According to our rule, we must begin by asking what is the immediate use of 
thinking about force” (W3: 268). Here he is talking not about how the subject of our predication 
will behave under given conditions, but the practical effects of our having the conception of force. 
This seems to imply that the meaning of the concept of “force” should be clarified not in terms of 
conceivable sensible effects, but in terms of the bearings which the concept will have on our con-
duct. It should be noted, however, that Peirce’s actual application of the pragmatic maxim to the 
concept of force is conducted along verificationist lines, this initial remark notwithstanding. I will 
return to the concept of force in the following section. 
There are passages from other writings, mainly from the later period of Peirce’s life, that rein-
force this reading. In the 1905 paper “The Issues of Pragmaticism,” Peirce gives a reformulation of 
his pragmatic maxim as follows:  
 
The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all general 
modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different cir-
cumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol. (EP2: 
346, 1905) 
 
Here, explicit reference to “effects” is dropped, and the meaning of a symbol (of which the concept 
is a species) is instead equated with “general modes of rational conduct.” Again, in the Harvard 
Lectures of 1903 Peirce says: 
 
Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical judgment expressible in a sen-
tence in the indicative mood is a confused form of thought whose only meaning, if 
it has any, lies in its tendency to enforce a corresponding practical maxim express-
ible as a conditional sentence having its apodosis in the imperative mood. (EP2: 
134–135, 1903) 
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The idea behind these formulations can be rendered in the following way. The meaning of a concept 
can be clarified in terms of habits of conduct expressible in conditional propositions of the form: 
 
(ii) If you want to have an experience of type r, then you ought to do s to object x (to which the 
concept in question can be veritably applied as a predicate). 
 
Call this the practicalist formulation of the pragmatic maxim.22 Again, to take the concept of hard-
ness for example, a practicalist clarification would look something like this: the meaning of calling 
something—take the diamond again—“hard” consists in habits of conduct expressible in condition-
al propositions such as “if you want to see the diamond resisting being scratched, then you ought to 
apply pressure to it with a knife-edge.” The idea is that the meaning of a concept lies in the attitudes 
that we take towards objects to which we can veritably apply the concept as a predicate. 
Sentences rendered in formulation (i) can always be translated into those of formulation (ii), by 
taking experience type n as the object of desire, and action m as the action one is obligated to on the 
condition of having the desire, that is, by substituting m for s and n for r.23 But the converse does 
not hold. In order to see why the converse does not hold, it is necessary to retrace Peirce’s deriva-
tion of the maxim in “How to Make Our Ideas Clear.” First he observes that the “soul and meaning 
of thought … can never be made to direct itself toward anything but the production of belief. 
                                                            
22 This formulation is taken in all essentials from Alston’s formulation of the same name: “if you 
want r, then you ought to do s to x” (1955: 68). There are two differences between my formula-
tion and Alston’s: I have added that the experience r should be a general type, and I have made it 
explicit that the meaning of the concept lies not in the conditional statement as such, but rather in 
the habits of conduct expressible in such statements. The significance of these modifications will 
become clearer in Chapters 4 and 5. 
23 Again, this way of putting the matter is borrowed from Alston (1955: 68). Hookway (2012) 
offers a similar account of Peirce’s various formulations of the pragmatic maxim, although he 
gives three distinct formulations instead of two. 
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Thought in action has for its only possible motive the attainment of thought at rest; and whatever 
does not refer to belief is no part of the thought itself” (W3: 263). So the meaning of a thought can 
be explicated by reference to the belief which it leads to. Next he notes, following his argument in 
“The Fixation of Belief,” that a belief is simply another name for a habit, a tendency to act in certain 
ways given the relevant circumstances. Thus we attain the practicalist formulation of the pragmatic 
maxim, as we have explicated the meaning of a thought in terms of belief, and belief in terms of 
habit. 
But the further move from habit to action, and action to sensible effects, requires two additional 
assumptions. Since a habit is a rule for action, what a habit is depends on when and how it causes us 
to act (W3: 265). We can thus explicate habit in terms of action, provided that action is understood 
as virtual and not actual—actions that would be executed given the relevant circumstances, even if 
those circumstances are never actually realized—lest we fall into a nominalist interpretation of 
pragmatism. And since, according to Peirce, the purpose of every action is to produce some sensible 
result (W3: 265), we can conduct the final move from action to sensible effects. We can thus see 
that the verificationist formulation requires two further assumptions than the practicalist formulation, 
and this is the reason why propositions in the former can be translated into those of the latter but not 
vice versa. 
From this it may be argued, as Alston (1955) does, that the practicalist formulation is more fun-
damental than the verificationist, the latter being a special case of the former. If, however, we grant 
Peirce’s assumption that there is no habit which is not a tendency towards action, and no action 
which does not aim at some sensible result, then we may legitimately speak of the pragmatic maxim 
as though it were equivalent to the verificationist formulation, even though the practicalist formula-
tion may be more fundamental. The rationale for this is that almost all of Peirce’s actual applica-
tions of the maxim take the form of the verificationist formulation, most likely because taking into 
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account all of the possible different circumstances and desires in which a conception may be in-
volved is highly impractical. Even if the practicalist formulation may be more fundamental in theo-
ry, in practice it is almost always the verificationist formulation that is employed. Therefore, in the 
ensuing discussion I shall drop reference to the practicalist formulation and speak of the pragmatic 
maxim in terms of the verificationist formulation, unless otherwise specified. It should be stressed, 
however, that in speaking of sensible results, we shall understand virtual sensible results—what 
would occur given the relevant conditions, even if those conditions are never actually real-
ized—rather than the sensible results of any actual instance. 
2. 2  Pragmatism as a Structuralist Theory of Meaning 
In order to illustrate what I mean when I say that pragmatism is a structuralist theory of meaning, 
let us first take up Peirce’s application of the pragmatic maxim to the concept of “force” in the third 
section of “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (W3: 268–71). There he gives a detailed explanation of 
vector composition, but I do not think this has much relevance to his main point.24 What is essential 
here is what the concept of force stands for, and Peirce’s answer is that its meaning is entirely cap-
tured in the relation F = ma, where F is force, m is mass of a body, and a is acceleration. F and a 
are vectors. 
Intuitively, this equation, Newton’s Second Law of Motion, denotes a causal relation: if you 
were to apply force F to a body of mass m, then the body would accelerate at an acceleration of a. 
An acceleration is any change in velocity, and as such it is a sensible effect. Conversely, any body 
                                                            
24 The reason why he gives such an explanation is most likely because the use of vectors in clas-
sical mechanics was not yet conventional at the time of writing (1878). The standard notation at 
the time was the quaternion notation developed by Sir William Hamilton and Peter Tait. It was 
not until J. Willard Gibbs introduced the methods of vector analysis in his lectures at Yale Uni-
versity in the 1880s that the vector notation became standard in classical mechanics (Yukawa 
1975: 58–62). 
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whose velocity is changing must be under the influence of some force. Peirce’s point is that the 
meaning of the concept of force is fully captured by this relation, F = ma. In conjunction with other 
laws for determining the force exerted on a given body in a given system, we can predict how the 
body will accelerate. But the concept of force itself has no reference other than to this acceleration. I 
just said that the equation of motion denotes a causal relation, but whether we say that force causes 
acceleration, or force is acceleration (of a body of mass m), is merely a verbal issue.25 All that we 
have a right to say is that F is such a thing which stands in such and such a relation to m and a. The 
meaning of the concept of force is entirely determined by the relational structure in which it figures; 
there is no such thing as a mysterious force-like entity over and above this relational structure. 
Now force is a general concept. To say that the meaning of general concepts is determined by the 
relational structure in which they figure is clearly not enough to establish that particular objects are 
not real, as claimed by OSR. Even if force is nothing but acceleration, apparently there must be 
something that is accelerating. We are thus led to the notion of an individual, of which properties 
and relations may be predicated. While this may seem to be a straightforward notion, let us examine 
it in more detail. When I perceive a particular object in front of me, say a table for example, and I 
perceive it as a table, I am making the perceptual judgment “this is a table” by categorizing the “this” 
in front of me under the general concept of a table. Without that general concept, I cannot cognize 
the thing in front of me as a table. The same goes for any other perceptual judgment, such as “this is 
brown” or “this is rectangular.” Without recourse to general concepts which function as predicates, 
I cannot cognize the particular thing in front of me at all. Now, if the meaning of a general concept 
                                                            
25 As I pointed out in the previous section, here we should be careful not to reduce force to actual 
acceleration, since otherwise we would have to say that a body at rest and under the influence of 
two equal forces of opposite direction is not under the influence of any force, because it is not 
actually accelerating. Rather we should say that force is virtual acceleration: if one of the forces 
were removed, then the body would accelerate in the direction opposite of that force. 
 48 
can be analyzed into a network of conceivable sense effects, then what I am seeing when I see a 
particular object in front of me, to which the general concept can be veritably applied as a predicate, 
must be nothing other than that web of relations which constitute the meaning of that general con-
cept. 
I contend that this is a direct consequence of Peirce’s theory of the categories, as set forth in his 
1867 “On a New List of Categories” (W2, Sel. 4). I shall discuss the categories in detail in the fol-
lowing chapter; here, as a propaedeutic, let us consider the logical process that leads us to formulate 
concepts in the first place.26 For the sake of illustration, our discussion will be predicated upon ref-
erence to the nervous system, but it should be emphasized that the process itself is independent of 
its physical implementation—the nervous system is only a perspicuous instance of a process that is 
governed by principles that make the pragmatic maxim applicable to it. Let us start from the postu-
late that the nervous system can be characterized as a classificatory apparatus. By this I mean that it 
can be adequately modeled as a machine or program that apportions sensory stimuli to distinct 
classes. Initially, the nervous system classifies objects according to the effects which they have on 
the organism. Suppose that I see two beakers of liquid in front of me: one is water and the other is 
hydrochloric acid. If we restrict our discussion to the sense modality of vision, then I shall classify 
the two liquids as the same substance, as there are no differences in the effects which the two liq-
uids have on my sensory receptors. The nervous system thus establishes a classificatory order of 
                                                            
26 The following illustration is inspired by the general framework of Friedrich A. Hayek’s theory 
of cognition, as developed in The Sensory Order (Hayek 1952). My example of the hydrochloric 
acid and aluminum is an elaboration of an example that Hayek gives in Chapter 8 of his book: 
“Several chemical substances may, e.g., be completely indistinguishable to the senses so long as 
they remain in their given state. The reason why chemistry classifies them as different substances 
is that in certain circumstances and in combination with certain other substances they will ‘react’ 
differently” (Hayek 1952, 8.22). 
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things, a mental map of the objects in its surrounding environment, according to the effects which 
those objects have on the organism. Call this mental map the sensory order. 
Now suppose that I conduct an experiment on the two liquids. I drop a piece of aluminum into 
each of the two beakers, and observe that a reaction takes place in one—the aluminum dissolves 
and emits a transparent gas which, upon being brought into contact with a burning match, makes a 
POP sound—but not the other. I thereby modify my initial classification; I classify the two liquids 
as different substances. What has taken place here is that I have re-classified the objects in front of 
me according to the effects which they have in relation to other objects, in this case the piece of 
aluminum. The aluminum thus plays the role of a differentiating agent, with reference to which I 
can see the difference between water and hydrochloric acid. Gradually, such re-classification will 
lead to the construction of a new mental map of the environment, based on the reciprocal relations 
that hold between things, rather than on the relations which hold between a thing and the organism. 
Call this new mental map the physical order. Science may be understood as that process by which 
the sensory order is gradually replaced by the physical order, and knowledge thereby detached from 
idiosyncrasies of the sensory apparatus of the organism. And this is precisely what the principle of 
pragmatism (understood in terms of the verificationist formulation) tells us to do: it tells us to clari-
fy our conception of objects in terms of the conceivable effects which they have in relation to other 
objects. That is, it tells us to retrace the steps that led us to formulate that concept in the first place. 
The conception can then be seen as a symbol that welds together, as it were, those relations into the 
unity of an idea. 
Consider, for example, Peirce’s pragmatic clarification of lithium, from the third section of his 
“A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic,” composed to accompany his 1903 Lowell Lectures: 
 
If you look into a textbook of chemistry for a definition of lithium, you may be told 
that it is that element whose atomic weight is 7 very nearly. But if the author has a 
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more logical mind he will tell you that if you search among minerals that are vitre-
ous, translucent, grey or white, very hard, brittle, and insoluble, for one which im-
parts a crimson tinge to an unluminous flame, this mineral being triturated with 
lime or witherite rats-bane, and then fused, can be partly dissolved in muriatic acid; 
and if this solution be evaporated, and the residue be extracted with sulphuric acid, 
and duly purified, it can be converted by ordinary methods into a chloride, which 
being obtained in the solid state, fused, and electrolyzed with half a dozen powerful 
cells, will yield a globule of a pinkish silvery metal that will float on gasolene; and 
the material of that is a specimen of lithium. (EP2: 286, 1903) 
 
Here we can see that the meaning of the general concept of lithium is determined entirely by the 
relations which it enters with other objects (and phenomena). To point at something and call it 
“lithium” is merely to specify a node within the network of relations of which the concept “lithium” 
is a symbolic unification.27 Indeed, as we shall see in the following chapter, for Peirce this is pre-
cisely what it means to explain something, to render the this in front of me intelligible: it is to put it 
into relation with other things already known so that it has a place within an order. It is true that 
Peirce mentions properties such as “vitreous” and “translucent” in the above definition of lithium. 
But the perception of such properties themselves involves predication and hence concepts; and the-
se concepts can be further clarified, via the pragmatic maxim, as being a system of relations. Every 
moment of our waking (and sleeping) hours we are perceiving and thinking relations, and it is the 
                                                            
27 Of course, this way of putting the matter still involves reference to a “something” of which 
judgments are made. This “something” corresponds to what Locke called the notion of pure sub-
stance in general, as opposed to ideas of particular sorts of substances. Regarding the former he 
writes: “The idea then we have, to which we give the general name substance, being nothing, but 
the supposed, but unknown support of those qualities, we find existing, which we imagine cannot 
subsist, sine re substante, without something to support them, we call that support substantia; 
which, according to the true import of the word, is in plain English, standing under or upholding” 
(Locke [1689] 1975, Bk. II, Chap. XXIII, Sec. 2). We shall return to this issue in Chapter 5. 
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principle of pragmatism that explicates the structural nature of our concepts by retracing their logi-
cal genesis.  
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3.  Peirce’s Theory of the Categories 
 
3. 1.  On a New List of Categories: General Outline 
In order to appreciate the depth of Peirce’s pragmatism, we cannot avoid delving into his theory 
of the categories. My aim in this chapter is twofold: first, to exhibit the operation of the three cate-
gories, Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, within the thought process and show how this opera-
tion manifests itself in the structuralism of the pragmatic maxim; and second, to show how the the-
ory of categories can lead us to a conception of representation that does not fall prey to the second 
of the difficulties faced by OSR. We will be going into dense discussions, particularly with respect 
to interpretive issues concerning Peirce’s notion of Reference to a Correlate; I beg the reader’s pa-
tience, as I believe these discussions have more than a merely scholarly interest. 
While Peirce’s categories developed significantly over the course of his life, the best place to 
start is where it all began: Peirce’s early studies, which culminated in his 1867 “On a New List of 
Categories” (W2, Sel. 4). It is here that we find the basso continuo that can be heard running 
through Peirce’s thought, changeless throughout his entire life.28 I will first give a general outline 
                                                            
28 Contra T. L. Short, who claims: “Contrary to the importance so often accorded to it, the ‘New 
List’ is a stepping stone, not a keystone. Furthermore, it was a stepping stone for Peirce, not for 
us. It is not required for mastery of his later thought” (2007: 32). Here, it should be emphasized 
that Peirce himself repeatedly says, in his later years as well as his earlier years, that the New List 
is his greatest achievement: “the theory of categories … is (if anything is) the gift I make to the 
world. That is my child. In it I shall live when oblivion has me—my body” (W2: 1, 1867); “on 
May 14, 1867… I produced my one contribution to philosophy in the ‘New List of Categories’” 
(CP 8.213, letter draft to Mario Calderoni, c.1905); “There is mighty little in the C. S. Peirce of 
1905 of identity with the C. S. Peirce of 1867. I feel entitled to speak of him as quite another per-
son. But my opinion is that the paper On a New List of Categories is one of the most perfect gems 
of all philosophy. I have not been able to find any positive error in it. There is a good deal that 
was not then worked out, but the leading features were made out correctly.” (L 224: 73, August 
1905 letter to William James). I am unable to resist the suspicion that there is something method-
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of the issue that Peirce is grappling with in the paper, and then I will discuss his derivation of the 
categories, addressing along the way the different interpretations of Peirce’s notion of Reference to 
a Correlate that have been proposed in the scholarship. As will become clear, Peirce’s notion of 
Correlate is of prime importance in understanding the structuralism embodied in his pragmatism. 
Let us begin with the question of what Peirce means by a category. Following Kant, Peirce uses 
the term category to denote a universal conception (W2: 49), universal in the sense that it is at work 
in any process of thought whatsoever, including perception (supposing that perception involves an 
act of judgment, and that judgment is a thought process).29 A conception is a logical entity having 
the form of a predicate, whose function is to “reduce the manifold of sensuous impressions to unity” 
(W2: 49), and whose validity consists in “the impossibility of reducing the content of consciousness 
to unity without the introduction of it” (W2: 49). Peirce’s aim in the New List is to find these uni-
versal conceptions, and thereby explicate the logical structure of the thought process at its most 
fundamental level.30 
Here, it is important to emphasize what the New List is not intended to be. It is not a psychologi-
cal investigation but a logical investigation; and Peirce was strenuously opposed to all forms of 
psychologism—the position that the study of logic ought to be grounded in a study of the human 
mind—from the first moment he spoke publicly on logic, in 1865, until the end of his life.31 The 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
ologically absurd in dismissing Peirce’s testimonies about his own thought. 
29 In Lecture IX of his 1866 Lowell Lectures, Peirce explains his use of the term universal in this 
context: “Of the numerous conceptions of the mind, some apply only to certain special collections 
of impressions and are called particular. Others apply to all collections of impressions and are 
called universal” (W1: 473). 
30 Later, Peirce will drop the idea that the categories are concepts, and instead suggest that they 
are rather “moods or tones of thought” (EP1: 247, 1887–88). Later still, he will come to describe 
them as “not concepts but merely elements of concepts—what fluorine was among chemical sub-
stances until Moissan isolated it. Or better like ions” (L 387b: 328, 1908). 
31 Peirce opened the first lecture of his 1865 Harvard Lectures with a critique of psychologism 
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New List is concerned with the logical structure of the thought process as such, irrespective of 
where or how that thought takes place. Accordingly, the argument of the New List is crafted in such 
a way that its results do not depend on contingencies such as the constitution of the human mind; 
for otherwise the universal validity of its conclusions would be infringed. It is true that Peirce uses 
terms such as “consciousness,” “sensuous impressions,” and “mental separation” that suggest a de-
pendence on psychology. However, the offending terms are immaterial to the argument and may be 
eliminated if desired. Later, starting in the mid-1880s, Peirce will expand his categories ontologi-
cally, arguing that they are the fundamental elements not only of human thought but of the universe 
itself. This “ontological turn” is exemplified in the title of one of his essays from 1885: “One, Two, 
Three: Fundamental Categories of Thought and of Nature” (W5, Sel. 35). While the Peirce of 1867 
was not thinking of the categories in such ontological terms, it is important to keep in mind that the 
ontological reinterpretation was made possible by the anti-psychologist approach of the New List. 
Peirce derives five categories (not three) in the New List: Being, Quality (Reference to a Ground), 
Relation (Reference to a Correlate), Representation (Reference to an Interpretant), and Substance. 
The three categories intermediate between Being and Substance are called accidents (W2: 55); later, 
Peirce will drop Being and Substance from the list of categories, resulting in a list of three catego-
ries. These correspond to what he will eventually come to call Firstness, Secondness, and Third-
ness—Quality corresponding to Firstness, Relation to Secondness, and Representation to Thirdness. 
Let us begin with the categories of Substance and Being. 
For Peirce, any act of thought can be analyzed as an act of predication, that is, the act of attach-
ing a mark to an object of attention. The “object of attention” need not be an external thing (external 
in the sense of its manifestation being uncontrollable); it can also be a feeling or preceding thought. 
However, in all of these cases the act of thought consists in the attaching of a conception as a logical 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
(W1: 163–65). 
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predicate to the object of attention as a subject; and in this sense there is no essential difference be-
tween them. The predicate need not be a monadic predicate (a predicate with only one “blank”). 
Before his long 1870 memoir on the logic of relations, “Description of a Notation for the Logic of 
Relatives” (W2, Sel. 39), and even before obtaining a copy of Augustus De Morgan’s memoir on 
the logic of relatives (De Morgan 1864) in 1868, Peirce had devoted some study to relational terms 
and their role in arguments.32 As early as 1865, Peirce was aware of the incompleteness of the tra-
ditional syllogistic and of George Boole’s algebra of classes (Michael 1974). We can see Peirce’s 
interest in the logic of relations around this time in §15 of the New List, where he gives the follow-
ing proposition in an example: “Whatever is the half of anything is less than that of which it is the 
half” (W2: 58). As pointed out by Ishida (2014: 138), this kind of proposition cannot be handled 
within the limitations of Kant’s traditional or Aristotelean syllogistic. Although his formal treatment 
of relations is not as elaborate as it is in his later works, already at this stage we can see Peirce ex-
perimenting with propositions and arguments that go beyond the limits of the traditional logic. We 
therefore have no reason for restricting Peirce’s notion of predication in the New List to monadic 
predicates: Peirce did not intend such a restriction, nor does the argument itself turn upon such a 
restriction. 
The “object of attention” mentioned above constitutes the first category, Substance. Peirce de-
scribes it variously as “the manifold of sensuous impressions” (W2: 49), “the present, in general” 
(W2: 49, emphasis in original), the “IT in general” (W2: 49), and “the general recognition of what 
is contained in attention” (W2; 49). It is the this in front of me, before anything has been thought 
about what or how it is. Peirce calls this first category “Substance” because it can only function as a 
                                                            
32 See Michael (1974) for a discussion of Peirce’s early studies in the logic of relations, between 
1865 and 1867. Merrill (1978) carries the study further, examining the developments between 
1867 and 1870, leading up to Peirce’s “Description of a Notation for the Logic of Relatives.” 
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logical subject and never as a predicate, coinciding with Aristotle’s definition of οὐσία.33 The read-
er may find it strange that Peirce characterizes Substance as a conception, despite the fact that it 
cannot function as a logical predicate. One way to understand this is to highlight Peirce’s use of the 
word “general” in his characterizations of Substance: “the present in general,” the “IT in general,” 
“the general recognition of what is contained in attention,” etc. Perhaps this means that although 
Substance cannot function as a logical predicate, there is already an incipient generality in it, or an 
intrinsic connexity, as De Tienne (1996: 167) calls it. I will not go into interpretational issues re-
garding the notion of Substance in this paper, since it will have little bearing on our main topic. Suf-
fice it to say that whatever Peirce may have meant by Substance, there is no way for us to actually 
experience or perceive it as a bare and undifferentiated this. We can only conceive of it post facto, 
as a hypothetical entity or situation that serves as the starting point of the thought process, after the 
process has run its course. That Peirce himself understood it so is evinced by the fact that he starts 
his derivation of the categories from Being rather than Substance, despite his characterization of 
Substance as the universal conception that is “nearest to sense” (W2: 49): we have no choice but to 
start from Being because we do not have perceptual access to Substance. 
Substance, then, is the starting point of the thought process. It is a question mark, the soliciting 
of an inquiry. At the end of the thought process is Being. It is that which completes the reduction of 
the manifold of sensuous impressions to the “unity of a proposition” (W2: 49). The end point of the 
thought process must be a proposition because it is the result of attaching a predicate to a subject. 
The rationale for calling this category “Being” is that it is “that which is implied in the copula” 
                                                            
33 Aristotle, Categories, 2a13. The last sentence of §3 of the New List is an allusion to this passage 
of Aristotle’s Categories: “This it is thus neither predicated of a subject, nor in a subject, and ac-
cordingly is identical with the conception of substance” (W2: 49). 
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(W2: 49). It is, so to speak, the period that seals the inquiry initiated by the question mark of Sub-
stance, rendering the object of attention intelligible. 
We therefore have the starting point and end point of the thought process, Substance and Being. 
The three categories intermediate between these two terminals are, in order of passing from Being 
to Substance: Quality (Reference to a Ground), Relation (Reference to a Correlate), and Represen-
tation (Reference to an Interpretant). Notice that the order is from Being to Substance rather than 
from Substance to Being. This is because, as mentioned above, we have no perceptual access to 
Substance. The derivation of the categories must start from Being, the end point of the thought pro-
cess, because that is where we always find ourselves. 
The method that Peirce adopts in the New List is to start from Being and proceed one step at a 
time, searching for a conception that would occasion, and, at the same time, justify the introduction 
of the conception that precedes it (in order of passing from Being to Substance). Peirce writes that it 
is empirical psychology that furnishes the data from which we are to seek the conceptions that will 
be candidates for the categories (W2: 51). Now this may seem to contradict Peirce’s an-
ti-psychologism. It could be argued that there is no contradiction, as long as the argument only 
makes use of psychological facts as data and does not appeal to them as principles. Yet, Peirce 
himself will later make the following comment in his Logic Notebook: “It may be doubted whether 
it was philosophical to rest this matter on empirical psychology. The question is extremely difficult” 
(W2: 94, 1868). Here I will not go into the issue; I will simply note that later in his life, Peirce will 
make the search for the categories rely not on the data of empirical psychology but on the data fur-
nished by the science of phenomenology or phaneroscopy. 
Whether a given conception is the sought for category is to be verified according to whether the 
preceding conception can be prescinded from it but not vice versa. Prescision is a mode of concep-
tual distinction that involves attending to one element to the neglect of another (W2: 50). Or as 
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Peirce puts it in a later text, it “consists in supposing a state of things in which one element is pre-
sent without the other, the one being logically possible without the other” (EP2: 270, 1903). What 
distinguishes prescision from other modes of distinction is that it is not always reciprocal: there are 
cases in which A can be prescinded from B but not vice versa. For example, space can be prescind-
ed from color but color cannot be prescinded from space; and color can be prescinded from red but 
red cannot be prescinded from color (W2: 51). Such non-reciprocal cases can be explained only by 
the circumstance that the prescindable conception is a necessary condition for the possibility of 
cognizing the conception from which it can be prescinded; whereas once the prescindable concep-
tion has been introduced, the conception that occasioned its introduction may in general be neglect-
ed (W2: 51). Thus, the manifold of sensuous impressions being united under the conception of 
space is a necessary condition for its being united under the conception of color (and hence color 
cannot be prescinded from space), but once the conception of space has been introduced, the color 
of the manifold may in general be neglected (and hence space can be prescinded from color). In 
other words, if we are able to show that a certain conception A can be prescinded from another 
conception B but not vice versa, we have thereby shown that B cannot be reduced to unity without 
the introduction of A. Now, as we saw earlier, the validity of a conception consists in “the impossi-
bility of reducing the content of consciousness to unity without the introduction of it” (W2: 49). 
Therefore, if A can be prescinded from B but not vice versa, this means that B justifies the introduc-
tion of A. The introduction of a category must be justified in this sense, for otherwise it would be a 
superfluous conception, which would in turn make it non-universal and hence not a category. Thus, 
if we are able to find a conception, B, such that another conception which we have already estab-
lished as a category, A, can be prescinded from it, then B must be the justification for the introduc-
tion of A. This does not prove conclusively that B is also a category, since there may be other con-
ceptions that also occasion and justify the introduction of A. But if there are such conceptions, once 
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they are found they may verified using the same method: if a conception does not satisfy the crite-
rion of prescindability with respect to the concepts adjacent to it within the order leading from Be-
ing to Substance, then it is thereby disqualified as a category. Peirce’s derivation of the categories in 
the New List is thus not a transcendental deduction à la Kant, but rather an inductive investigation. 
The first category that Peirce finds, in order of passing from Being to Substance, is Quality, or 
Reference to a Ground. A Ground is a hypostatic abstraction that serves as the basis for a predica-
tion.34 For example, in the predicative judgment “this stove is black,” blackness is the Ground, 
since it is the blackness embodied in the stove that justifies and serves as the basis of that judgment. 
It is by referring to such a Ground that we are able to attach a Quality to Substance and thereby 
produce a proposition. As Peirce puts it in an early draft of the New List, “Character is the ground of 
being; whatever is, is by being somehow” (W1: 352). Reference to a Ground is what occasions and 
justifies the introduction of Being, making it the first category in order of passing from Being to 
Substance. I will have more to say about Reference to a Ground after discussing the next category. 
3. 2  Reference to a Correlate 
The next category that Peirce finds, in order of passing from Being to Substance, is Relation, or 
Reference to a Correlate. The section in which Peirce discusses this category in the New List is brief 
and unhelpful: 
 
Empirical psychology has established the fact that we can know a quality only by 
means of its contrast with or similarity to another. By contrast and agreement a 
thing is referred to a correlate, if this term may be used in a wider sense than usual. 
The occasion of the introduction of the conception of reference to a ground is the 
                                                            
34 A hypostatic abstraction is a logical operation that turns “predicates from being signs that we 
think or think through, into being subjects thought of. We thus think of the thought-sign itself, 
making it the object of another thought-sign” (CP 4.549, 1906). For example, the transformation 
of “honey is sweet” into “honey possesses sweetness” is a hypostatic abstraction. Hereinafter, I 
will use the term to refer to both the operation itself and the result of such an operation. 
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reference to a correlate, and this is, therefore, the next conception in order. (W2: 
53) 
 
In an earlier draft, Peirce writes that “A correlate is a second substance with which the first is in 
comparison” (W1: 524). This and other clues have led De Tienne to suggest that “the correlate is 
the subject of a past experience which has already undergone predication” (1996: 297). That is, it is 
the comparison of the yet unknown case at hand, which Peirce calls the Relate, with the subject of a 
case already known from past experience, the Correlate, that justifies referring the Relate to the 
same (or similar or contrasting) Ground as that of the Correlate, and thereby attributing to it the 
same Quality. 
The trouble in interpreting what Peirce means by a Correlate arises from the fact that he seems 
to be using the term in two different senses: firstly, in the sense suggested by De Tienne, as that 
which occasions and justifies the reference of the Relate to a Ground by serving as a precedent; and 
secondly, as the second term of a (dyadic or triadic) relation, the first term being the Relate. Peirce’s 
use of the term Correlate in the second sense occurs, among other places, in §9 of the New List, 
where he gives the dyadic relation of “murder” as an example to illustrate the notion of representa-
tion: 
 
Again, suppose we think of a murderer as being in relation to a murdered person; 
in this case we conceive the act of the murder, and in this conception it is repre-
sented that corresponding to every murderer (as well as to every murder) there is a 
murdered person; and thus we resort again to a mediating representation which 
represents the relate as standing for a correlate with which the mediating represen-
tation is itself in relation. (W2: 53) 
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Here, the murderer is regarded as the Relate, and the murdered person the Correlate. De Tienne ar-
gues that Peirce was confused about the nature of the Correlate, confounding two incompatible 
senses of the term: 
 
Included in the conception of reference to a correlate is that of a reference to a 
treasure of past experiences—a stock of representations already carried out. Where 
does this reference appear in the relationship of the murderer to his victim? If the 
former is the relate, and the latter the correlate, we obviously cannot say that the 
reference to the victim is a reference to a past representation … But how can the 
interpretant put the murderer and victim into correlation if it cannot refer to an ear-
lier representation, in which this correlation has already taken place? I think the 
main difference between “the stove is black” and “the murderer kills his victim” 
consists only in the number of subjects involved in the predicate, and that such a 
circumstance should not influence the general representation of the process as such. 
In other words, it should be possible to present in both cases a formally identical 
process. Thus, if the attribution of “black” to the stove is the function of a reference 
to a correlate that also underwent (or experienced) this attribution, this should also 
be the case with the attribution of the murder relationship between the murderer 
and his victim. (De Tienne 1996: 297) 
 
Thus, in the case of the murder relation, the Correlate should be neither the murderer nor the mur-
dered person, but past instances in which one has witnessed a murder. By comparing the yet un-
known case at hand with past instances of the murder relation, one is able to refer the case at hand 
to the same Ground as that which successfully made sense of those past instances. 
This interpretation rests upon the assumption that by a Quality Peirce meant not only monadic 
predicates but also polyadic ones (predicates with two or more “blanks”). For otherwise there would 
be no reason to compare a Relate consisting of two or more subjects with a Correlate likewise con-
sisting of two or more subjects, as in the case of the murder relation. In other words, this interpreta-
tion takes, in the murder example, the dyadic relation “____ murders ____” to be the Quality to be 
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attached to the Relate (consisting of two subjects). However, this is not how Peirce understood the 
notion of Quality. In an attempt at a fourth installment of his Monist Pragmaticism series—a manu-
script that bears the title “The Bed-Rock Beneath Pragmaticism”—he writes (in the context of his 
definition of logic as the science that studies the application of symbols to objects): 
 
Yet in the paper in which I first put forward and defended this definition of Logic 
[“On a New List of Categories”] … I noticed but one interpretation of an ordinary 
proposition, its Subject being taken as denoting the Object of the proposition, this 
being considered as a Symbol, while the Predicate signifies that non-relative char-
acter (which I called the “ground”) which the proposition informatively attributes 
to that Object … (MS 300: 64–65, 1908; emphasis mine) 
 
Here, Peirce explicitly states that the Ground is a non-relative character. Again, in a 1908 letter 
draft to Francis C. Russell, he writes: “My ‘ground,’—is a univalent element of thought, to use a 
chemical term …” (L 387b: 328, emphasis in original). The Quality which consists in a reference to 
this Ground, therefore, must have the form of a monadic predicate. 
There is a further problem with De Tienne’s interpretation of Peirce’s notion of the Correlate. 
Namely, it cuts the categories away from Peirce’s logic of relations, and, in particular, his Reduction 
Theorem, which states that all relations of adicity four or higher can be reduced to a combination of 
triadic relations, while triadic relations cannot be further reduced to dyadic and monadic ones, nor 
dyadic ones to monadic ones.35 If the Correlate is regarded not as the second term of a relation but 
as different instances of the relation, then Peirce’s Reduction Theorem, as well as his logic of rela-
tions in general, loses its applicability to the categories and hence its metaphysical significance. 
                                                            
35 See Burch (1991) for a proof of the Reduction Theorem, and Burch (1997a, 1997b) for a con-
cise introduction to the proof. Burch’s proof relies on a logic system that he calls PAL (for 
“Peircean Algebraic Logic”), an algebraic logic that encodes the syntax of the Alpha and Beta 
parts of Peirce’s Existential Graphs. 
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This is certainly not a direction that Peirce himself intended to take, nor is it a philosophically fruit-
ful one. 
How, then, should the notion of Correlate be understood? Firstly, there is the issue of whether a 
Correlate is a form, or a determinate thing or event. Ransdell (1966: 86) argues that Peirce intended 
the Correlate to be a form—a quality, essence, or “firstness”—different from the Quality constituted 
by Reference to a Ground. De Tienne objects to this: “If the correlate is a form or quality, then the 
relate should be of such nature as well. But Peirce always speaks of the relate as substance-subject, 
that is to say, as that of which the form is yet indeterminate” (1996: 287). As Ishida (2009: 52) 
rightly points out, however, there is no reason why the Correlate should have the same mode of be-
ing as the Relate. There is no inconsistency in supposing that the Relate is a substance-subject, 
while the Correlate is a quality. 
Furthermore, if we regard the Correlate as always being a substance-subject—or in other words a 
determinate thing or event rather than a form or quality—a problem arises when we try to map 
Peirce’s terminology in the New List to his later writings on semiotic, the study of signs. As we 
shall see in the following section, for Peirce a relation of prime importance is the triadic relation of 
representation. In general, when we say that X represents Y to Z, this means that Z is somehow 
able to see Y through X. Here, X is the Relate, Y is the Correlate, and Z is the Interpretant (which 
we shall turn to in the next section). To use an example that Peirce gives at the end of §9 of the New 
List, when a person sees the direction of the wind through a weathercock, the weathercock (Relate) 
represents the direction of the wind (Correlate) to the general conception of weathercocks in the 
person’s mind (Interpretant); or in other words, the person sees the direction of the wind through the 
weathercock. Peirce is here clearly thinking of the Correlate as equivalent to what he will later come 
to call the object of a sign, that which a sign stands for and serves to convey knowledge about. But 
the problem is this: is the object of a sign always a determinate thing or event? It is sufficient to 
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think of, say, a mathematical formula to realize that this is not so. Clearly, a mathematical formula 
does not represent any determinate thing or event; if it represents anything, it must be a general re-
lational form. Hence, if we are to understand the notion of Correlate to be synonymous with 
Peirce’s later notion of the object of a sign (and Peirce’s examples at the end of §9 of the New List 
give us grounds for doing so), then we should reject the idea that the Correlate is always a determi-
nate thing or event—it may be so in some cases, but not always.36 
The second issue that we must address is: how do we reconcile the two senses in which Peirce 
seems to use the term Correlate, namely the sense in which it occasions and justifies the attribution 
of a Quality to the object of attention by serving as a past instance of a similar or contrasting quali-
ty; and the sense in which it is the second term of a relation? Let us consider a passage from an 
1865 manuscript, in which Peirce discusses themes that will later make it into the New List. After 
taking up the proposition “this is blue,” and arguing that the Correlate in this predication is anything 
non-blue which serves as a contrasting agent, he takes up the example of a man killing a deer: 
 
[E]verything is such as it is in comparison with something else … the effect of this 
ancient maxim is that ‘blue’ means ‘blue in comparison to’ and therefore requires a 
suffering object [correlate]. The transitive verb supplies this comparison [more ex-
                                                            
36 It is true that there are places where Peirce himself says that the Correlate should be under-
stood as a determinate occurrence: “What I call there [in the New List] a ‘correlate’ is an ordinary 
experiential correlate, reference to which is forced upon the mind. We may call it an occurrence,’ 
meaning a thing or fact, single and definite” (L 387b: 329, 1908). My interpretation is that here 
Peirce is speaking of genuine or pure Secondness; this does not rule out the possibility of there 
being degenerate kinds of Secondness, where the Correlate is not a determinate occurrence. This 
interpretation is corroborated by a claim that Peirce makes in the third of his 1903 Harvard Lec-
tures: “In pure secondness, the reacting correlates are, as I showed in the last lecture, Singulars, 
and as such are Individuals, not capable of further division” (EP2: 161). The implication is that in 
impure (or degenerate) Secondness, the correlates (that is, the Relate and Correlate) need not be 
singular or individual. Unfortunately, although Peirce says “as I showed in the last lecture,” no 
textual evidence survives that indicates what Peirce may have said in the second lecture. 
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plicitly]. If a man kills a deer, that in comparison to which he is a killer is the deer. 
No other comparison is needed … There is undoubtedly a philosophical distinction 
between a transitive and an intransitive verb; but the latter is nothing but that spe-
cies of the former which allows its object [the correlate] most readily to be 
dropped—which amounts to supplying its place by an indefinite pronoun. He 
murders something and he is a murderer are the same. (W1: 336) 
 
Recall that the Ground of a predication is a hypostatic abstraction. In the case of the proposition “a 
man kills a deer,” it is the character killing-ness, which is a non-relative character. Consequently, 
the Quality which consists in a reference to this Ground is also a monadic predicate, not a dyadic 
one (note that the Ground killing-ness is neither monadic, dyadic, nor triadic; the Ground is a hypo-
static abstraction, and a hypostatic abstraction does not have the form of a predicate). Peirce’s later 
concept of continuous predicates will serve to clarify this point. His explanation of continuous 
predicates in a 14 December 1908 letter to Victoria Lady Welby is worth quoting in full: 
 
When we have analyzed a proposition so as to throw into the subject everything 
that can be removed from the predicate, all that it remains for the predicate to rep-
resent is the form of connection between the different subjects as expressed in the 
propositional form. What I mean by “everything that can be removed from the 
predicate” is best explained by giving an example of something not so removable. 
But first take something removable. “Cain kills Abel.” Here the predicate appears 
as “____ kills ____.” But we can remove killing from the predicate and make the 
latter “____ stands in the relation ____ to ____.” Suppose we attempt to remove 
more from the predicate and put the last into the form “____ exercizes the function 
of relate of the relation ____ to ____” and then putting the function of relate to the 
relation into another subject leave as predicate “____ exercizes ____ in respect 
to____ to____.” But this “exercizes” expresses “exercizes the function.” Nay more, 
it expresses “exercizes the function of relate,” so that we find that though we may 
put this into a separate subject, it continues in the predicate just the same. Stating 
this in another form, to say that ‘A is in the relation R to B’ is to say that A is in a 
certain relation to R. Let us separate this out thus: “A is in the relation R1 (where R1 
is the relation of a relate to the relation of which it is the relate,) to R to B.” But A 
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is here said to be in a certain relation to the relation R1. So that we can express the 
same fact by saying “A is in the relation R2 to the relation R1 to the relation R to B,” 
and so on ad infinitum. A predicate which can thus be analyzed into parts all ho-
mogeneous with the whole I call a continuous predicate. It is very important in 
logical analysis, because a continuous predicate obviously cannot be a compound 
except of continuous predicates, and thus when we have carried analysis so far as 
to leave only a continuous predicate, we have carried it to its ultimate elements. 
(SS: 71–72) 
 
To put it bluntly, the adicity of a predicate is inessential from a logical point of view, because any 
predicate can be analyzed into a triadic relation or combination of triadic relations, by transforming 
the “quality” involved in the predicate into a substantive via hypostatic abstraction. We are thus able 
to exhibit the pure form of the predicate, with everything inessential (so far as the logical form is 
concerned) thrown into the subjects. What is left is only the form of connection between the things 
that the proposition containing that predicate is about. Although the quality is left as a subject in the 
above analysis, we can further treat it as a monadic 
predicate attached to an indefinite individual. Thus, 
“a man kills a deer” can be analyzed into “a man is in 
the relation of killing to a deer,” which can be further 
analyzed into “there is an x, y, and z such that x is a 
killing, y exercises the function of Relate with re-
spect to x, and z exercises the function of Correlate 
with respect to x.” This last proposition can be rep-
resented graphically as in the figure above. K stands for the monadic predicate “____ is a killing,” 
X stands for the dyadic predicate “____ exercises the function of Relate with respect to ____,” Y 
stands for the dyadic predicate and “____ exercises the function of Correlate with respect to ____,” 
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M stands for the monadic predicate “____ is a man,” and D stands for the monadic predicate “____ 
is a deer.” The lines represent existential quantification. Note the presence of the teridentity term, 
which, following Burch (1991), I will denote as 13. This is a triadic relation that states that “____ is 
identical to ____ and ____,” and is always present whenever a proposition is analyzed into its pure 
form, that is, into a proposition containing a continuous predicate. My reason for bringing the teri-
dentity term to the reader’s attention is to point out that even in a dyadic relation such as “a man 
kills a deer,” there is hidden triadic relation. The implications of this fact will become clear in the 
following section, where we turn to the third category. 
Let us to return to Peirce’s 1865 passage. Although Peirce did not have the notion of continuous 
predicates at this stage, he seems to be thinking along the same lines in this passage (which is not 
surprising, considering that the central idea of continuous predicates was already implicit in Peirce’s 
early discussions on the leading principle of inferences; see Bellucci 2013: 192–94). Thus, the 
transformation of “a man kills a deer” into “a man is a murderer” involves substantivizing the mur-
der relation and saying that “a man exercises the function of Relate with respect to the act of mur-
der,” as represented by the left half of the above figure. If we then erase D and Y—that is, if we 
“drop” the Reference to a Correlate—then we are left with the monadic predication “a man is a 
murderer.” Note, however, that we cannot prescind the Reference to the Ground killingness from 
Reference to the Correlate “deer” in this example—dropping the Reference to a Correlate alters the 
predication; and this is precisely what makes the relation of “killing” a dyadic relation (W2: 55). 
But the fact that, by dropping (not prescinding from) the Reference to the Correlate, the initial 
predication (“a man kills a deer”) can be altered into a monadic predication (“a man is a murderer”) 
that refers to the same Ground as that of the initial predication, shows that the Quality of killing, 
which consists in a Reference to that invariant Ground, is indeed monadic.37 
                                                            
37 Against this it may be objected that Peirce speaks of a “relative quality” in §14 of the New List, 
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An inductive examination of similar instances will show that any judgment involving a polyadic 
predicate can be turned into a judgment involving only a monadic predicate, without altering the 
Quality attributed by the judgment to the object of attention. The procedure involves two steps: first, 
we transform the Quality embodied in the polyadic predicate into a non-relative character via hypo-
static abstraction (this non-relative character being the Ground of the judgment); and second, we 
“drop” the Reference to the Correlate (and Reference to the Interpretant) without altering the 
Ground that the judgment refers to, though this will alter the judgment itself. From this it follows 
that the Quality involved in a judgment must always be monadic, regardless of the adicity of the 
predicate attributed by the judgment to the object of attention. 
Hypostatic abstraction plays a crucial role in the above procedure, and I am tempted to think that 
this is the reason why Peirce speaks of the Ground as a hypostatic abstraction in the New List. Fur-
thermore, the view that Quality is always monadic fits neatly with the overall scheme of Peirce’s list 
of categories: Quality is monadic, Relation (in the sense used in the New List) is dyadic, and Repre-
sentation is triadic. It would be strange, to say the least, if Relation were dyadic, Representation tri-
adic, and Quality a general n-adic predicate. Hence, we should dispense with the idea that the Cor-
relate is the a past instance of a judgment involving a Quality similar or contrasting to the one ap-
                                                                                                                                                                                 
as a Quality that cannot be prescinded from Reference to a Correlate. However, it is in no way 
evident that a relative quality in this sense should have the form of a dyadic predicate. The Qual-
ity of killing, for example, is a relative quality because it cannot be prescinded from Reference to 
a Correlate, not because it is a dyadic predicate. Indeed, if one were to hold that the Quality of 
killing is a dyadic predicate, then the Correlate of the predication “a man kills a deer” cannot be 
the deer, since upon this theory both the man and deer must be the Relate, and the Relate cannot 
be its own Correlate except in special cases; instead, the Correlate must be a past instance of the 
killing relation (or a collection thereof). But then §14 of the New List will make no sense: if the 
Correlate is understood as a past instance (or collection of past instances) of the killing relation, 
then any Quality whatsoever can be prescinded from Reference to such a Correlate, and there 
would be no way of distinguishing between relative and internal (non-relative) qualities. 
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plicable to the case at hand. It may be so in the case of a judgment involving a monadic predicate, 
but given that Quality is always monadic, this cannot be generalized to hold for polyadic predica-
tions; and even in the case of monadic predications, we have no reason to suppose that this is uni-
versally so. In the case of the monadic predication “this is blue,” for example, the Correlate does not 
have to be a blue or non-blue thing (or collection of blue and/or non-blue things) that one has wit-
nessed in the past—the background with which the subject of predication is in contrast may also be 
a Correlate. However, it should be emphasized that no matter what the Correlate may be, the pro-
cess of predication will always have the same logical form, according to our interpretation. 
Still, it may be asked, how does a Correlate occasion and justify the attribution of a Quality to 
the Relate, if it is regarded as the second term of a relation? A hint towards answering this question 
can be found in Peirce’s 1894 rewriting of the New List (MS 403), originally intended as Chapter 1 
of a projected book entitled The Art of Reasoning, but then turned into Chapter 1 of his complete 
but unpublished How to Reason: A Critick of Arguments. He begins his rewriting of §8, which treats 
the Reference to a Correlate, as follows: 
 
The study of psychology, from which we find it convenient to borrow a few prin-
ciples, shows us that we can never know, or even think, that a thing has a quality 
without thinking or having thought of other things partaking that quality and of still 
others wanting it, or at least possessing it in smaller measure. This is the natural, 
common-sense belief of the mass of men; and it seems to be confirmed by careful 
observation. There are only a few thinkers who do not accept it. This is the doctrine 
which ought in strictness to be called the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge. 
(MS 403: 11–12, 1894) 
 
This would seem to confirm De Tienne’s interpretation of the Correlate, as a past instance of a thing 
partaking of a Quality similar or contrasting to the one to be predicated in a judgment. But the ques-
tion is not whether such a thing is a Correlate; the question is whether that is the only kind of Cor-
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relate, or, on the other hand, whether that is merely a special case. The passage that follows the 
above quotation is interesting: 
 
There is a corresponding truth in regard to existence. That is to say, things can only 
possess qualities by virtue of their mutual interactions. This proposition may be 
called the doctrine of the relativity of facts. For example, a thing cannot be hard, 
except by virtue of resisting other things; and if there were but one atom in the 
universe, to say that atom was hard would be a phrase without meaning. Against 
attraction at a distance some men have urged that a thing cannot act where it is not; 
but what can it mean to say that a thing is in a place, except that the forces it exerts 
upon other things center at that place? (MS 403: 12, 1894) 
 
Consider first the example of the quality hard. Peirce is here claiming that the quality of hard-
ness consists in the (virtual as well as actual) reactions between the thing partaking of that quality 
and other things that may, for example, be scratched against it. The connection with the pragmatic 
maxim is evident—it is, in fact, the example that Peirce gives immediately after introducing the 
maxim in “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (W3: 266–67). Furthermore, it is important to realize the 
context in which this discussion is taking place: namely, the rewriting of §8 of the New List, whose 
topic is the Reference to a Correlate. Peirce’s point is clearly that the other object—the object re-
acting with the hard object—is the Correlate of the predicative judgment “this is hard.” Here we can 
see how a Reference to a Correlate, where the Correlate is understood as the second term of a rela-
tion (in this case the relation of mutual resistance), can occasion and justify the attribution of a 
Quality to a Relate. Note that I am not claiming that the Correlate must be a correlate of the same 
relation as that attributed to the Relate. “A is hard” is not the same as “A resists B.” My point is 
simply that the affirmation “A is hard” involves, or virtually contains, the affirmation “A resists 
B.” Of course, a thing need not be in actual resistance with something else in order for it to be 
hard: the Quality of being hard can be prescinded from Reference to any Correlate with which the 
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hard object is in the relation of resistance, and this is precisely why “____ is hard” is a monadic 
predicate. 
Again, recall the example of water and hydrochloric acid from the previous section. Suppose that 
I already know the chemical properties of hydrochloric acid. I drop a piece of aluminum into each 
of the liquids and observe that a reaction takes place in one but not the other. Here, the aluminum 
plays the role of Correlate in the predicative judgment “this is hydrochloric acid.” That is, it is the 
reactive relation between the object of attention with the aluminum that occasions and justifies the 
attribution of the Quality of being hydrochloric acid to the object of attention. 
Now when we are speaking of relations, it is crucial to distinguish between relations that are ac-
tualized here and now, as in the case of the chemical reaction, and relations that have a virtual being, 
or the modality of a “would-be,” as Peirce would call it. The virtual relation that holds between hy-
drochloric acid and aluminum, for example, is: “if I were to drop a piece of aluminum into hydro-
chloric acid, then the aluminum would dissolve and emit a transparent gas, etc.” Let us call such a 
virtual relation a correlation. In order for the actual reaction to serve as an occasion and justification 
for the predicative judgment “this is hydrochloric acid,” there must be a correlation already estab-
lished between hydrochloric acid in general and aluminum in general; and furthermore, that corre-
lation must be replicated within me, the mind performing the predication (hence our assumption that 
I already know the chemical properties of hydrochloric acid).38 
What Peirce’s principle of pragmatism states is that the difference between two objects, such as 
water and hydrochloric acid, consists in nothing but differences in such correlations, namely corre-
lations that dictate what practical effects would ensue conditionally upon a certain type of operation. 
Or, expressed in terms of the practicalist formulation, it states that the difference between two ob-
                                                            
38 As we shall see in the following section, this correlation-replica is the Interpretant of the pred-
ication “this is hydrochloric acid.” 
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jects consists in nothing but differences in such correlations as replicated in the behavioral patterns 
of information-sensitive agents simulating those correlations. Here we can see vividly the structur-
alism embodied in Peirce’s pragmatism, and already implicit in his 1867 account of the categories. 
The structuralism becomes even more striking when we consider Peirce’s example of attraction 
at a distance: “what can it mean to say that a thing is in a place, except that the forces it exerts upon 
other things center at that place?” (MS 403: 12, 1894). The point that Peirce wants to make is clear: 
the meaning of a general concept is its position within a network of correlations. In the above ex-
ample, the general concept is the dyadic predicate “P is at x,” and the correlations are the propensi-
ties of bodies to accelerate relative to P. Thus the meaning of the concept “P is at x” is a function of, 
and only of, the configuration of these acceleration propensities. Now, since what a thing is is de-
termined by the general concepts applicable to it, we can further say: what a thing is is the way it is 
related with other things. Peirce himself makes a statement very similar to this in a draft of “Ab-
stracts of 8 Lectures,” which he intended to deliver as part of his 1898 Cambridge Conferences 
Lectures: “Two bodies which act upon other bodies in precisely the same way will be the same 
body, for it is only their different reactions which impart to bodies their distinction” (MS 942: 43, 
1898). That is, the very being of a body—what makes a given body the particular body that it 
is—consists in the way it reacts (or will react) with other bodies; apart from such relations, there is 
no such thing as an intrinsic identity or individuality that bestows upon a body its distinction from 
other bodies. The affinity of this statement with the central thesis of OSR is striking. 
Reference to a Correlate is what occasions and justifies Reference to a Ground, making it the 
second category in order of passing from Being to Substance. In the following section we shall turn 
to Peirce’s third category and draw out the implications of what we have discussed so far in the 
context of our main topic: what is a pattern?  
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3. 3  Semiosis and the Flow of Information 
The third category that Peirce derives in the New List is what he calls Reference to an Interpre-
tant. An Interpretant (or Third, as Peirce will later also call it) is anything that is what it is by virtue 
of a power of bringing two things into relation. It is that “whose Being consists in active power to 
establish connections between different objects” (EP2: 435, 1908). Significant in this definition is 
the notion of power. In order for something to have a power of doing something, X, its function of 
doing X must be inexhaustible by any number of actual instances of doing X. A bridge, for example, 
cannot be an Interpretant, because it establishes a relation between two things only in one instance, 
and therefore does not possess a power. 
In the hydrochloric acid example, the Interpretant is the virtual relation “if I were to drop a piece 
of aluminum into hydrochloric acid, then the aluminum would dissolve and emit a transparent gas, 
etc.,” as replicated in the mind performing the predication. By saying that this relation is virtual, I 
mean that it is not actual but has a real power or virtus, such that if the relevant circumstances arise, 
it can establish an actual relation between two objects, in this case between hydrochloric acid and 
aluminum. That the Interpretant is such a virtual relation agrees with Peirce’s identification of the 
meaning of a symbol with its Interpretant in his later writings (for example, EP2: 218, 1903 and 
418, 1907). Since the pragmatic maxim (in the practicalist formulation) explicates the meaning of 
a symbol in terms of habits of conduct that would arise upon the acceptance of the symbol, the 
identification of the meaning of a symbol with its Interpretant would make sense only if the In-
terpretant too were a habit of conduct, expressible in the form of a conditional proposition.39 
                                                            
39 Against this it may be objected that this holds only for the Final Interpretant (or Logical Inter-
pretant) and does not hold for the Immediate or Dynamical Interpretant (or Emotional or Ener-
getic Interpretant) in Peirce’s late division of Interpretants (here I will not go into the issue of 
how the Immediate/Dynamical/Final division is related to the Emotional/Energetic/Logical divi-
sion). In reply, I am inclined to say that the Immediate and Dynamical Interpretants (or Emotional 
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Reference to an Interpretant is the third category in order of passing from Being to Substance, be-
cause it is what occasions and justifies the Reference to a Correlate. 
As an interesting side note, let us rephrase the Interpretant in the hydrochloric acid example as 
follows: “if this liquid were hydrochloric acid, then dropping a piece of aluminum into it would re-
sult in the dissolution of the aluminum and the emission of a transparent gas, etc.” The Correlate, it 
will be recalled, is the aluminum that is reacting with the (yet unknown) liquid; and the Ground is 
the character hydrochloric-acid-ness, reference to which constitutes the Quality to be attributed to 
the liquid. Note how the transition from Reference to an Interpretant to Reference to a Correlate, 
and then to Reference to a Ground has the form of an abductive inference: 
 
If A, then B 
B 
Therefore A 
 
This is in agreement with Peirce’s claim that the attribution of a Quality to a Substance is hypothet-
ical (W2: 52), and also with his later claim that perceptual judgments are a limiting case of abduc-
tive inferences, differing from the latter only in the degree of uncontrollability (W2: 227, 1903). 
Now let us turn to Peirce’s examples in §9 of the New List, which deals with Reference to an In-
terpretant. While Peirce’s discussion in this section is couched in terms of “comparing” the Relate 
and the Correlate, we should be careful not to allow this psychological language to lead us into a 
narrow conception of the Interpretant. In order to make sense of some of Peirce’s examples, we 
must understand the Interpretant as anything whose being consists in the power of establishing any 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
and Energetic Interpretants) are degenerate variants of Interpretant, and therefore do not possess 
the characters proper to the genuine Interpretant. It must be admitted, however, that the issue 
needs to be worked out more fully. 
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kind of relation between two elements, and not just the relations of similarity or contrast, as the no-
tion of comparison may suggest. 
Peirce’s first example is the “comparison” of the letters p and b: 
 
Suppose we wish to compare the letters p and b. We may imagine one of them to 
be turned over on the line of writing as an axis, then laid upon the other, and finally 
to become transparent so that the other can be seen through it. In this way we shall 
form a new image which mediates between the images of the two letters, inasmuch 
as it represents one of them to be (when turned over) the likeness of the other. (W2: 
53) 
 
In this example, the Interpretant consists in the operation of flipping one of the letters, laying it up-
on the other, and then making it transparent. This is an Interpretant, insofar as it is an image that 
allows us to see one of the letters through the other, and thereby bring them into relation. It can be 
expressed in a conditional proposition such as: “if I were to flip one of the letters, lay it upon the 
other, and then make it transparent, the two letters would coincide.” Consider what the situation 
would be like if we did not have this Interpretant. The two letters would be opposed to each other 
blindly; we would not be able to make any sense as to the mode of their relation. It is the Interpre-
tant that supplies intelligibility to the relation by serving as a sign that represents that relation 
(hence Peirce’s characterization of the third category as “Representation”). For example, let us de-
note the operation described above as R. Then we can express the entire relation as bRp. Without 
the mediating sign R, there would be no way of representing—and hence making intelligible—the 
relation between the letters b and p. Now if we hypostatize R and turn it into an object of thought, 
then we can treat it as the subject of a proposition, as in “p is in the relation R to b,” making it the 
third term of a triadic relation (namely the relation of representation). 
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Thirdness, as Peirce will later call the third category, consists in none of the three terms taken 
separately, but in the form of connection between the three terms, which can be represented graph-
ically by the teridentity term 13. The Interpretant itself is not the form of connection, but a sign that 
explicates the teridentity term that is implicit in the case of relations prescindable from Reference to 
an Interpretant, such as the “killing” relation that we considered above (recall the graphic represen-
tation of the proposition “a man kills a deer”). We may call Thirdness the pure power of gluing, 
“pure” because it lacks any material content—whatever quality, object, or intellectual purport a 
representation may have is inherited from the three terms that Thirdness brings into relation. 
Peirce’s second example is the murder relation that we saw above: 
 
Again, suppose we think of a murderer as being in relation to a murdered person; 
in this case we conceive the act of the murder, and in this conception it is repre-
sented that corresponding to every murderer (as well as to every murder) there is a 
murdered person; and thus we resort again to a mediating representation which 
represents the relate as standing for a correlate with which the mediating represen-
tation is itself in relation. (W2: 53) 
 
Here, the murder relation, that is, the conception of murder, is the Interpretant, since this is what 
establishes the relation between the murderer and victim. Again, if we denote the murder relation as 
M, the murderer as a, and the victim as b, then the relation as a whole can be expressed as aMb. If 
we then hypostatize M and turn it into an object of thought, then we can treat it as the subject of a 
proposition, such as “a engages in a certain act M with respect to b,” making M the third term of a 
triadic relation. M thereby serves two distinct functions: on the first-order level, it represents a as 
standing in the murder relation to b; and on the second-order level, it presents itself as standing in 
the triadic relation of representation to both a and b. In the form aMb, the Interpretant M is fulfilling 
its first-order function, by representing a as standing in the relation of murder to b. Here, the Inter-
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pretant is invisible, so to speak; we see through it without making it an object of thought. In its se-
cond-order function, on the other hand, M is itself turned into an object of thought, as in “a engages 
in a certain act M with respect to b.” The relation between a and b is thereby compressed into a sin-
gle sign that presents itself as a compression of that relation.40 Hence Peirce’s characterization of 
the Interpretant as a “mediating representation which represents the relate to be a representation of 
the same correlate which this mediating representation itself represents” (W2: 53, emphasis in 
original). 
Instead of saying that the Interpretant represents (in its second-order function) the relation be-
tween Relate and Correlate, Peirce here says that it represents the Correlate which it represents the 
Relate to represent. This is likely in order to emphasize the directionality involved in the represen-
tation relation: we attend from the sign (Relate), which is present to us, to the object (Correlate), 
which, if not present, is present as a re-presentation. Suppose that, in the hydrochloric acid example, 
the aluminum is not present; that is, we have not yet dropped it into the acid. Even in the absence of 
the aluminum, the Interpretant re-presents it in its virtual relation, “if I were to drop a piece of alu-
minum into hydrochloric acid, then the aluminum would dissolve and emit a transparent gas, etc.” I 
am thereby able to see the aluminum through the hydrochloric acid in front of me, in the form of an 
                                                            
40 Psychologically, this amounts to “catching one of the transient elements of thought upon the 
wing and converting it into one of the resting places of the mind” (CP 3.424, 1892), as Peirce, 
alluding to James’s illustration of the distinction between the “substantive parts” and “transitive 
parts” of consciousness in The Principles of Psychology (James 1890, Chap. IX, §3), puts it in his 
second installment of “The Critic of Arguments” series for The Open Court. Especially interest-
ing in this connection is Peirce’s response to James’s suggestion to replace the term “transitive” 
in his notion of the “transitive parts” of consciousness with the term “relational”: “When you 
shoot one of our ‘transitive’ thoughts on the wing, transfix it and make it ‘substantive,’ then you 
have the idea of a relation; and until the thought ceases to be transitive it has no consciousness of 
the relation. While it is transitive, it is in a certain sense what you may call relative but it is not 
relational” (COWJ 7: 487, 28 Jan 1894). 
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anticipation of what would occur if it were dropped into the acid. In other words, the aluminum is 
virtually contained within my recognition of the liquid in front of me as hydrochloric acid. Don 
Ross, summarizing Ian Hacking’s (1990) interpretation of Peirce, suggests that Peirce viewed the 
world as “a kind of directed graph in which the edges are statistical relations” (Ross forthcoming: 
10). I think this is a very apt expression, provided that we differentiate between statistical relations 
that are due to mere chance and those that are manifestations of real Thirds. The graph must be di-
rected rather than undirected because for Peirce, relations in general have an orientation, from the 
Relate to the Correlate. This does not, of course, rule out the possibility of symmetric relations. 
What functions as a Relate in a certain predication instance of a dyadic relation R may be the Cor-
relate in a different predication instance of the same relation, in which case R would be a symmetric 
relation. 
The double function of the Interpretant is what makes triadic relations so powerful: it enables a 
dyadic relation to be turned into an object of thought, without destroying the information encapsu-
lated in that relation, and thereby makes it susceptible to becoming the element of another relation, 
and so on ad infinitum. In the case of the murder relation, the hypostatization of M in the form of “a 
engages in a certain act M with respect to b” allows M to become the Relate of a further relation, 
such as “M is N to P.” That is, through its second-order function, the Interpretant is able to address 
itself as a sign to a future Interpretant, in this case N. We shall presently see an example of this, but 
first let us consider in more detail the concept of information that we have referred to repeatedly 
throughout this thesis; and in particular, let us consider in what the process of information “flow” 
consists in. My aim is to show how the Peircean conception of representation that we have been 
discussing so far offers us a viable alternative to the correspondence relation relied upon by the 
OSRists (see Chapter 1.4). 
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In the most general terms, information is correlation.41 To say that A carries information about 
B is equivalent to saying that there is a correlation—a virtual relation—between A and B such that 
an observer would be able to make predictions about B on the basis of A with a higher probability 
of success than in the absence of A. This is the basic idea behind the concept of mutual information 
in information theory and probability theory; the main difference being that our definition explicitly 
involves the notion of an observer.42 Reference to an observer is unnecessary in the case of mutual 
information, insofar as the observer is the scientist using the concept of mutual information—it 
would be redundant to incorporate into a concept reference to the user of the concept. But in order 
to understand the process of information “flow,” with which we are here concerned, it is essential to 
incorporate the notion of observer into our definition, since the same data may be interpreted as in-
formation by one observer and as noise by another. In other words, information is an essentially 
triadic concept—it cannot be prescinded from Reference to an Interpretant. 
Suppose that a man hiking in the mountains finds a footprint, and, on the basis of this footprint, 
infers that a bear is nearby. The footprint is the Relate, which we shall denote as A, and the bear is 
the Correlate, which we shall denote as B. The Interpretant that occasions and justifies the reference 
to a bear is the correlation between a certain type of footprint and bears, embodied in the man’s 
general conception of bear footprints. Let us denote this Interpretant as C. If the man’s background 
knowledge is adequate, that is, if he is able to supply an adequate Interpretant, then he will be able 
                                                            
41 Here I am not using the term information in the technical sense introduced by Peirce in his 
1867 “Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension” (W2, Sel. 6). 
42 The mutual information between two event systems, X and Y, is defined as the difference be-
tween the entropy of X and the entropy of X conditional upon knowledge of Y. A standard text-
book covering a broad range of topics in information theory is Cover & Thomas (2006). Mutual 
information is introduced in Chapter 2 of this book. 
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to make valid predictions about B on the basis of A, such as “if I go this way, I should encounter a 
large, four-legged hairy mammal, etc.” 
The Interpretant is at the same time that which establishes the correlation between A and 
B—thus preceding it in some sense—and a product of that same correlation—thus following it in 
another sense. In the former sense the Interpretant is fulfilling its first-order office, and in the latter 
its second-order office. It is in the latter sense that Peirce says in his later semiotic writings that a 
sign determines an Interpretant in such a way that the latter is thereby mediately determined by the 
sign’s object. This process can also be described in the following manner: C has become “infected” 
by the correlation between A and B, with the result of a new correlation being established between 
B and C. Suppose that the man is with his wife, and says to her: “be careful, there’s a bear around 
here.” The correlation between the word “bear” and the animal which that word stands for, embod-
ied in the wife’s general conception of the word “bear,” will conjure in her mind an image of the 
bear, as a result of the man’s utterance. What was the Interpretant in the initial sign relation, namely 
the correlation in the man’s mind between the footprint and bear, has turned itself into the Relate of 
a different sign relation, this time with the same bear as the Correlate and the wife’s general con-
ception of the word “bear” as the Interpretant. The wife is thereby infected by the correlation that 
initially held between the footprint and bear. By such a process, which we should suppose will con-
tinue virtually indefinitely, we can see how information about the Correlate B “flows” from one 
mind to another, or from one state of the same mind to another state.43 This is the central insight 
encapsulated in Peirce’s law of mind, that “ideas tend to spread” (W8: 136, 1892).44 
                                                            
43 By “mind” I do not, of course, mean only human minds. Anything that is sensitive to infor-
mation—that is, anything that is capable of simulating correlations—I shall call a mind. 
44 See also Peirce’s interesting example of the liquid in bottles connected by tubes, in one of his 
“Basis of Pragmaticism” manuscripts: “Let a community of quasi-minds consist of the liquid in a 
number of bottles which are in intricate connexion by tubes filled with the liquid. This liquid is of 
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Our discussion of information brings us back to the topic of patterns, since as we saw in Chapter 
1.4, a pattern is something that in some sense carries information about other patterns. Firstly, let us 
consider how we can characterize a pattern within the general framework that we have developed in 
the current chapter. We can say that a pattern is either a general Form or the manifestation of a gen-
eral Form, depending on whether one uses the term to refer to a pattern conceived independently of 
its particular instantiations, as when we say that the motions of charged particles near a current ring 
and the motions of charged particles near a magnetic dipole exhibit the same pattern, or a pattern 
instantiated here and now, as is anything that we perceive through our senses. Adopting Dennett’s 
criterion for the presence of a pattern in some data, we can say that it is the compressibility of the 
manifold of the given that constitutes the being of a pattern; and to specify a program that may have 
produced some data is to give a plausible explanation of the data, in the same way that to specify a 
Form that may be applied to a subject is to give a plausible explanation of the subject. (I say pro-
gram instead of compression algorithm because the latter term tends to give the impression that the 
data is somehow ontologically prior to the algorithm, whereas in fact the data should be regarded as 
a product of the operation of the program). Forms and programs thus fulfill the same practical func-
tion, and according to the pragmatic maxim, any two things that fulfill the same practical function 
ought to be regarded as identical. Hence, if by a “pattern” we mean the program governing the pro-
                                                                                                                                                                                 
complex and somewhat unstable mixed chemical composition. It also has so strong a cohesion 
and consequent surface-tension that the contents of each bottle take on a self-determined form. 
Accident may cause one or another kind of decomposition to start at a point of one bot-
tle producing a molecule of peculiar form, and this action may spread through a tube to another 
bottle. This new molecule will be a determination of the contents of the first bottle which will 
thus act upon the contents of the second bottle by continuity. The new molecule produced by de-
composition may then act chemically upon the original contents or upon some molecule produced 
by some other kind of decomposition, and thus we shall have a determination of the contents that 
actively operates upon that of which it is a determination, including another determination of the 
same subject” (EP2: 392, 1906). 
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duction of the data, then we are referring to a general Form; if by a “pattern” we mean the manifes-
tation of the program governing the production of the data, then we are referring to the manifesta-
tion of a Form. This holds regardless of whether the pattern is real or not; in a case where one has 
discerned an unreal pattern, one has identified a program or Form that has no real being (that is, one 
that cannot be projected into unobserved cases), or one that is not operative in the case at hand. 
Furthermore, since the pragmatic maxim tells us that the entire intellectual purport of a general 
Form consists in a network of correlations, a pattern too must be an embodiment of the correlations 
that constitute the intellectual purport of the Form which it is identical to or is a manifestation of. 
Recall the way in which Ladyman and Ross defined patterns in ETMG: they defined patterns 
recursively, in relation to a computer simulating those patterns (Chapter 1.3). The simulation is then 
said to “carry information” about the pattern that it simulates. The output of that simulation is a fur-
ther pattern, which can be simulated by another computer, and so on ad infinitum. The congruence 
with our description of the sign process—as illustrated in our example of the footprint and bear—is 
striking, but so are the differences. 
While it is not altogether clear how Ladyman and Ross conceive of the relation between the sim-
ulation relation that they employ in their definition of real patterns and the correspondence relation 
that seems to be involved in their distinction between “representational” and “extra-representational” 
real patterns, as well as in their response to the argument from theory change and Van Fraassen’s 
constructive empiricism (Chapter 1.4), their simulation relation is, I believe, the one that harbors 
more philosophical potential, for two reasons: first, the simulation relation does not assume that its 
object is an actual existent as does the correspondence relation (recall our example of the abstract 
group structure in Chapter 1.4); and second, it is formalizable in information-theoretic terms, and 
considering that the language of information is quickly becoming the lingua franca of the scienc-
es—from fundamental physics to biology, ecology, neuroscience, economics, linguistics, and soci-
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ology—a philosophical concept’s formalizability in information-theoretic terms can only be a virtue. 
However, there is one aspect of Ladyman and Ross’s conception of simulation that I find problem-
atic; and furthermore, it will be my contention that the Peircean representation relation outlined in 
this chapter can serve to rectify this problem. The key difference between the simulation relation 
employed by Ladyman and Ross and the Peircean representation relation is that the former is a dy-
adic relation, whereas the latter is triadic. The problem with relying on a dyadic relation in this con-
text is that there will be no guarantee that all of the simulations carry information about the same 
object; whereas in the Peircean model, the Reference to a Correlate is preserved across the replica-
tion of correlations. 
In order to illustrate what I mean, and to give a concrete example of how the triadic model works 
in the case of a non-actual object, let us return to our earlier example of the footprint and bear. 
There, the Correlate was a determinate existent, namely a bear (or rather we should say partially 
determinate, since all that the hiker can say is that some bear created the footprint). Let us replace 
this Correlate with an indeterminate Form, such as the general molecular structure that we consid-
ered in Chapter 1.4. Here, the particular sample of the substance is the Relate or sign through which 
we see the general molecular structure. When a chemist is able to determine the molecular structure 
of this sample, his conception of the substance is thereby infected by the correlation between the 
sample and general structure. In the terminology of Ladyman and Ross, we can say that the chem-
ist’s conception becomes a simulation of the same structure of which the sample was a sign. If the 
chemist writes down the chemical formula of the substance he has determined, then that formu-
la—the output of the simulation—will be infected by the initial correlation. The sample and the 
formula thus function as representations of the same general molecular structure, in much the same 
way that {0, 90, 180, 270} together with addition modulo 360 and {1, i, −1, −i} together with mul-
tiplication are representations of the same abstract group structure. It is evident that if the sign rela-
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tion were not triadic, there would be no guarantee that the formula is about the same structure as 
that represented by the sample; and indeed there would be no directionality or intentionality in-
volved in the relation, these being attributes proper to Thirdness. 
Given that Peirce’s categories are the fundamental elements of thought, and that the theory of 
categories reveals the thought process to consist in the establishment and propagation of correla-
tions, we can say that thought is thoroughly relational. How does this relate with the thesis of OSR? 
It may be alleged that from the thesis that thought is thoroughly relational, it does not follow that 
the world itself is thoroughly relational, as claimed by OSR. To argue so would be tantamount to 
sliding from epistemology to ontology, says the interlocutor. In the following chapter, we shall see 
why Peirce rejects such a distinction between epistemology and ontology, between thought and the 
world. For Peirce, thought is continuous with the world itself; and this continuity is what makes 
possible the ontological re-interpretation of the categories that was mentioned at the outset of this 
chapter. Furthermore, we will see how this rejection of the epistemology/ontology distinction will 
provide us with an answer to the second of the difficulties faced by OSR, that it cannot give an ad-
equate account of the relationship between the world and our representations of the world.  
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4.  Nominalism and Realism 
 
Let us begin by noting that the Peircean model of representation (or rather our Peircean modifi-
cation of Ladyman and Ross’s simulation relation) outlined in the previous chapter does not pre-
suppose that the represented object is an actual existent, as does the correspondence model of the 
OSRists. This will constitute the positive component of our answer towards the second difficulty 
faced by OSR. That is, we have seen how something, X, can represent something else, Y, without Y 
being an actual existent. The current chapter will constitute the negative component of our answer, 
that if there is such a thing as the “world-structure” as espoused by the OSRists, then it cannot be an 
actual existent—it must be a real general. 
The realism of Peirce and “realism” as it is commonly understood today are entirely different 
philosophical positions. For Peirce, realism is opposed to all forms of nominalism, and not just to 
what we today call anti-realism, instrumentalism, or constructive empiricism (although these too 
can be characterized as species of nominalism). Therefore, in order to attain a proper understanding 
of Peirce’s realism, it is first necessary to understand what nominalism is, and Peirce’s arguments 
against it. 
Before delving into the realism/nominalism debate, however, a few words on the methodology 
of metaphysics are in order. As we saw in Chapter 1, the advocates of OSR regard metaphysics as 
the work of synthesizing scientific hypotheses, at least one of which must be a hypothesis from 
fundamental physics; and as such, it only comes after the other sciences. Ladyman and Ross support 
this position by attacking the use of intuition in philosophy, at least as evidence for the truth or fal-
sity of hypotheses, arguing that there is no reason to suppose that our intuitions about the way the 
world is track truth in any sense (ETMG: 10–15). I fully endorse Ladyman and Ross’s attack on the 
evidential use of intuition in philosophy, and so would Peirce. 
 86 
However, it does not follow from this that metaphysics ought to be confined to synthesizing the 
hypotheses of other sciences. The assumption of Ladyman and Ross’s view is that science is possi-
ble without any metaphysics. Of course, science may be possible without any metaphysicians, but 
to suppose that scientific inquiry can proceed without any underlying metaphysical assumptions 
about the way the world is—that is a crude metaphysics indeed. 
The kind of metaphysics espoused by Peirce is not one that relies on intuition as evidence for the 
truth or falsity of its claims, but one that is based on the observation of facts. For Peirce, metaphys-
ics is an observational science, just like any other science (excluding mathematics, which is a hypo-
thetical science in that it proceeds by freely laying down hypothetical constructions, with no regard 
for whether those constructions are applicable to the actual world). The only difference between 
metaphysics and the other observational sciences lies in the nature of the data that they rely upon: 
 
[M]etaphysics, even bad metaphysics, really rests on observations, whether con-
sciously or not; and the only reason that this is not universally recognized is that it 
rests upon kinds of phenomena with which every man’s experience is so saturated 
that he usually pays no particular attention to them. The data of metaphysics are 
not less open to observation, but immeasurably more so, than the data, say, of the 
very highly developed science of astronomy, to make any important addition to 
whose observations requires an expenditure of many tens of thousands of dollars. 
(CP 6.2, 1897) 
 
This does not mean, however, that there is no place for the kind of metaphysics espoused by 
Ladyman and Ross. The kind of metaphysics espoused by Ladyman and Ross corresponds to what 
Peirce would call philosophia ultima or synthetic philosophy, as opposed to philosophia prima or 
metaphysics (EP2: 372–73, 1906). The aim of synthetic philosophy is to synthesize the results of 
the other sciences into a unified picture of the world; and as such, it comes after the other sciences. 
The aim of metaphysics, on the other hand, is to provide the principles that the special sciences 
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(physics, biology, chemistry, psychology, economics, history, etc.) must take for granted in their 
investigations; and as such it comes before the special sciences. In Peirce’s late classification of the 
sciences, metaphysics is based only on mathematics, phenomenology, and the normative sciences 
(which includes logic). Both metaphysics and synthetic philosophy are important branches of scien-
tific inquiry, and we must be careful not to disregard one in favor of the other. In this chapter we 
will be engaging in metaphysics in the sense espoused by Peirce. 
4. 1  Introduction of Terminology and Basic Framework 
Our first step should be to familiarize ourselves with the terminology and basic framework of the 
realism/nominalism debate. Of course, this is not the place to retrace the entire history of the debate, 
from Plato and Aristotle through the Middle Ages; that would be the subject of at least a 
book-length monograph. Neither will I be concerned so much with exegesis of Peirce’s texts, as 
with outlining the central issue in a broadly Peircean framework, and in a way pertinent to our dis-
cussions so far in this thesis. 
The traditional definition of a general (or universal) is that which is predicable of multiple oc-
currences, such as horses in general as opposed to this or that particular horse.45 This definition 
should be understood to encompass relations as well as properties. I use the word “occurrence” in-
stead of “thing” to avoid the implication that “things” are individuals in the sense defined in Chap-
ter 1.2. This is also Peirce’s preferred terminology, for the same reasons: “I like the word ‘occur-
rence’ as reminding the thinker that a thing is never thoroughly singular, but the only object that is 
so is an instantaneous event” (L 387b: 329, 1905). Whether or not something is predicable of mul-
tiple occurrences is independent of whether or not there really are multiple occurrences of which the 
general can be veritably predicated. Thus sun is general because as a matter of logical form it is 
predicable of multiple occurrences, although in reality there is only one sun. Indeed, not only can 
                                                            
45 Aristotle, De Interpretatione, VII, 17a38. 
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we apply it falsely to many things other than the bright, fiery object in the sky, but we can also ap-
ply it truthfully to different occurrences of that same object (cf. EP2: 183, 1903). 
Something is predicable of many occurrences if and only if it is indeterminate in regard to some 
possible property or relation, either as possessing it or not possessing it.46 For example, animal is 
logically divisible into vertebrate animal and invertebrate animal—or in other words animality is 
indeterminate in regard to the property of being a vertebrate—and is thus general. This indetermi-
nacy is what makes the general applicable in multiple instances, since the application of a general to 
a particular instance must be hypothetical in order for it to be informative (W2: 52); and the appli-
cation can be hypothetical only if the general is conceived independently of its particular application, 
that is, as indeterminate. Conversely, anything that is indeterminate in some respect is general, for 
the same reasons. 
Anything that is determinate in all respects we shall call an individual, to express the fact that it is 
logically indivisible.47 This definition of individual is equivalent to our definition in Chapter 1.2, as 
something that can subsist independently of relation to anything else. The proof is as follows. Ac-
cording to the pragmatic maxim, the intellectual purport of a general consists in correlations be-
tween the potential subject of predication and other objects (that is, Correlates). Furthermore, the 
being of an object consists in the intellectual purport of the generals applicable to it. Therefore, an-
ything capable of subsisting independently of relation with anything else cannot contain any ele-
ment of generality in it—otherwise its being would consist in correlations with other objects—and 
                                                            
46 This is the idea behind Peirce’s definition of general as that for which the Principle of Ex-
cluded Middle does not hold: “anything is general in so far as the principle of excluded middle 
does not apply to it” (EP2: 351, 1905). 
47 “[T]he individual is determinate in regard to every possibility, or quality, either as possessing 
it or as not possessing it” (CP 1.434, 1896). See also Peirce’s discussion of the “logical atom” in 
his 1870 “Description of a Notation for the Logic of Relatives” (CP 3.93, 1870). 
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thus it must be determinate in all respects. Conversely, anything that is determinate in all respects 
must be capable of subsisting independently of relation with anything else, because from the fact 
that relations are general, it follows that anything that cannot be conceived apart from its relation 
with something else (and hence cannot subsist independently of anything else) must ipso facto con-
tain in it an element of generality. 
It will be found convenient to distinguish between absolute individuals and relative individuals 
(recall our preliminary discussion of the distinction in Chapter 1.1). A relative individual is some-
thing that may be made more determinate, but is logically indivisible for the practical purpose at 
hand. In other words, it is individual relative to a certain grain of observational or conceptual reso-
lution; the relevant grain of resolution being dictated by a particular purpose or inquiry. Something 
that is indivisible on any grain of observational or conceptual resolution we shall call an absolute 
individual. 
In order for something to be individual, absolute or relative, it must be actual, or present here and 
now (in the sense to be explained below), for in no other way can every question regarding its pos-
sible properties and relations, which may conceivably be asked of it (in the case of an absolute indi-
vidual) or is necessary to ask of it given a particular purpose or inquiry (in the case of a relative in-
dividual), be determinately answered. In order for something to be actual, it must be at least a rela-
tive individual, for if something is present here and now, then every question regarding its possible 
properties and relations that is necessary to ask of it given a particular purpose or inquiry, must in 
principle (even if not practically) be susceptible to a determinate answer. Thus, in the case of a 
horse in general, we need not be able to answer the question of whether it is black or non-black; but 
in the case of an actual horse, the question must be susceptible to a determinate answer. If it be ob-
jected that this does not do justice to boundary cases for which some question does not admit of a 
determinate answer—such as a man who is at the boundary of being bald and non-bald—the reply 
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is that relative to the particular purpose or inquiry in which that question is relevant, the object is not 
even a relative individual but is general. 
The quality of being here and now, or haecceity, should not be confounded with spatiotemporal 
determination. It may entail spatiotemporal determination, but that is not self-evident.48 It is simply 
the quality of being this unique occurrence rather than some other occurrence of the same kind, of 
being denotable by indices such as “this” or “that” or the pointing of a finger. For lack of a better 
expression, we may say that haecceity is a property, but we must keep in mind that this is only a 
manner of speech. Even if we decide to speak of haecceity as a property, we must realize that it is a 
property of a fundamentally different nature from other properties. The reason is that the property of 
being this unique occurrence cannot be a property common to many occurrences, for to say that 
different occurrences have in common the property of being unique would be to affirm a contradic-
tion. 
Realism is the doctrine that some (but not necessarily all) generals have a real being. Something 
is said to be real if and only if its being is such as it is independently of what any particular mind or 
collection of minds may think about it. We should be particularly careful with the notion of 
mind-dependency, since our entire argument for realism will turn upon it. Namely, we should be 
careful to distinguish between the property of being dependent or independent of this or that partic-
ular instance of thought, and the character of being dependent or independent of thought in general. 
Something is said to be dependent on a particular instance of thought if and only if its being is such 
that it is by virtue of its being thought as such. Thus, the content of a dream prescinded from its ac-
tual occurrence is mind-dependent in this sense of mind-dependency, since its being consists wholly 
in the circumstance that someone dreamt it as such; while the fact that the dream took place in the 
                                                            
48 The question of whether haecceity entails spatiotemporal determination will not be addressed 
in this thesis. 
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way it did is mind-independent in this sense of mind-dependency, since that fact cannot be altered 
or destroyed merely by thought, no matter how many minds may think otherwise (W3: 271). On the 
other hand, something is said to be dependent on thought in general if and only if it is cognizable, 
that is, it is a possible object of thought. Both the content of a dream and the fact that the dream 
took place are mind-dependent in this sense of mind-dependency, since both are possible objects of 
thought. It should be emphasized that we shall take real to be synonymous with mind-independent 
in the first of the two senses of mind-dependency outlined above; this is merely a terminological 
stipulation and does not, if I am not mistaken, beg the question in favor of either nominalism or re-
alism. Hereinafter, the terms “mind-dependent” and “mind-independent,” as well as cognate terms, 
will be used in the first of these two senses, unless otherwise specified. 
Against the claim that the fact that the dream took place in the way it did is real, it may be urged 
that if every mind in the world were to think in a certain way, in this case that the dream took place 
in the way it did, then that would ipso facto constitute the fact that the dream took place in the way 
it did. The reply to this is that there are cases where everyone may think that such and such is the 
case and yet everyone is wrong—the existence of the luminiferous ether, for example. Just because 
every mind believes that such and such is the case at a certain stage of inquiry does not mean that 
further inquiry may not reveal facts that contradict those beliefs. This property of exerting an exter-
nal constraint on thought is what we shall mean by real. 
Nominalism is the doctrine that only individuals, relative or absolute, are real—generals are mere 
names, mind-dependent signs that exert no influence on existing things; hence the term nominalism. 
There is no essential difference between conceptualism and nominalism in the sense defined, inso-
far as both take generals to be mind-dependent rather than real. The distinction between reality and 
existence is crucial in the realism-nominalism debate. Reality is equivalent to mind-independency, 
whereas existence is synonymous with actuality. It is perfectly conceivable that something that does 
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not exist (is not actualized here-and-now) is nonetheless real. Whether this is not only conceivable 
but also really the case is the point upon which nominalism and realism dispute. 
4. 2  Peirce’s Scholastic Realism 
Perhaps the most famous of Peirce’s arguments against nominalism is the one that he delivers in 
the fourth of his 1903 Harvard Lectures, “The Seven Systems of Metaphysics” (EP2: 179–95). 
There, he takes a stone in his hand and announces that he will conduct an experiment: he will let go 
of the stone and see whether it will fall to the floor. Of course, the experiment itself is meaningless, 
since everybody knows what will happen. But the deeper meaning of the experiment lies in the very 
fact that it is meaningless. How do we know that our expectation that the stone will fall will be ful-
filled? The only intelligible answer is that the stone is governed by a real law operative in nature, 
real in the sense that it is not a mere mental formula or way of organizing the phenomena. For if the 
law were only a mental formula, there would be no way of explaining why future events will con-
form to it (and we know that they will), apart from assigning to the mind some kind of miraculous 
power of prognosis. If the law, however, is a real would-be, a rule dictating what would occur given 
the relevant conditions, even if those conditions are never actually realized, then witnessing the ac-
tual instantiations of the law will be no wonder. 
Now as we saw in Chapter 2.1, the pragmatic maxim dictates that all generals are embodiments 
of laws expressible in conditional propositions of the form: “if you were to do a to object x (to 
which the general in question can be veritably applied as a predicate), then you would have an ex-
perience of type b.” In the case of the stone, saying that something is a stone involves identifying 
the laws it conforms to, one of which can be expressed as: “if the stone were released from one’s 
hand, then it would fall to the floor”; and the conjunction of all such conditionals constitute the en-
tire intellectual purport of the general concept stone. Therefore, insofar as we know those laws to be 
real, then so is the general that embodies them. Thus runs Peirce’s argument for realism from the 
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experience of anticipation.49 Here we can see the intimate connection between Peirce’s pragmatism 
and Scholastic realism, a connection emphasized by Peirce himself in many places throughout his 
writings.50 It should also be recalled that this is essentially the same argument given by Dennett for 
the reality of patterns (Chapter 1.2), which is not surprising, considering that patterns are either 
generals or manifestations of generals. The merit of this way of arguing for realism is that it gives 
us a criterion for distinguishing between real and non-real generals—a criterion that the realist is 
obliged to provide, given that he holds that only some and not all generals are real. Namely, those 
generals that embody laws that we know (inductively) to be real are real generals, while those gen-
erals that we know (inductively) to not embody real laws are non-real generals. 
I shall outline another one of Peirce’s arguments for realism in a moment, but before that I want 
to return to our main topic, the difference between realism in the Peircean sense and realism as it is 
commonly understood today. It should be emphasized that realism in the Peircean sense is in no 
way opposed to idealism, the doctrine that only ideas are real; rather it necessarily entails a form of 
idealism, as we shall see below. Contemporary philosophers, particularly those working in the An-
glophone tradition, often use the term realism to denote the doctrine that there is a reality inde-
pendent of all thought, rather than this or that particular instance of thought, and that truth consists 
in a “correspondence” in some sense between our thoughts on the one hand and this external reality 
on the other. As we saw in Chapter 1.4, this is the way that Ladyman and Ross understand realism, 
and this is also the sense of realism upon which the scientific realism debate is predicated. Taken in 
                                                            
49 The argument is also developed in “Hume on Miracles and Laws of Nature” (of which the first 
four sections out of eleven are published in EP2: 67–74, 1901), and in the fourth of his 1903 Lowell 
Lectures (MS 460, partly published in CP 1.15–26 but misidentified by the editors of the Collected 
Papers as part of Lecture III). 
50 For example, in a manuscript of 1906: “It is plain that pragmaticism involves scholastic realism, 
since it makes all intellectual purport, and therefore, the meaning of reality itself, to consist in what 
would be, under conceivable conditions most of which can never be actualized” (MS 845: 26, 1906). 
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this sense, realism is certainly opposed to idealism. But this is really a species of nominalism, inso-
far as it makes the realness of ideas derive from their correspondence in some sense with an external 
reality, instead of being real on their own. But as Peirce put it: “Realism, in the proper sense of the 
word, sanctioned by the continual usage of nigh a thousand years, is the doctrine that reality and 
idea are not contrary, but that ideas are sometimes real …” (MS 860: 8, 1893). Of course, this is not 
the place to go into an assessment of the historical accuracy of this statement.51 Significant for our 
purposes is Peirce’s argument to the effect that any other form of realism would be a 
self-contradictory doctrine. Let us turn to this argument. 
The fundamental difference between the nominalist and realist lies in where they locate the real. 
In order to illustrate what I mean, I shall take up Peirce’s argument for realism in his 1871 review of 
Alexander Campbell Fraser’s The Works of George Berkeley (W2: 462–87). Although clothed as a 
book review, this article is perhaps the clearest statement of Peirce’s peculiar brand of realism in his 
entire oeuvre. What follows will be a condensed reconstruction of the line of thought that can be 
discerned in this text, reinforced by considerations developed in other earlier texts. 
The nominalist holds that generals have only a mind-dependent or mental being, and are not “out 
there” in the world. But there must be something to constrain these ideas so that they are not arbi-
trary fictions. Thus the nominalist is compelled to say that there are real things outside of the mind 
which are the source of our ideas. Our ideas, they typically say, are derived from sensations which 
in turn are caused by these external objects, and are veracious insofar as they “represent” or “corre-
spond to” these objects. There can be no element of generality in these external objects—considered 
in themselves they cannot have any properties or partake in any relations—since it is the assump-
                                                            
51 See Chapter 2 of Boler (1963) for a discussion of the possibility of reading Duns Scotus along 
such lines. 
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tion of the nominalist theory that generals have only a mental being. The external object must 
therefore be absolutely individual, determinate in all respects. 
Now as we saw in Chapter 3, it is only by putting things into relation with other things and 
thereby giving them a place within an order that we understand them. But how can an absolute in-
dividual be put into relation with something else? To put something, A, into relation with something 
else, B, is to make it determinate in regard to its relation with B; but this would be possible only if 
A is initially indeterminate in regard to that relation. It follows that an absolute individual is not 
susceptible of being put into relation with anything else, and hence it must be absolutely unintelligi-
ble. 
But as Peirce had demonstrated in “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man” 
(W2, Sel. 21, 1868), to posit such an unintelligible entity is self-contradictory, for to think of any-
thing as being beyond all thought is to think it nonetheless, and therefore the conception of that 
thing must have the form “A, not A.” It is like trying to step outside of oneself or trying to see one’s 
own eye. An absolute individual is thus impossible. In order for something to have any being at all, 
it must be a possible object of thought—even if it is unknown at a certain stage of inquiry, it must in 
principle be cognizable through inquiry. Whence Peirce concludes that “cognizability (in its widest 
sense) and being are not merely metaphysically the same, but are synonymous terms” (W2: 208–9). 
The realist alternative must therefore inevitably be a kind of idealism—an objective idealism, to use 
a later expression of Peirce (EP1: 293, 1891). 
What exactly is objective idealism? First Peirce observes that there is an element of arbitrariness 
or under-determination in all thought. This includes our sense perceptions, since all perceptions in-
volve judgments (of the form discussed in the New List), and all judgments are hypothetical with 
respect to the Quality that they attribute to their object. The nominalist theory, which locates the real 
in the past as the cause of our sensations, therefore leads to skepticism concerning our knowledge of 
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the world. For there is no guarantee that our sensations “copy” the external thing exactly as it is. 
This in turn gives the realist a clue as to where to locate the real. Whereas the nominalist looks to-
ward the past, the realist locates the real in the future, for it is in the future that we expect the ele-
ment of arbitrariness in thought to be ultimately eliminated. Indeed, the real as cognizable must ipso 
facto be an object of indefinite inquiry. 
Experience establishes that when two incomplete or inconsistent ideas collide, a process of sup-
plementation or self-correction takes place. In other words, among ideas there is a universal ten-
dency towards the establishment of consistency, regardless of whether those ideas are in one mind 
or multiple minds. Peirce illustrates this point using the example of a blind man and deaf man: 
 
Suppose two men, one deaf, the other blind. One hears a man declare he means to 
kill another, hears the report of the pistol, and hears the victim cry; the other sees 
the murder done. Their sensations are affected in the highest degree with their in-
dividual peculiarities. The first information that their sensations will give them, 
their first inferences, will be more nearly alike, but still different; the one having, 
for example, the idea of a man shouting, the other of a man with a threatening as-
pect; but their final conclusions, the thought the remotest from sense, will be iden-
tical and free from the one-sidedness of their idiosyncrasies. (W2: 468–69) 
 
The general tendency of rational minds to supplement each other and correct themselves ensures 
that for any question with a definite answer, thought in general must gravitate towards that answer 
given a sufficient amount of time. This answer, the ideal limit of inquiry, is what Peirce calls the 
truth, and that which is expressed in the truth is what he calls the real (W2: 470). This conception of 
reality is consistent with the rejection of the absolute individual, for here the real is conceived as 
independent of any particular instance of thought, but not of thought in general. Again, this view 
necessarily implies the reality of generals, for general concepts enter into all judgments, including 
veridical judgments. 
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From the standpoint of this Peircean brand of realism, the distinction between epistemology and 
ontology is no longer relevant. The important distinction is no longer between thought and the 
world as it is in itself, but between arbitrary thoughts and thoughts that resist and have persistence. 
It is on the basis of this realism that Peirce is able to expand his categories into cosmic principles, 
during the period leading up to his seminal “A Guess at the Riddle” (W6, Sels. 22–28, 1887–88). 
The categories are no longer confined to thought processes as we find them in human and other 
higher animals, but are conceived to be the fundamental principles operative in Nature itself. This is 
not the place to go into the details of how Peirce conceives the categories to operate in the domain 
of each science—psychology, physiology, biology, physics, etc. Suffice it to say that they are me-
ta-laws, laws that govern the evolution of the laws of nature. 
Now, as we saw in the previous chapter, the categories reveal thought to be thoroughly relational, 
consisting in the establishment and propagation of correlations. Given that the categories are the 
fundamental elements not only of human thought but also of the world itself, it follows that the 
world itself must also be thoroughly relational, in agreement with the central thesis of OSR. 
However, it is important that we also see the crucial difference between this Peircean brand of 
structuralism and OSR. Insofar as OSR takes reality to consist of structures rather than individual 
objects, we may say that it is realist (in the Scholastic/Peircean sense), since structures must be gen-
eral (see Chapter 1.4). But insofar as its proponents endorse the correspondence view of truth, it is 
conceiving of structures as actual existents rather than as indeterminate laws—or in other words it is 
conceiving of structures on the model of individuals—and is therefore nominalist: recall that the 
issue upon which realism and nominalism dispute is whether there is anything real other than the 
actual. We can thus see that OSR is straddling two incompatible metaphysics, nominalism and real-
ism. The only way that the OSRist can be logically consistent is to expunge the residue of nominal-
ism from his system and embrace Scholastic realism, along with the idealism that it necessarily en-
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tails. This move will at once solve the second of the difficulties faced by OSR, that it cannot give an 
adequate account of the relation between the world and our representations of the world; since, as 
we saw in Chapter 1.4, the root of this problem is the nominalistic identification of the real with the 
actual. 
Against this the OSRist may object that he does not identify the real with the actual, or that which 
is determinate in all respects, because he recognizes that quantum indeterminacy is real and cannot 
be ascribed to errors or disturbances in measurement. My reply to this is that quantum indetermina-
cy is only a rudimentary kind of the indeterminacy that I have in mind. Even if the OSRist recog-
nizes the indeterminacy of certain physical magnitudes of a quantum system, he is identifying the 
real with the actual insofar as he presupposes that the laws of quantum physics are absolutely de-
terminate. A Peircean, on the other hand, would reject the idea that there is any sharp line of de-
marcation between the state of a physical system and the laws that operate on such states. Both are 
essentially patterns; the only difference between the two is that a state is a pattern whose rate of 
change is relatively fast, whereas a law is a pattern whose rate of change is relatively slow.52 Thus, 
if there is such a thing as genuine indeterminacy, then we should expect it to be pervasive rather 
than restricted to a small part of the universe. For a Peircean realist, the laws of nature are them-
selves subject to infinitesimal fluctuations; and it is this indeterminacy of laws that allows them to 
evolve under the governance of the categories, the fundamental elements of thought. 
Again, the crucial point that separates the nominalist and the realist is that the realist makes reali-
ty continuous with thought, so that the laws of nature differ from representations of those laws only 
in degree, while the nominalist drives a stake in between reality and thought, so to speak, with the 
                                                            
52 This is an idea that has recently been put forth by the theoretical physicist Lee Smolin (see 
Unger & Smolin 2015: 476–79). It is noteworthy that over the past few years, Smolin has been 
developing the idea—with explicit reference to Peirce—that the laws of nature evolve.  
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consequence that their relationship becomes utterly inexplicable. Now I just said that “the laws of 
nature differ from representations of those laws only in degree,” but we still have not gained a pre-
cise understanding of what this “difference in degree” consists in. This brings us to the first diffi-
culty faced by OSR, the issue of the relation between physical and mathematical structure. This is-
sue can be understood as a variant of the issue of the relation between reality and thought: loosely 
speaking, the mathematical is on the side of thought, while the physical is on the side of reality. 
Now if reality and thought are to be regarded as continuous, then so ought the physical and mathe-
matical. That is, the difference between physical and mathematical structure ought to be regarded as 
a difference of degree, since otherwise there would be no way of explaining their relationship (as I 
remarked in Chapter 1.4). But the question is: what does this “difference in degree” consist in? This 
question is inseparably bound up with the issue of how we ought to understand the phenomenon of 
instantiation. To this issue we shall now turn.  
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5.  Peirce’s Theory of the Continuum 
 
Chaque portion de la matière peut être conçue comme un jardin plein de plantes, et 
comme un étang plein de poissons. Mais chaque rameau de la plante, chaque 
membre de l’animal, chaque goutte de ses humeurs est encore un tel jardin ou un 
tel étang. 
G. W. Leibniz, La Monadologie 
 
At the end of Chapter 2.2, I remarked that to point at something and call it “lithium” is to treat it 
as a node within the network of relations of which the concept “lithium” is a symbolic unification. 
But this still involves the notion of a something that can be pointed at and made the object of a 
judgment. We cannot say anything about what it is or how it is without reference to general con-
cepts, but there must be a this, something that we can point at or turn our attention towards. Is this 
not what we mean by an individual? Here we meet the first of the two problems faced by OSR, that 
it cannot give an adequate account of the relation between mathematical and physical structure. Re-
call from Chapter 1.4 that the core of the issue concerns the notion of instantiation. Physical struc-
ture is structure that we know is instantiable, whereas mathematical structure is structure whose 
instantiability is unknown to us. But what does it mean for a structure to be instantiated? It is, ap-
parently, to have some kind of anchor by which the structure, in itself purely general, manifests it-
self in the actual world. But this anchor cannot itself be of the nature of a structure, since, as we saw 
in Chapter 1.4, a general can in no way differentiate between the actual and non-actual. How, then, 
can we make sense of the nature of this anchor? In what follows we shall see how Peirce approach-
es this problem; and indeed this is where Peirce, with his deep acquaintance with the Scholastic 
doctors as well as with modern mathematics and logic, is at his best. 
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5. 1  Secondness as the Category of Individuation 
Let us begin by considering the difference between the actual and non-actual from the standpoint 
of Peirce’s categories. Suppose that there is a fire burning in front of me. In my imagination I can 
change the properties of the fire at will; for example I can change its color, its smell, etc. I can also 
pretend in my imagination to put my hand into the fire, without feeling any pain. Such is the nature 
of a non-actual fire. The various images of fire that I conjure in my imagination are possible varia-
tions of the fire encompassed under the general concept of fire. Now the actual fire burning in front 
of me cannot be changed in the way that a non-actual fire can. I cannot change its color or its smell 
by the mere act of thinking; and if I put my hand into it, the consequences are painful. There is in it 
an uncontrollable element, a resistance against the will. This is the way in which the category of 
Secondness, or Reference to a Correlate, manifests itself in the phenomena. 
Here, it should be emphasized that I am not claiming that there is an absolute difference between 
the actual and non-actual. Even in pure mathematics there is a kind of conceptual friction, as it were, 
that constrains the process of reasoning. Thus, as I remarked above, the difference between physical 
structure and mathematical structure must be a difference of degree; and Peirce’s theory of the cat-
egories suggests that this degree is the degree of Secondness relative to something else. 
Recall that Secondness is the category of blind relation. It must be blind because if there is any 
intelligibility in it, then there must be a Third that is supplying that intelligibility by serving as its 
sign. One way in which such a blind relation manifests itself in the phenomena is in brute action and 
reaction between two agents, of which resistance against my will can be understood as a special 
case. Against this it may objected that action and reaction is nothing but a feeling of Quality, and is 
therefore of the nature of a First. The reply to this is that although it is true that there is a Quality to 
every instance of action and reaction, yet the action and reaction itself cannot be reduced to that 
Quality. Consider, for example, the sound of a pin being dropped in a completely silent room. Next, 
 102 
consider the sound of the same pin being dropped during a party or parade. Let us suppose that the 
Quality of the sound considered in itself—as a First—is identical in the two cases. We know from 
experience that there will still be a difference between these two cases, namely in the way that the 
sound forces the attention of the mind towards it. This is a difference in the degree of Secondness 
relative to the mind. In “The Law of Mind,” Peirce recalls how his memory of the color of a cardi-
nal’s robes, which he saw many years before, has become dimmed, and yet the color itself is not 
remembered as dim (W8: 149, 1892). This shows that the vividness or insistence of an idea or sen-
sation is something of an altogether different nature from its Quality. It is, as Peirce puts it, an intru-
sion into the Ego of a Non-Ego (EP2: 154, 1903), an opposition or clash between two agents. 
Secondness is what makes a possibility actual and confers to it its here-and-now-ness. Experi-
ence shows that the insistency of an idea or sensation diminishes over time, and this is only natural 
if we regard Secondness as the category of actualization, since actual is simply another word for 
here and now. Now even if something is not reacting against my will at this very moment, if it is of 
such nature that it reacts against other things, I infer that if it were made the object of my will, then 
it would react against it. In other words, the actual is that which is at least virtually reactive against 
my will. Remembering that actual is synonymous with individual (Chapter 4.1), these considera-
tions afford us with the following categorial definition of individual: “an individual is something 
which reacts. That is to say, it does react against some things, and is of such a nature that it might 
react, or have reacted, against my will” (CP 3.613, 1901). Secondness can thus be said to be the 
category of individuation. By an individual we shall mean a relative individual (as defined in Chap-
ter 4.1), since, as we have seen, the notion of an absolute individual is a contradictory notion. 
Recall that a relative individual is something that may be made more determinate, but is logically 
indivisible relative to a certain grain of observational or conceptual resolution. Now in order for it to 
be susceptible of further determination, it must contain an element of generality in it, since it must 
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be indeterminate in the respect in which further determination is possible. Then the question arises: 
how can something be individual, and yet contain in it an element of generality? What does it mean 
for something to “contain” an element of generality in the first place? Peirce’s theory of continuity 
will help us in giving a precise answer to these questions, by providing an abstract model of gener-
als, individuals, and the instantiation relation between them. Furthermore, it will allow us to see in a 
vivid way why exhibiting patternhood is a necessary condition for the very possibility of cognition, 
as noted in the Introduction in connection with the example of the “snow” noise that appears on 
analog TV screens receiving no transmission signal. 
5. 2  The Mathematical Theory of the Continuum 
My approach to Peirce’s concept of continuity will be chronological, focusing on how his con-
ception of the continuum developed over his lifetime. This approach, I believe, will put into relief 
the issues that motivated Peirce’s mature conception of the continuum as a “supermultitudinous” 
collection, a collection whose multitude is greater than that of any discrete multitude, and whose 
members are no longer distinct individuals but are “fused together.” 
Potter & Shields (1977), Havenel (2008), and Maddalena (2009) each attempt to divide the de-
velopment of Peirce’s conception of continuity into distinct periods. Potter & Shields distinguishes 
the following four periods: 
 
(1) Pre-Cantorian Period: until 1884 
(2) Cantorian Period: 1884–1894 
(3) Kantistic Period: 1895–1908 
(4) Post-Cantorian Period: 1908–1911. 
 
Havenel (2008) distinguishes the following five periods: 
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(1) Anti-nominalistic Period: 1868–1884 
(2) Cantorian Period: 1884–1892 
(3) Infinitesimal Period: 1892–1897 
(4) Supermultitudinous Period: 1897–1907 
(5) Topological Period: 1908–1913 
 
Furthermore, Havenel criticizes Potter & Shields’s identification of a “Kantistic” period, arguing 
that is based on an editorial blunder in the Collected Papers (Havenel 2008: 103). Namely, Peirce 
asserts in CP 6.166 that “continuity consists in Kanticity and Aristotelicity.” A close examination of 
the manuscripts shows that this was written in 1892–1893, but according to Havenel, Potter & 
Shields follow the editorial affirmation in the Collected Papers that this section was written in 1903, 
and therefore mistakenly attribute the “Kantistic” conception of continuity to a period in which 
Peirce had already abandoned it (Havenel 2008: 104). This criticism, however, seems to be based 
on a confusion on Havenel’s part, namely, that of linking Potter & Shield’s “Kantistic” period with 
his “infinitesimal” period, where in fact it should correspond to Havenel’s “supermultitudinous” 
period. Potter & Shields make it clear that they are not using “Kanticity” in the sense of infinite di-
visibility, which was the meaning that Peirce attributed to the term before 1899.53 In a 16 March 
1900 letter to the editor of Science, Peirce writes: 
 
Although Kant confuses continuity with infinite divisibility, yet it is noticeable that 
he always defines a continuum as that of which every part … has itself parts. This 
is a very different thing from infinite divisibility, since it implies that the continu-
um is not composed of points … (CP 3.569, 1900) 
 
                                                            
53 This date is based on a letter that Peirce sent to Paul Carus on August 17, 1899. See W8: 394, 
ann. 143.16–19. 
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Peirce is here clearly using Kant’s definition of continuity to describe his supermultitudinous con-
ception of continuity, as an entity not composed of distinct points. It is thus puzzling why Havenel 
has to criticize Potter & Shields’s labeling Peirce’s supermultitudinous period “Kantistic,” apart 
from the fact that they place its beginning perhaps a bit too early, in 1895. Maddalena’s (2009) di-
vision is similar to Havenel’s, the differences being that he calls the first period “Pre-Cantorian” 
instead of “anti-nominalistic,” the third period “Aristotelico-Kantian” instead of “infinitesimal,” and 
identifies a sixth “crisis” period between the supermultitudinous and topological periods, from 
1905–1907. I think the term “Aristotelico-Kantian” is better than “infinitesimal,” since Peirce’s en-
dorsement of infinitesimals is by no means restricted to 1892–1897. The issue of whether we can 
discern a period of crisis between 1905 and 1907 will have no direct bearing on my discussions in 
this thesis. I will follow Havenel and Maddalena’s division; but one point that deserves emphasis is 
that Peirce’s topological approach to continuity is in no way confined to the period after 1908: al-
ready in the Cambridge Conferences Lectures of 1898, we can see Peirce applying his ideas on to-
pology to his theory of the continuum and his cosmology. 
With these clarifications in place, let us trace the development of Peirce’s conception of continu-
ity. My exposition will not be comprehensive, but will merely outline the major steps that led to his 
supermultitudinous conception in 1897. 
While we can find germs of Peirce’s synechism in early works such as the last section of “Ques-
tions Concerning Faculties Claimed for Man” (W2, Sel. 21, 1868) and the opening section of “The 
Doctrine of Chances” (W3, Sel. 62, 1878), it was not until Peirce had read Georg Cantor’s 
Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Mannichfaltigkeitslehre (Cantor 1883; hereinafter Grundlagen) in 
late 1883 or early 1884, most likely in the French translation published in Acta Mathematica (see 
Moore 2011: 324), that his study of continuity became a rigorous enterprise. This is not to say that 
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Peirce had no interesting ideas concerning continuity prior to 1884; it is only that those ideas were 
in a germinal form, awaiting fruition in the fertile soil of mathematics. 
During the period spanning from 1884 to 1892, Peirce more or less accepts Cantor’s definition of 
the continuum, which he gives in §10 of the Grundlagen, as a series of points that is concatenated 
(zusammenhängenden) and perfect (perfecte). Peirce defines these terms in his contribution to the 
Century Dictionary as follows: 
 
Cantor calls a system of points concatenated when any two of them being given, 
and also any finite distance, however small, it is always possible to find a finite 
number of other points of the system through which by successive steps, each less 
than the given distance, it would be possible to proceed from one of the given 
points to the other. He terms a system of points perfect when, whatever point not 
belonging to the system be given, it is possible to find a finite distance so small that 
there are not an infinite number of points of the system within that distance of the 
given point. (CP 6.164, c.1884) 
 
Thus a series S is said to be concatenated if for every t ∈ S, every t’ ∈ S, and every ε > 0, there ex-
ists a finite number of t’s belonging to S, t1, t2, … , tn, such that | t1 – t | < ε, | t2 – t1 | < ε, … , | t’ – tn | 
< ε. A series is concatenated only if there exists a term between every two (for if there were two 
points between which there is no third point, then we can let ε be a distance smaller than the dis-
tance between these two points, violating the condition of concatenated-ness), although the con-
verse does not necessarily hold. A series S is said to perfect if it contains “every” element t such that 
for every ε > 0, there exists an infinite sub-series S’⊂ S such that for every ti ∈ S’, | t – ti | < ε. This 
is equivalent to saying that S contains every point that is a limit-point of an infinite sub-series; or in 
other words, any point not contained in S is an “isolated” point. 
In 1892, however, Peirce begins to criticize Cantor’s definition of continuity. One problem with 
this definition, according to Peirce, is that it “turns upon metrical considerations; while the distinc-
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tion between a continuous and discontinuous series is manifestly non-metrical” (W8: 144). That is, 
it assumes that a distance metric is defined on the series, whereas it is possible for a series to be 
continuous without having such a metric. Continuity is a topological property, not a metrical one. 
Another problem is that Cantor’s definition of a “perfect” series involves reference to “every point” 
of a certain description. But “no positive idea is conveyed of what all the points are: that is defini-
tion by negation, and cannot be admitted” (W8: 144). By “definition by negation,” Peirce probably 
means that Cantor defines a “perfect” series by giving a characterization of the points that should be 
excluded from the series, without giving a positive idea of what the points that are not excluded 
are.54 
Peirce’s alternative is to define continuity in terms of what he calls the properties of Kanticity 
and Aristotelicity. A series satisfies Kanticity if there exists a term between every two—a more 
general version of concatenated-ness. But this condition is not enough to define a continuum, since 
it is satisfied by e.g. the series of rational numbers, which is manifestly not continuous. Thus in or-
der to give an adequate definition of continuity we must mend the definition in terms of Kanticity: 
 
Kant’s definition expresses one simple property of a continuum; but it allows of 
gaps in the series. To mend the definition, it is only necessary to notice how these 
gaps can occur. Let us suppose, then, a linear series of points extending from a 
point, A, to a point, B, having a gap from B to a third point, C, and thence extend-
ing to a final limit, D; and let us suppose this series conforms to Kant’s definition. 
Then, of the two points, B and C, one or both must be excluded from the series; for 
                                                            
54 As Myrvold (1995: 521) points out, Peirce’s second criticism seems a bit off the mark. In §10 
of the Grundlagen, Cantor is concerned with identifying the conditions for subsets of real num-
bers and n-dimensional spaces  ℝ!  to be continuous, where he has already defined real numbers in 
terms of Cauchy sequences of rationals in the previous section. That is, Cantor has already speci-
fied what “every point” not excluded from the continuous series is. Yet, it could be argued that 
Peirce’s criticism is justified, insofar as Cantor’s definition takes for granted a background to-
pology, and therefore does not give a definition of continuity as an intrinsic property of a series. 
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otherwise, by the definition, there would be points between them. That is, if the se-
ries contains C, though it contains all the points up to B, it cannot contain B. What 
is required, therefore, is to state in non-metrical terms that if a series of points up to 
a limit is included in a continuum the limit is included. (W8: 144, 1892) 
 
The structure of this argument can be rendered thus: if there is a gap in a series S, then there is at 
least one sub-series of S which does not contain its limit (least upper bound or greatest lower 
bound). The problem with Kant’s definition of continuity is that it is consistent with the existence of 
such gaps. Therefore, in order to mend this definition, we take the contrapositive of the aforemen-
tioned conditional: “if every sub-series of S contains its limit (least upper bound or greatest lower 
bound), then series S does not have any gaps.” Peirce calls the property stated in the antecedent of 
this conditional Aristotelicity. By combining Kant’s definition with Aristotelicity, we get an ade-
quate definition of continuity. Note that Aristotelicity alone is not sufficient to define a continuum, 
since e.g. the series of integral numbers satisfies the condition although it is not continuous. 
Peirce’s definition of continuity is a generalized version of Richard Dedekind’s construction of 
the real numbers by Dedekind cuts on the series of rational numbers. By “generalized” I mean that 
it does not make reference to numbers as does that of Dedekind, although it certainly defines a 
structure isomorphic to the real number series. Peirce then goes on to argue that according to his 
definition, continuity presupposes infinitesimals—infinitesimal being understood as the “infinitieth 
place of a decimal”—for the reason that it contains the incommensurable as well as commensurable 
numbers (W8: 145). But this must be the result of a confusion. For as Matthew Moore points out in 
his headnotes for the “Law of Mind” in Philosophy of Mathematics, Aristotelicity rules out infini-
tesimals: 
 
A monotone infinite sequence of infinitesimal steps, beginning at 0, would be 
bounded above by any finite number; but it would have no least upper bound, since 
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the sum of two infinitesimals is itself infinitesimal, and there is no smallest finite 
positive number. (PM: 143) 
 
That is, since a series of infinitesimals does not contain its limit, it is ruled out by Aristotelicity. 
Another tension in Peirce’s thought during this period becomes evident in his application of the 
concept of continuity to the problem of boundary elements: 
 
Suppose a surface to be part red and part blue; so that every point on it is either red 
or blue, and, of course, no part can be both red and blue. What, then, is the color of 
the boundary line between the red and the blue? The answer is that red or blue, to 
exist at all, must be spread over a surface; and the color of the surface is the color 
of the surface in the immediate neighborhood of the point. I purposely use a vague 
form of expression. Now, as the parts of the surface in the immediate neighborhood 
of any ordinary point upon a curved boundary are half of them red and half blue, it 
follows that the boundary is half red and half blue. (W8: 145–46) 
 
There is an air of absurdity in the statement that “every point is either red or blue” yet “the bounda-
ry is half red and half blue.” I think the difficulty is this: to say that the boundary is half red and half 
blue implies a violation of the Law of Excluded Middle, the principle that for any proposition P, 
either P or not-P must be true, for here Peirce is saying that the boundary is neither red nor not-red 
(and neither blue nor not-blue), but a third middle state. Now as Peirce will make clear in his later 
writings, the Law of Excluded Middle applies to only to distinct individuals—it does not hold on a 
continuum, which is, from the standpoint of the supermultitudinous conception, no longer a collec-
tion of distinct individuals at all but a system of potential points. Indeed, an individual can be char-
acterized as that for which the Law of Excluded Middle (and the Law of Non-Contradiction) holds, 
since it is anything that is determinate in all respects. The problem here is that Peirce is speaking as 
though the boundary line were a distinct individual; and here we can see that he is still unable to 
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escape the influence of the Cantorian conception of the continuum as a collection of points. This is 
also probably the reason why he is unable to properly harness the infinitesimal concept at this stage. 
The breakthrough comes with Peirce’s discovery in 1896 of what is today known as Cantor’s 
theorem. Independently but under the influence of Cantor, Peirce discovers the diagonal argument, 
and uses it to prove that for every collection of multitude N, finite or infinite, there exists a collec-
tion of multitude 2N > N. Here it is unnecessary to go into the details of Peirce’s proof.55 Significant 
for our purposes are two facts. The first is that Peirce uses Cantor’s theorem to obtain the result that 
the infinite multitudes can be arranged in a denumerable (countably infinite) series. That is, if we 
denote the denumerable multitude (the multitude of natural numbers) as ℵ0  and 2x as exp(x), then we 
obtain the denumerable series: 
 ℵ0, exp(ℵ0), exp(exp(ℵ0)), exp(exp(exp(ℵ0))), … 
 
Let us follow Moore (2007) in calling this result—that there is a denumerable series of infinite 
multitudes, and that this series contains all of the infinite multitudes—Peirce’s Step Lemma. The 
Step Lemma assumes the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis, that for any infinite set S, there is no 
cardinal lying between the cardinality of S and the cardinality of the power set of S. Peirce tried on 
                                                            
55 As early as 1892, Peirce gives a proof of the existence of two distinct grades of infinity—the 
countable and uncountable—using a kind of diagonal argument (MS 1573: 82, 590: 16–18; 
forthcoming in W9). However, this diagonal argument relies on the notion of permutations of 
elements rather than on power set constructions as in his later diagonal proofs; and therefore it is 
unable to establish the general theorem, that for every collection of multitude N, there exists a 
collection of multitude 2N > N. Peirce’s first proof of Cantor’s theorem is in Art. 17 of “On Quan-
tity, with special reference to Collectional and Mathematical Infinity” (NEM 3: 51–52, 1896). See 
also the third of the 1898 Cambridge Conferences Lectures (RLT: 158) and “Prolegomena to an 
Apology for Pragmaticism” (CP 4.532, 1906) for examples of Peirce’s later diagonal proofs. I 
wish to express my gratitude to Dr. Matthew Moore, who offered valuable comments regarding 
the 1892 proof in personal correspondence. 
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several occasions to prove the continuum hypothesis, both in its general and special form, but was 
never satisfied with his argument. For the most part he seems to have assumed it to be true 
(Myrvold 1995: 514–15). Today we know that the continuum hypothesis is independent of (cannot 
be proved or disproved within) the standard set theory; and the bearings of this on Peirce’s concep-
tion of the continuum as a supermultitudinous collection is an open question that must be reserved 
for future research. Here I will simply point out that Peirce himself seems to have thought that his 
identification of the supermultitudinous collection with the continuum does not turn upon the truth 
of the continuum hypothesis, for he remarks at one point that the continuum hypothesis is not as 
important as the question of whether there is a multitude greater than all abnumerable (uncountable) 
multitudes: “Yet so far as I know (I am not acquainted with the work of Borel, of which I have only 
quite vaguely heard), it has never been exactly proved that there are no multitudes between two 
successive abnumerable multitudes, nor, which is more important, that there is no multitude greater 
than all the abnumerable multitudes” (CP 4.656, 1908). In any case, I will set aside the continuum 
hypothesis for now and proceed upon the assumption that Peirce’s argument is unaffected by it. 
The Step Lemma plays an important role in Peirce’s conception of continuity as a supermultitu-
dinous collection, because he defines the supermultitudinous collection as the “limit” of the series ℵ0, exp(ℵ0), exp(exp(ℵ0)), … (NEM 3.86, c.1897). Specifically, he asks us to consider the union of 
the collections of every assignable multitude (NEM 3.86, c.1897; see also RLT: 158–59, 1898). 
That is, this collection consists of the members of all the finite multitudes, together with the mem-
bers of all the possible collections of those multitudes, together with the members of all the possible 
collections of collections of those multitudes, and so on ad infinitum. This collection, the supermul-
titudinous collection, is a collection whose multitude is greater than all ℵn for finite n. The very 
conceivability of such a collection gives rise to a version of Cantor’s Paradox. Namely, if we denote 
the multitude of the supermultitudinous collection as Ω, then it follows that 2Ω = Ω, since taking the 
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power set of the supermultitudinous collection does not increase its multitude. Peirce’s reasoning is 
as follows: 
 
[The supermultitudinous collection is] the result of a denumerable succession of 
exponential operations upon the denumerable multitude. But the magnitude of the 
collection of possible ways of distributing the individuals of a collection into two 
abodes is simply the result of an exponential operation upon the magnitude of the 
collection itself. Hence the magnitude of the ways of distributing the individuals of 
a supermultitudinous collection into two abodes is obtained by adding one more to 
the collection of collection of exponential operations successively performed upon 
the denumerable multitude. But this collection of operations being denumerable, 
the addition of one operation to it does not increase its multitude. Hence, the col-
lection of possible ways of distributing the individuals of a supermultitudinous 
collection into two abodes equals that collection itself. (NEM 3.86, c.1897) 
 
Thus 2Ω = Ω, in violation of Cantor’s theorem. The fallacy in this argument has been explained by 
Myrvold (1995: 515–17). Namely, Peirce is confusing ω + 1, the order type of a sequence of ℵ0 el-
ements with one more added to the end, with 1 + ω, the order type of a sequence of ℵ0 elements 
with one more added at the beginning. It would be correct to say that 1 + ω is the same as ω, but the 
order type of the infinite sequence of exponentiations that defines the power set of the supermulti-
tudinous collection is ω + 1, not 1 + ω; and ω + 1 is not the same as ω. Nonetheless, Peirce’s basic 
point holds if we consider a collection that contains, for every collection of multitude ℵn, a collec-
tion of multitude ℵn+1  or  exp(ℵn), since such a collection would have a multitude greater than every 
possible multitude, in violation of a direct corollary of Cantor’s theorem, that there is no greatest 
multitude. 
Interestingly, Peirce does not conceive of this result as a “paradox” at all. This brings us to the 
second significant fact: Peirce qualifies the applicability of Cantor’s theorem so that it only holds 
for collections composed of distinct individuals. This qualification is justified by the fact that the 
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proof of Cantor’s theorem requires us to assign to each member of a collection a collection of ele-
ments of that collection and judge whether or not each of those members falls under the collection 
to which it is assigned, which would be impossible if those members were not determinate in regard 
to every possible collection, either as falling under it or not falling under it (this is easier to see if, 
instead of considering collections under which elements either fall under or do not fall under, we 
consider predicates which are either affirmed or denied of objects. Indeed, Peirce’s first proof of 
Cantor’s theorem in “On Quantity” is couched in terms of predicates rather than collections). 
Therefore, the fact that the supermultitudinous collection violates Cantor’s theorem is taken as 
proof that the supermultitudinous collection does not consist of distinct individuals at all—it is so 
vast a multitude that the members lose their distinct identities and are welded together in continuity 
(RLT: 159, 1898). 
Later, Peirce will explicitly reject the Cantorian continuum (the set of real numbers) as a pseu-
do-continuum, and argue that a true continuum cannot be reduced to a collection of points, however 
infinitely large (CP 6.176, 1908). Rather, the true continuum derives its essence from the mode of 
connection between its elements. The mode of connection that defines a true continuum is that of 
“immediate connection” (CP 4.642, 1908). Two elements, A and B, are said to be immediately 
connected if they are in some sense identical. But what does this mean? If they are identical, then 
how can we say that they are two elements, A and B? 
An example that Peirce gives in the third of his 1898 Cambridge Conferences Lectures to illus-
trate his supermultitudinous conception of continuity will serve to clarify this point (RLT 159–60, 
1898). Suppose we draw a point on a continuous line. We then cut the line at the point, so as to 
produce a left-hand region (L) and right-hand region (R). The original point then becomes two 
points, one at the right end of L and one at the left end of R. If we rejoin the two ends, the points 
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again become a single point.56 And we have no reason for restricting this to two points: “The end of 
a line might burst into any discrete multitude of points whatever, and they would all have been one 
point before the explosion. Points might fly off, in multitude and order like all the real irrational 
quantities from 0 to 1; and they might all have had that order of succession in the line and yet all 
have been at one point” (RLT: 160). 
Any multitude of immediately connected elements can thus be identical but potentially distinct, 
that is, they may possess an order such that if a discontinuity is imposed on the line, their difference 
becomes apparent. But before the imposition of discontinuity, the elements cannot be said to be dis-
tinct at all. They are only potential points, and the notions of identity and distinctness do not, 
properly speaking, apply to potentials; they only apply to individuals. Thus the continuum, “being a 
potential aggregate only, … does not contain any individuals at all. It only contains general condi-
tions which permit the determination of individuals” (RLT: 247, 1898). Relations do not hold be-
tween individual elements of the continuum; rather, the continuum is the relational (in this case, 
topological) structure itself, and individuality is brought about only as the result of extrinsic deter-
mination.57 
So far we have discussed three defining characteristics of the Peircean continuum: its supermul-
titudinousness, its inextensibility (the property of not being composed of distinct individuals), and 
the potentiality of its elements. One more important characteristic is what Zalamea (2012: 16–18) 
                                                            
56 This, of course, is clearly different from the situation in a Dedekind cut, where the two regions 
produced by the cut are not always mirror images of each other: namely, in the case of a Dedekind 
cut corresponding to a rational number, one of the regions has a greatest (or least) member while the 
other does not. In the Peircean cut, however, the two regions produced are always mirror images of 
each other. 
57 As Johanson (2001) points out, although Peirce’s ideas on the continuum are in conflict with 
modern point-set topology, they are in agreement with the concepts of pointless topology. Connec-
tions have also been drawn with Smooth Infinitesimal Analysis, an approach to analysis based on the 
category-theoretic ideas of F. William Lawvere; see Herron (1997: 621–23) and Havenel (2008). 
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has called its reflexivity, namely, the property of every part having a structure identical or similar to 
the whole. In other words, in the Peircean continuum every part reflects or mirrors the whole. Re-
flexivity immediately implies that the continuum cannot be composed of points, since a point is 
precisely that which does not have any parts, and as such it cannot mirror the structure of the whole, 
which is composed of parts. This is the reason why Peirce calls continuous predicates “continuous.” 
Recall from Chapter 3.2 that a continuous predicate is a predicate that can be “analyzed into parts 
all homogeneous with the whole” (SS: 72). This is precisely the property of reflexivity, one of the 
defining characteristics of the Peircean continuum. 
5. 3.  Continuity, Generality, and the Inexhaustibility of Nature 
Thus in outline is Peirce’s mathematical conception of continuity. It may be asked how this 
conception has bearings on the world outside of mathematics. Here it must be observed that for 
Peirce, generality is nothing but a rudimentary form of continuity: “corresponding to generality in 
nonrelative logic is continuity in relative logic” (L 390: 5, Letter to F. C. S. Schiller, 12 May 1905); 
“continuity is shown by the logic of relations to be nothing but a higher type of that which we know 
as generality. It is relational generality” (RLT: 258); “the doctrine of the reality of continuity is 
simply that doctrine the scholastics called realism” (MS 398: 12, 1893). Despite the crucial im-
portance that the “continuity = relational generality” equation plays in Peirce’s philosophy, it must 
be admitted that he is never sufficiently clear about the exact nature of this equation. My view is 
that the mathematical continuum is a model of the logical structure shared by all generals, in much 
the same way that a quadratic equation is a model of the time-displacement relation of a falling 
body. 
Let us first see how the supermultitudinousness, inextensibility, and potentiality of the Peircean 
continuum capture the structure of generals. Just as a continuum is a space of possible elements, so 
a general concept delimits a space of possible instantiations, instances in which it is applicable as a 
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predicate. Since for any two instantiations with similar characteristics, it is possible to conceive of a 
continuously infinite multitude of possibilities with characteristics that fall between the two, the 
multitude of possible variations can never exhaust the general concept: 
 
Take any two possible objects that might be called suns and however much alike 
they may be, any multitude whatsoever of intermediate suns are alternatively pos-
sible and therefore … these intermediate possible suns transcend all multitude. In 
short, the idea of a general involves the idea of possible variations which no multi-
tude of existent things could exhaust but would leave between any two not merely 
many possibilities, but possibilities absolutely beyond all multitude. (EP2: 183, 
1903) 
 
In Chapter 3 we saw that a general cannot be reduced to (that is, explained in terms of) its individual 
instantiations, because it has reference to every possible instance of a general type, including future 
instances that may never be actualized. Peirce’s reformulation of this irreducibility in terms of su-
permultitudinousness allows us to see a neat correspondence between continuity and generality: just 
as a continuum is something more than a mere collection of points, so a general is something more 
than a mere collection of its individual instantiations. Furthermore, just as in the case of the contin-
uum, it makes no sense to speak of the identity or distinctness of a general’s instantiations prior to 
their instantiation. They are “fused” together in the overall structure, so to speak, and it is only in 
actualization that they can be discerned as individuals: “continuity and generality are two names for 
the same absence of distinction of individuals” (CP 4.172, 1897). 
There is, however, a deeper correspondence between continuity and generality. The pragmatic 
maxim tells us that all generals can be explicated into correlations that dictate what would occur 
under conceivable circumstances. As we saw in Chapter 3.3, these correlations are Thirds, because 
their being consists in a power of establishing relations between two objects. Now reference to a 
Third cannot be prescinded from reference to a First and Second, and therefore a Third can only be 
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understood as a term of a triadic relation. And a triadic relation can always be analyzed, via hypo-
static abstraction, into a relation containing the teridentity term, 13. The teridentity term is a contin-
uous predicate—or rather it is the continuous predicate par excellence, since it is what makes all 
other continuous predicates continuous—because it is analyzable into parts absolutely homogene-
ous with the whole. Therefore generals can be explicated into correlations, which, so far as their 
pure form is concerned, are themselves continua. Furthermore, the general is a welding together of 
these correlations (again, by Thirdness) into the unity of an idea, making it a continuum of continua. 
The precise relation of these properties of the general with the property discussed above, namely its 
irreducibility to actual existents, is a topic requiring further investigation. 
Now since a pattern is either a general Form or manifestation of a general Form (Chapter 3.3), it 
follows from the identity of generality and continuity that a pattern must be a continuum or a mani-
festation of a continuum. This is only natural, considering that a continuum is a regularity among its 
parts (as implied by the property of reflexivity), and that “regularity” is simply another word for 
“pattern”: 
  
A perfect continuum belongs to the genus, of a whole all whose parts without any 
exception whatsoever conform to one general law to which same law conform 
likewise all the parts of each single part. Continuity is thus a special kind of gen-
erality, or conformity to one Idea. More specifically, it is a homogeneity, or gen-
erality among all of a certain kind of parts of one whole. Still more specifically, 
the characters which are the same in all the parts are a certain kind of relationship 
of each part to all the coordinate parts; that is, it is a regularity. (CP 7.535n6, 
1908)58 
                                                            
58 Peirce’s claim that continuity is a special kind of generality may seem to suggest that there are 
generals that are not continua. However, we should pay attention to the adjective “perfect” in 
Peirce’s definition. I think that Peirce’s definition should be understood in this way: a perfect 
continuum is a special kind of generality, while there are generals that correspond to imperfect 
continua, that is, continua with topological singularities (CP 4.642, 1908). This would in turn im-
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Thus, we can say that patternhood, generality, and continuity are three ways of describing the same 
state of affairs, namely a conformity to a law. 
With these results in place, let us return to our question of instantiation. In light of our identifica-
tion of generality and continuity, we can say that instantiation is the imposition of a discontinuity on 
a continuum. The fire here and now, for example, is a discontinuity marked upon the continuum of 
possible fires—it is at once a reaction against the will, and a “crowding out,” as Peirce puts it (NEM 
4.135, 1897), of other possibilities from so reacting: “individual existence depends upon the cir-
cumstance that not all that is possible is possible in conjunction” (NEM 4.135, 1897), “a this is 
something positive and insistent, but it only is so by pushing other things aside and so making a 
place for itself in the universe” (NEM 4.136, 1897). 
Recall that to explain a this is to subsume it under a general concept, and thereby treat it as a 
node within a network of relations. But in order for us to be able to turn our attention towards the 
this and make it an object of inquiry, it must be intelligible, something open to cognizance. And in 
order for the this to be intelligible, there must already be in it an element of generality or continuity, 
some kind of regularity which the mind can seize upon, whether it be a regularity in space, time, or 
some other dimension: “Generality is, indeed, an indispensable ingredient of reality; for mere indi-
vidual existence or actuality without any regularity whatever is a nullity. Chaos is pure nothing” 
(EP2: 343, 1905). This brings us back to the example of the “snow” noise mentioned in the Intro-
duction. There, I noted that in order for the noise to be perceptible, it must display some kind of 
regularity; although the noise itself is not a regularity, it can only be discerned upon the backdrop of 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
ply that generals have a topological structure, which is indeed what Peirce seems to have had in 
mind since as early as 1898: “If metaphysics is really to be made a definite science, and not 
child’s play, the first inquiry concerning any general must be, first, what its dimensionality is, and 
second, what those intermediate Listing numbers are ...” (RLT: 264, 1898). 
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a regularity or series of regularities. In other words, exhibiting patternhood is a necessary condition 
for the very possibility of cognition. The reason for this becomes clear when we look at patternhood 
from the standpoint of continuity. 
As I have been emphasizing, an individual must contain in it an element of generality in order 
for it to be cognizable. Now an individual can have an “element of generality” in it only if it is a 
determination of a higher dimensional continuity. A continuum is an embodiment of a law that 
governs the manner of its determinations, and as such it is the background upon which alone indi-
viduals can come into being. Peirce’s analogy of the blackboard in the last of his 1898 Cambridge 
Conferences Lectures illustrates this point vividly: 
 
Let the clean blackboard be a sort of diagram of the original vague potentiality … I 
draw a chalk line on the board. This discontinuity is one of those brute acts by 
which alone the original vagueness could have made a step towards definiteness. 
There is a certain element of continuity in this line. Where did this continuity come 
from? It is nothing but the original continuity of the blackboard which makes eve-
rything upon it continuous. (RLT: 261–62) 
 
In much the same way, the individuals that we experience in this world can themselves be un-
derstood as continua marked upon continua of a higher dimensionality—they are topological sin-
gularities within the higher dimensional continua. Note also that Peirce says that this discontinuity 
is a brute act that determines the original potentiality. It is “brute” because it has no reason—there 
is no way of explaining why it is this thing in front of me that was actualized rather than some other 
possibility. It is through such brute action and reaction with the environment—of which resistance 
against my will can be understood as a special case—that generals become instantiated here and 
now. 
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We can thus see how Peirce’s theory of the continuum, along with the theory of the categories, 
affords us with a way of understanding the distinction between physical and mathematical structure 
in a non-question-begging way, by explaining the phenomenon of instantiation as the result of the 
operation of universal principles. Furthermore, Peirce’s theory of the continuum allows us to see a 
deep connection between patternhood and generality that I have been gesturing towards throughout 
this thesis, namely, that the impossibility of the absolute individual is equivalent to the central thesis 
of OSR, that there is no bit map representation of the world. For if there were a bit map representa-
tion, then the world would consist of discrete ultimate units, to each of which is assignable a “bit” 
(or any other unit) of information. These ultimate units must be absolute individuals, for if they 
were indeterminate in some respect, then there would be no way of assigning a unit of information 
in regard to that respect. Against this it may be objected that the unit of information used in the bit 
map need not be discrete but instead could be continuous, and that a continuously varying sign can 
be used to completely capture an indeterminate dimension. The reply is that whatever is indetermi-
nate in some dimension must be supermultitudinous in its possible variations along that dimension, 
and such a multitude of possible variations cannot be captured by a string of signs, however infi-
nitely long. Thus, if there were a bit map representation of the world, then the world must be com-
posed of discrete units. Conversely, if the world consisted of discrete units, then there would (in 
principle) be a bit map representation of it. Thus, to say that the world is continuous and to say that 
it is “real patterns all the way down” are two ways of expressing the same fact, that Nature is inex-
haustible.  
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 Concluding Remarks  
 
We have seen how Peirce’s philosophy—his pragmatism, theory of categories, Scholastic real-
ism, and theory of the continuum—not only diagnoses the root of the problems faced by OSR, but 
also provides us with a remedy. Furthermore, we have seen how Peirce’s philosophy leads us to a 
worldview very similar to that of OSR, via a line of reasoning that is completely different from 
those standardly used to argue for OSR, condensable into a simple syllogism: exhibiting pattern-
hood is a necessary condition for the possibility of cognition; cognizability is a necessary condition 
for something to be real; therefore, anything that is real must exhibit some kind of patternhood or, 
which amounts to the same thing, anything that is real must be a pattern. The line of reasoning is 
different in part because, as we saw in Chapter 4, the metaphysics of OSR is based on physics, 
whereas the metaphysics of Peirce is based on mathematics and logic. To recapitulate: in Peirce’s 
late classification of the sciences, metaphysics is based only upon mathematics, phenomenology, 
and the normative sciences (which includes logic). The special sciences, including physics, only 
come after metaphysics. For the proponents of OSR on the other hand, metaphysics comes after the 
special sciences. 
The question I want to pose is this: is Peirce’s classification of the sciences still valid today, in 
light of the revolutions we have seen in physics since his time? The subject matter, and to some ex-
tent even the methods of research have changed so drastically that it is hardly the same discipline. 
Peirce viewed physics as the study of matter, and (being an idealist) held that matter is “mind 
hide-bound with habits” (W8: 155, 1892). Recall that for Peirce, there is a universal tendency for 
thought to drift towards a state of fixity—he called this the principle of habit-taking (e.g. W6: 208, 
1887–1888; W8: 179, 1892). My view is that physics is no longer the study of effete mind, but ra-
ther the study of a realm in which the spontaneity of mind has not yet been subdued by the principle 
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of habit-taking. May it not be that we have probed so deep into reality that we are beginning to see 
thought at work in its utmost purity? And by “thought” I do not mean thought in the head of this or 
that human—that would be nominalistic—but the thought of Nature itself. If this is so, and if logic 
is understood as the study of the formal laws of thought, then what becomes of the distinction be-
tween logic and physics? Is it not this distinction that is blurred rather than the distinction between 
mathematics and physics? What implications does this have for the proper methodology of meta-
physics? My hope is that an inquiry into such questions will bring about a mutual fecundation be-
tween the different stripes of OSRists on the one hand and the Peirceans on the other.  
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